The development of the private equity industry since the 2008 financial crisis

The private equity industry was experiencing a phenomenal boom at the turn of the century but collapsed abruptly in 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis. Considered one of the worst crises since the Great Depression of the 1930s, it had sent ripples around the world threatening the collapse of financial institutions and provoking a liquidity crunch followed by a huge downturn in economic activity and recession. Furthermore, the physiognomy of the financial landscape had considerably altered with banks retracting from the lending space, accompanied by a hardening of financial regulation that sought to better contain systemic risk. Given the new set of changes and challenges that had arisen from this period of financial turmoil, private equity found itself having to question current practices and methods of operation in order to adjust to the harsh realities of a new post-apocalyptic world. Consequently, this paper goes on to explore how the private equity business, management and operation model has evolved since the credit crunch with a specific focus on mature markets such as the United States and Europe. More specifically, this paper will aim to gather insights on the development of the industry since the crisis in Western Europe through a case study approach using as a base interviews with professionals working in the industry and those external to the sector but who have/have had considerable interaction with PE players from 2007 to the present.

Processos digitais nos Tribunais de Contas

O trabalho pretende investigar, por meio da realização de uma pesquisa nacional, como se dá a utilização de processos administrativos eletrônicos nos Tribunais de Contas (TCs) brasileiros. Para tanto, são apresentados o atual cenário institucional em que estão inseridos os TCs e as oportunidades de melhorias em seus métodos de trabalho. Em seguida, são elencadas as orientações vigentes para a utilização do processo eletrônico. Os resultados da pesquisa demonstram que a maioria dos Tribunais de Contas respondentes já utiliza o processo eletrônico, havendo um boom de implantação nos últimos cinco anos. Destaca-se como ponto positivo o fato de que todos os TCs que ainda não adotaram o processo eletrônico terem afirmado que possuem planejamento em curso para sua implantação em no máximo dois anos. Por fim, com o intuito de se obter uma abordagem com caráter predominantemente qualitativo, são apresentados aspectos relevantes que permearam a implantação do processo eletrônico no TCE/SP.

Balance of payments dominance: its implications for macroeconomic policy

This paper defines “balance of payments dominance” as a macroeconomic regime in which the short-term macroeconomic dynamics is essentially determined by external shocks, positive or negative. It argues that this is the predominant regime in emerging and developing countries. Trade shocks play an important role but the major procyclical shocks are associated with boom-bust cycles in external financing. Policy challenges are associated not only with the management of such shocks but also with the need to enhance the space for countercyclical macroeconomic policies, as boom-bust cycles tend to pressure macroeconomic policies to behave in a procyclical way. Under these conditions, the best bet is to design policies to reduce external vulnerabilities through a mix of administered exchange rate policies, very active foreign exchange reserve management, reduced reliance on external borrowing, and macroprudential regulations, including those directly affecting capital flows. Countercyclical fiscal policy can also play a role but face strong economic and political economy challenges.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Balance of payments dominance : its implocations for macroeconomic policy

This paper defines “balance of payments dominance” as a macroeconomic regime in which the short-term macroeconomic dynamics is essentially determined by external shocks, positive or negative. It argues that this is the predominant regime in emerging and developing countries. Trade shocks play an important role but the major procyclical shocks are associated with boom-bust cycles in external financing. Policy challenges are associated not only with the management of such shocks but also with the need to enhance the space for countercyclical macroeconomic policies, as boom-bust cycles tend to pressure macroeconomic policies to behave in a procyclical way. Under these conditions, the best bet is to design policies to reduce external vulnerabilities through a mix of administered exchange rate flexibility, very active foreign exchange reserve management, reduced reliance on external borrowing, and macroprudential regulations, including those directly affecting capital flows. Countercyclical fiscal policy can also play a role but face strong economic and political economy challenges.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.