Medidas de risco extraídas de opções sobre petróleo

Bali, Cakici e Chabi-Yo (2011) introduziram uma nova medida de risco, englobando as medidas de risco de Aumann e Serrano (2008) e Foster e Hart (2009). Trata-se de um modelo de medida de risco implícito de opções baseado na distribuição neutra ao risco dos retornos de ativos financeiros. Este trabalho se propõe a calcular a medida de risco de Bali, Cakici e Chabi-Yo (2011) com base nas opções de petróleo, a commodity mais importante da economia mundial. Como os preços das opções incorporam a expectativa do mercado, a medida de risco calculada é considerada forward-looking. Desta forma, esse trabalho também analisa a significância dessa medida em prever a atividade econômica futura. Os resultados indicaram poder preditivo em relação ao índice VIX, o qual representa a incerteza do mercado financeiro, e ao índice CFNAI, indicador da atividade econômica norte-americana.

Are returns on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), FDI determinants?

Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) acquired an important role in the development process of the global economy. FDI inward stock was equivalent to an average of 32% of GDP for OECD countries in 2013. However, FDI affects a country’s Balance of Payments (BoP) in two ways: FDI flows are recorded in the BoP financial account while returns on FDI affect the BoP current account. Therefore, part of the positive contribution of inward FDI to a country on its financial account could be potentially offset by a negative contribution of FDI returns on the current account. The intent of this work is to complement the research on FDI determinants by introducing FDI returns as a variable in a gravity model where bilateral FDI outflows are the dependent variable. Moreover, using outward FDI flows as the dependent variable, the work allows looking at the behavior of Multinational Corporations (MNC) investing abroad. The results show that MNCs repatriate returns generating from the investments they make abroad. This is particularly true when high-income countries are involved: MNCs from high-income countries repatriate returns to their home countries from FDI made anywhere, while MNCs from middle-income countries repatriate returns from FDI in high-income countries. Repatriated returns are a relevant variable determining the value of FDI that a country makes in another country. The information on FDI returns is starting to become available to the public. This allows MNCs to sharpen their investment location decision models and national IPAs to better assess the two-fold BoP effects of promoting FDI.

The political economy of global economic disgovernance

A Desgovernança Econômica Global, Mais do que a Governança Caracteriza Hoje a Economia Mundial. Dois Fatos Substanciam Essa Afirmativa: a Crise Recorrente do Balanço de Pagamentos nos Países em Desenvolvimento, e o Enorme Déficit em Conta Corrente dos Estados Unidos. as Crises nos Mercados Emergentes são Essencialmente Resultantes da Estratégia que o Norte Propõe para o Sul: a Estratégia de Crescimento com Poupança Externa. Dado o Fato de que a Entrada de Capital Aumenta a Taxa de Cambio, e que os Paises não Reconheceram as Principais Oportunidades de Investimento nos Anos 1990, Tal Estratégia Levou não ao Aumento das Taxas de Acumulação de Capital e ao Crescimento, Mas ao Aumento do Déficit em Conta Corrente e À Crise do Balanço de Pagamento (Financeiro). por Outro Lado, o Déficit em Conta Corrente dos Estados Unidos é um Problema Sério. Aquele Já é um País Devedor, Mas os Ajustes Continuam a ser Adiados. a Probabilidade de um Soft Landing (Desfecho Satisfatório) é Pequena. as Duas Fontes de Instabilidade Estão Relacionadas Aos Déficits em Conta Corrente e À Moeda Sobrevalorizada. a Política Econômica por Trás tem um Nome: Taxa de Câmbio Populista, uma das Duas Formas de Populismo Econômico (A Outra é o Populismo Fiscal). Isto não é Surpreendente em Países em Desenvolvimento, Mas Pode ser em um País Desenvolvido, como os Estados Unidos. Ainda Assim não é Surpreendente Quando se Considera a Recessão Política e Social que a Sociedade Americana Está Vivendo Desde o Fim da Segunda Guerra

The Free Trade Area of the Americas : positive outcomes for Brazil and the global community

This document discusses Brazil and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Since the FTAA is only a proposed agreement and trade apparatus at the moment, NAFTA is used as a working model and its influence on and benefit for Mexico and that country’s economy.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.