Sovereignty, exchange rate and the Euro crisis

This paper presents an interpretation of the European crisis based on the balance of payments imbalances within the Eurozone and highlighting the role of the “internal” real exchange rates as a primary cause of the crisis. It explores the structural contradictions that turn the Euro into a “foreign currency” for each individual Eurozone country. These contradictions imply the inability of national central banks to monetize the public and private debts, which makes the Euro crisis a sovereign crisis similar to those typical of emerging countries, but whose solution presents additional obstacles.

Addressing important econometric issues on how to construct theoretical based exchange rate misalignment estimates

Exchange rate misalignment assessment is becoming more relevant in recent period particularly after the nancial crisis of 2008. There are di erent methodologies to address real exchange rate misalignment. The real exchange misalignment is de ned as the di erence between actual real e ective exchange rate and some equilibrium norm. Di erent norms are available in the literature. Our paper aims to contribute to the literature by showing that Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate approach (BEER) adopted by Clark & MacDonald (1999), Ubide et al. (1999), Faruqee (1994), Aguirre & Calderón (2005) and Kubota (2009) among others can be improved in two following manners. The rst one consists of jointly modeling real e ective exchange rate, trade balance and net foreign asset position. The second one has to do with the possibility of explicitly testing over identifying restrictions implied by economic theory and allowing the analyst to show that these restrictions are not falsi ed by the empirical evidence. If the economic based identifying restrictions are not rejected it is also possible to decompose exchange rate misalignment in two pieces, one related to long run fundamentals of exchange rate and the other related to external account imbalances. We also discuss some necessary conditions that should be satis ed for disrcarding trade balance information without compromising exchange rate misalignment assessment. A statistical (but not a theoretical) identifying strategy for calculating exchange rate misalignment is also discussed. We illustrate the advantages of our approach by analyzing the Brazilian case. We show that the traditional approach disregard important information of external accounts equilibrium for this economy.

Why the ‘Rest’ doesn’t need foreign finance

The Rest will be able to catch up and grow faster than the West only if it goes against a “received truth”, namely that capital-rich countries should transfer their capital to capital-poor countries. This intuitive truth is the mantra that the West cites to justify its occupation of the markets of developing countries with its finance and its multinationals. Classical Developmentalism successfully criticized the unequal exchange involved in trade liberalization, but it didn’t succeed in criticizing foreign finance. This task has been recently achieved by New Developmentalism and its developmental macroeconomics, which shows that countries will invest and grow more if they don’t run current account deficits, even when these deficits are financed by foreign direct investment

Foreign support, internal political disputes and mass killings

This paper studies the incentives underlying the relations between foreign countries and rival domestic groups. It models the interaction in a infinitely-repeated game between these three players. The domestic groups bargain for a split of the domestic surplus and may engage in violent dispute for power and in unilateral mass killing processes. The foreign country may choose to support one of these groups in exchange for monetary transfers. The paper characterizes the parametric set in which strategies leading to no violent disputes nor mass killings are Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibra in the presence of foreign support, but not in its absence.