What happens after the Central Bank of Brazil increases the target interbank rate by 1%?

In this paper I use Taylor's (2001) model and Vector Auto Regressions to shed some light on the evolution of some key macroeconomic variables after the Central Bank of Brazil, through the COPOM, increases the target interest rate by 1%. From a quantitative perspective, the best estimate from the empírical analysis, obtained with a 1994 : 2 - 2004 : 2 subsample of the data, is that GDP goes through an accumulated decline, over the next four years, around 0.08%. Innovations to interest rates explain around 9.2% of the forecast erro r of GDP.

The forward and the equity premium puzzles: two symptoms of the same illness?

The Forward Premium Puzzle (FPP) is how the empirical observation of a negative relation between future changes in the spot rates and the forward premium is known. Modeling this forward bias as a risk premium and under weak assumptions on the behavior of the pricing kernel, we characterize the potential bias that is present in the regressions where the FPP is observed and we identify the necessary and sufficient conditions that the pricing kernel has to satisfy to account for the predictability of exchange rate movements. Next, we estimate the pricing kernel applying two methods: i) one, du.e to Araújo et aI. (2005), that exploits the fact that the pricing kernel is a serial correlation common feature of asset prices, and ii) a traditional principal component analysis used as a procedure 1;0 generate a statistical factor modeI. Then, using on the sample and out of the sample exercises, we are able to show that the same kernel that explains the Equity Premi um Puzzle (EPP) accounts for the FPP in all our data sets. This suggests that the quest for an economic mo deI that generates a pricing kernel which solves the EPP may double its prize by simultaneously accounting for the FPP.

Um estudo sobre os impactos da surpresa dos indicadores macroeconômicos de atividade e inflação no mercado futuro brasileiro de juros

As diretrizes de política monetária são definidas com base em resultados dos indicadores macroeconômicos divulgados ao mercado periodicamente. Os agentes deste mercado respondem rapidamente às alterações de cenário, com o objetivo de obter lucro ou evitar perdas financeiras expressivas. Com este motivacional, a proposta deste trabalho é avaliar como reage o mercado futuro de juros diante da divulgação de surpresas em determinados indicadores macroeconômicos, propondo um indicador de surpresa agregado para prever os impactos causados. Através dos dados extraídos da Bloomberg e da BM&F Bovespa, foi construída uma base de dados simplificada pela adoção de premissas para mensuração do impacto das surpresas divulgadas no preço do DI Futuro. A padronização dos parâmetros, a realização dos testes de média e as regressões otimizadas pelo método OLS possibilitaram ponderar os indicadores econômicos de acordo com a oscilação que os mesmos causam a este mercado. Por fim, o teste de comparação mostrou que o indicador de surpresa proposto foi mais eficiente nas previsões da reação do mercado do que um indicador que pondere de forma igualitária todos os indicadores macroeconômicos.

Capital flows and monetary control under a domestic currency substitution regime: the recent Brazilian experience

The 90s have witnessed a resumption in capital flows to Latin America. due to the conjugation of low interest rates in the US and economic reforms in most LA countries. In Brazil. however. substantial capital flows have becn induced by the extremely high domestic interest rates practiced by the Central Bank as a measure of last reson given the absence of successful stabilization policies. These very high interest rates were needed to prevent capital flight in a context of a surprisingly stable inflation rate above 20% a month. and keep interest bearing govemment securities preferable to foreign assets as money substitutes. We carefully describe how this domestic currency substitution regime (interest bearing govemment securities are substituted for MIas cash holdings) requires the Central Bank to renounce aoy control over monerary aggregates. In this domestic currency substitution regime. hyperinflation is the most likely outcome of an isolated (i.e.. without fiscal adjusanents) attempt by the Brazilian Central Bank to control money.

Does monetary policy stabilize the exchange rate following a currency crisis?

This paper provides evidence on the relationship between rnonetary policy and the exchange rate in the aftermath of currency crises. It ana1yzes a large data set of currency crises in 80 countries in the period 1980 to 1998. The rnain question addressed is: can rnonetary policy significantly alter the probability of reversing the post-crisis undervaluation through nominal appreciation rather than higher int1ation? We find that tight rnonetary policy facilitates the reversal of currency undervaluation through nominal appreciation rather than inflation. When the econorny is also facing a banking crisis, depending on the specification, tight rnonetary policy rnay not have the same effect.

Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

Trade liberalization and the evolution of skill earnings differentials in Brazil

From 1988 to 1995, when trade liberalization was implemented in Brazil, relative earnings of skilled workers decreased. In this paper, we investigate the role of trade liberalization in explaining these relative earnings movements, by checking all the steps predicted by the HeckscherOhlin- style trade transmission mechanism. We find that: i) employment shifted from skilled to unskilled intensive sectors, and each Sector increased its relative share of skilled labor; ii) relative prices fell in skill intensive sectors; iii) tariff changes across sectors were not related to skill intensities, but the pass-through from tariffs to prices was stronger in skill intensive sectors; iv) the decline in skilled eamings differentials mandated by the price variation predicted by trade is very elose to the observed one. The results are compatible with trade liberalization, accounting for the observed rei ative eamings changes in Brazil.

Toward a theory of international currency : a step further

We generalize the two-country, two-currency model of Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui to resolve two "shortcomings" in their approach. First, we endogenize prices and excb.ange rates. Second, we introduce monetary policy. We then use the model to address the following new questions: How does the fact that a currency circulates intemationally affect its purcb.asing power? Where does an intemational currency purcb.ase more? What are the effects on seignorage and welfare when a currency becomes intemational? How is policy affected by concems of currency substitution? How are national monetary policies connected, and what is the scope for international cooperation?

Political budget cycles in a fiscal federation : the effect of partisan voluntary transfers

This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.

Electoral control in the presence of gridlocks

This article presents a game-theoretic partisan model of voting and political bargaining. In a two-period setup, voters ¯rst elect an executive incumbent and the legislators from a pool of candidates belonging to di®erent parties. Once elected, the executive and the legislature bargain over a budget. Party origin and a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world, in°uence the bargaining cost, such that political gridlocks may occur. At the end of the ¯rst period voters observe the outcome of bargaining but do not observe the true estate of the world, and decide whether or not to reelect the same parties for the Executive and the Legislature. The model con¯rms the very recent literature by showing that voters tend to have more °exible reelection criteria when they believe the true state of the world is likely to be unfavorable. On the other hand, when voters believe the true state of the world is likely to be favorable, they become more demanding in order to reelect the incumbents. In particular, there will be government shutdown with positive probability in equilibrium. Gridlocks occur due to the imperfect information of voters and they constitute indeed an information revelation mechanism that improves electoral control in the second period.

Taylor rule with hidden states

This work evaluates empirically the Taylor rule for the US and Brazil using Kalman Filter and Markov-Switching Regimes. We show that the parameters of the rule change significantly with variations in both output and output gap proxies, considering hidden variables and states. Such conclusions call naturally for robust optimal monetary rules. We also show that Brazil and US have very contrasting parameters, first because Brazil presents time-varying intercept, second because of the rigidity in the parameters of the Brazilian Taylor rule, regardless the output gap proxy, data frequency or sample data. Finally, we show that the long-run inflation parameter of the US Taylor rule is less than one in many periods, contrasting strongly with Orphanides (forthcoming) and Clarida, Gal´i and Gertler (2000), and the same happens with Brazilian monthly data.