Modeling and predicting the CBOE market volatility index

This paper performs a thorough statistical examination of the time-series properties of the daily market volatility index (VIX) from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The motivation lies not only on the widespread consensus that the VIX is a barometer of the overall market sentiment as to what concerns investors' risk appetite, but also on the fact that there are many trading strategies that rely on the VIX index for hedging and speculative purposes. Preliminary analysis suggests that the VIX index displays long-range dependence. This is well in line with the strong empirical evidence in the literature supporting long memory in both options-implied and realized variances. We thus resort to both parametric and semiparametric heterogeneous autoregressive (HAR) processes for modeling and forecasting purposes. Our main ndings are as follows. First, we con rm the evidence in the literature that there is a negative relationship between the VIX index and the S&P 500 index return as well as a positive contemporaneous link with the volume of the S&P 500 index. Second, the term spread has a slightly negative long-run impact in the VIX index, when possible multicollinearity and endogeneity are controlled for. Finally, we cannot reject the linearity of the above relationships, neither in sample nor out of sample. As for the latter, we actually show that it is pretty hard to beat the pure HAR process because of the very persistent nature of the VIX index.

Especulative (sic) attack on exchange rate target zone regime : the uncertainty case

We present a continuous time target zone model of speculative attacks. Contrary to most of the literature that considers the certainty case, i.e., agents know for sure the Central Bank behavior in the future, we build uncertainty into the madel in two different ways. First, we consider the case in whicb the leveI of reserves at which the central bank lets the regime collapse is uncertain. Alternatively, we ana1ize the case in which, with some probability, the government may cbange its policy reducing the initially positive trend in domestic credito In both cases, contrary to the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, speculators face a cost of launching a tentative attack that may not succeed. Such cost induces a delay and may even prevent its occurrence. At the time of the tentative attack, the exchange rate moves either discretely up, if the attack succeeds, or down, if it fails. The remlts are consistent with the fact that, typically, an attack involves substantial profits and losses for the speculators. In particular, if agents believed that the government will control fiscal imbalances in the future, or alternatively, if they believe the trend in domestic credit to be temporary, the attack is postponed even in the presence of a signal of an imminent collapse. Finally, we aIso show that the timing of a speculative attack increases with the width of the target zone.

Dynamic hedging with stocastic differential utility

In this paper we study the dynamic hedging problem using three different utility specifications: stochastic differential utility, terminal wealth utility, and we propose a particular utility transformation connecting both previous approaches. In all cases, we assume Markovian prices. Stochastic differential utility, SDU, impacts the pure hedging demand ambiguously, but decreases the pure speculative demand, because risk aversion increases. We also show that consumption decision is, in some sense, independent of hedging decision. With terminal wealth utility, we derive a general and compact hedging formula, which nests as special all cases studied in Duffie and Jackson (1990). We then show how to obtain their formulas. With the third approach we find a compact formula for hedging, which makes the second-type utility framework a particular case, and show that the pure hedging demand is not impacted by this specification. In addition, with CRRA- and CARA-type utilities, the risk aversion increases and, consequently the pure speculative demand decreases. If futures price are martingales, then the transformation plays no role in determining the hedging allocation. We also derive the relevant Bellman equation for each case, using semigroup techniques.

Buy-or-sell auctions

This paper develops a game theoretic model of a "Buy-or-Sell" auction. Participants have to submit both a bid and an offer price for up to one of the many units of the good being auctioned. The bid-ask spread is set in advance by the auctioneer. Such an auction was used by the Central Bank of Brazil to intervene in the foreign exchange market during the exchange rate crawling-peg regime (1995-1999). I investigate whether such mechanism is more effective than standard intervention auctions to prevent speculative attacks in the context of managed exchange rate regimes.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.