On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century and beyond

The main objective of this paper is to propose a novel setup that allows estimating separately the welfare costs of the uncertainty stemming from business-cycle uctuations and from economic-growth variation, when the two types of shocks associated with them (respectively,transitory and permanent shocks) hit consumption simultaneously. Separating these welfare costs requires dealing with degenerate bivariate distributions. Levis Continuity Theorem and the Disintegration Theorem allow us to adequately de ne the one-dimensional limiting marginal distributions. Under Normality, we show that the parameters of the original marginal distributions are not afected, providing the means for calculating separately the welfare costs of business-cycle uctuations and of economic-growth variation. Our empirical results show that, if we consider only transitory shocks, the welfare cost of business cycles is much smaller than previously thought. Indeed, we found it to be negative - -0:03% of per-capita consumption! On the other hand, we found that the welfare cost of economic-growth variation is relatively large. Our estimate for reasonable preference-parameter values shows that it is 0:71% of consumption US$ 208:98 per person, per year.

Bailey's measure of the welfare costs of infiation as a general-equilibrium measure

Lucas (2000) has ShO\nl t hat Baile,\"'s formula for t hc \\'elfare costs of inflatioIl caIl bc rcgardpd as an approximation to t hc gcneral-equilibriuIll IllCaSllH'S \\"hich emerge from thc Sidrauski anrl the shopping-time models, In this paper \\'c shm\' that Baile~"s mcaSllrc can bc cxactly obtairlf'd in tllf' Siclrauski geIleral-equilibri1lIn framp\\'ork under the assUIllption of quasilinpar prefpreIlC'cs, The rpslllt. based on ",heter or not \\'Palt h pffpcts are incorporatccl into t hp analysis, is also helpful in darif\'ing \\'hy Lucas' Illeasurp clerin'd from the Siclrauski model turns 01lt to be aIl upper bOllIlcl to Bailp~"s, T,,'o eXaInplcs arp used to illustratc t he main C'ondusions,

Avoiding some costs of inflation and crawling toward hyperinflation : the case of the Brazilian domestic currency substitute

The pattem of a classical hyperinflation is an acute acceleration of the inflation levei accompanied by rapid substitution away from domestic currency. Brazil, however, has becn experiencing inflation leveis well above 1,000% a year since 1988 without entering the classical hyperinflation path. Two elements play key roles in differcntiating the Brazilian case from other hyperinflationary experiences: indexation and the provision of a reliable domestic currency substitute, Le., the provision of liquidity to interest-bearing assets. This paper claims that the existence of this domestic currency substitute is lhe main source of both lhe inability of the Brazilian central bank to fight inflation and of the unwillingness of Brazilians to face the costs of such a fight. The provision of the domestic currency substitute through the banking sector is modeled, and the main macroeconomic consequences of this monetary regime are derived. Those are: the lack of a nominal anchor for the price system due to the passive monetary policy; the endogeneity of seignorage unlikc traditional models of hyperinflation; and lhe ineffectiveness of very high real interest rates.

WeIfare costs of inflation the case for interest-bearing money and empiricaI Estimates for Brazil

We provide in this paper a closed fonn for the Welfare Cost of Inflation which we prove to be closer than Bailey's expression to the correct solution of the corresponding non-separable differential equation. Next, we extend this approach to an economy with interest-bearing money, once again presenting a better appoximation than the one given by Bailey's approach. Finally, empirical estimates for Brazil are presented.

A restatement of the welafare costs of inflation. The wast of scarce resources in the manufacturing , banking and household sectors

Lucas (2000) estimates that the US welfare costs of inflation are around 1% of GDP. This measurement is consistent with a speci…c distorting channel in terms of the Bailey triangle under the demand for monetary base schedule (outside money): the displacement of resources from the production of consumption goods to the household transaction time à la Baumol. Here, we consider also several new types of distortions in the manufacturing and banking industries. Our new evidences show that both banks and firms demand special occupational employments to avoid the inflation tax. We de…ne the concept of ”the foat labor”: The occupational employments that are aflected by the in‡ation rates. More administrative workers are hired relatively to the bluecollar workers for producing consumption goods. This new phenomenon makes the manufacturing industry more roundabout. To take into account this new stylized fact and others, we redo at same time both ”The model 5: A Banking Sector -2” formulated by Lucas (1993) and ”The Competitive Banking System” proposed by Yoshino (1993). This modelling allows us to characterize better the new types of misallocations. We …nd that the maximum value of the resources wasted by the US economy happened in the years 1980-81, after the 2nd oil shock. In these years, we estimate the excess resources that are allocated for every speci…c distorting channel: i) The US commercial banks spent additional resources of around 2% of GDP; ii) For the purpose of the firm foating time were used between 2.4% and 4.1% of GDP); and iii) For the household transaction time were allocated between 3.1% and 4.5 % of GDP. The Bailey triangle under the demand for the monetary base schedule represented around 1% of GDP, which is consistent with Lucas (2000). We estimate that the US total welfare costs of in‡ation were around 10% of GDP in terms of the consumption goods foregone. The big di¤erence between our results and Lucas (2000) are mainly due to the Harberger triangle in the market for loans (inside money) which makes part of the household transaction time, of the …rm ‡oat labor and of the distortion in the banking industry. This triangle arises due to the widening interest rates spread in the presence of a distorting inflation tax and under a fractionally reserve system. The Harberger triangle can represent 80% of the total welfare costs of inflation while the remaining percentage is split almost equally between the Bailey triangle and the resources used for the bank services. Finally, we formulate several theorems in terms of the optimal nonneutral monetary policy so as to compare with the classical monetary theory.

Formation of social capital in Eastern Europe : explaining the gap vis-à-vis developed countries

Recent Eurobarometer survey data are used to document and explain the leveI of social capital in thirteen new members and fifteen current members of the European Union. Social capital in Eastern Europe - measured by participation in clubs and organization, intensity of networks or altruistic behavior - lags behind that in developed countries. The differences in individual-leveI determinants cannot fully account for the gap at the aggregate leveI. Once we also include aggregate measures of economic development and quality of institutions, the gap disappears. This implies that the EU enlargement will contribute to a convergence in social capital, assuming that it contributes to the economic and institutional development of Eastern European countries. A necessary condition is that both, formal and informal institutions and their interaction should be regarded in this process.

Factors influencing consumer decision in crowdfunding

Crowdfunding é um método recente e emergente de captar dinheiro para desenvolvimento de projetos (tanto orientados a lucro ou não) sem a intermediação tradicional de instituições financeiras, liberando empreendedores de custos, regulações e burocracia associada a essa prática. Além disso, também é um método de pré-testar novos produtos com um público selecionado e entusiasmado. O objetivo dessa dissertação é entender que fatores estão influenciando a decisão do consumidor de investir em projetos. A literatura contribui com: (1) fatores intrínsecos, como desejo de patronagem; (2) fatores extrínsecos, como a apresentação do projeto; e (3) pressão social. Há ainda fatores associados com o nível atual de captação e número de investidores, assim como tipo de projeto envolvido, sendo ele de caridade ou não. Além disso, atitudes também possuem um papel em afetar a decisão de compra. Para responder a pergunta de pesquisa, uma metodologia de duas fases foi usada: uma entrevista de profundidade para capturar intenção de investir e motivação, de forma a construir um processo de decisão que englobasse todas as possibilidades descritas pela literatura. Após essa pesquisa qualitativa, uma pesquisa quantitativa foi feita para validar as informações coletadas pela fase anterior e coletar dados adicionais para gerar uma associação entre intenção de investir e comportamento. Dentre as informações geradas pela fase qualitativa, temos o fato que a maioria dos investidores tiveram como principal motivação a compra do produto sendo oferecido como se eles estivessem participando de uma pré-venda. Entretanto, essa não foi a principal razão para o investidor de caridade. Além disso, os respondentes que pré-compraram os produtos o fizeram para única razão que esses produtos satisfizeram desejos que tinham. Esses desejos variavam, sendo desde saudade de jogos antigos como resolver um problema de organização da carteira. Outra característica da pré-compra foi que eles não investiam valores simbólicos, pela razão que se o fizessem não receberiam o produto em troca. Recompensas tiveram um grande papel em atrair os respondentes para investimento em valores maiores que consideravam anteriormente. Também é verdade para o investidor em caridade, que também doou mais. A fase quantitativa confirmou as informações acima e gerou informação extra sobre as categorias de produto. Projetos de caridade e arte concentraram a maioria dos respondentes que disseram que a principal razão para investir foi basicamente ajudar a desenvolver o projeto sem demandar um produto em retorno. Entretanto, outros projetos como Música também apresentaram altos números de comportamento caridoso, possivelmente por causa do envolvimento emocional com o artista. Outras categorias apresentaram um mix de razões para investir ou enviesado a comprar o produto apenas, o que pode ser explicado pelo efeito de recompensas e pelo fato que essas categorias estão simplesmente pré-vendendo produtos. Essa pesquisa também confirmou as principais fontes usadas para conhecer mais sobre os projetos: recomendação pessoal e blogs e fóruns. Outro resultado dessa fase foi o desenvolvimento de fatores a partir de frases atitudinais que puderam explicar intenção de investir. Seis fatores foram criados: Entusiasmo (por crowdfunding), Exclusividade (compra de recompensas), Caridade (doações pequenas para ajudar o desenvolvimento do projeto), Cautela (similar à difusão de responsabilidade, isto é, espera por mais investidores para dar o primeiro passo), Intimidade (projeto foi recomendado ou há ligação emocional com o criador) e Compartilhamento (compartilhar para ajudar a trazer mais investidores para o projeto). Categorias com alto envolvimento emocional apresentaram associação com Intimidade, como música, filme e tecnologia. Dado o fato que a amostra não continha muitos entusiastas por crowdfunding, esse fator não apresentou qualquer associação com as categorias. Categorias que não entregam produtos em troca, como comida e fotografia, apresentaram altos níveis de associação com o fator caridade. Compartilhamento é altamente associado com tecnologia, dado o fato que essa categoria concentra os respondentes que são mais orientados à inovação e entusiastas sobre o produto, então precisam compartilhar e gerar boca-a-boca para ajudar a atingir a meta de investimento.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Economic growth and complementarity between stages of human capital

We study the impact of the different stages of human capital accumulation on the evolution of labor productivity in a model calibrated to the U.S. from 1961 to 2008. We add early childhood education to a standard continuous time life cycle economy and assume complementarity between educational stages. There are three sectors in the model: the goods sector, the early childhood sector and the formal education sector. Agents are homogenous and choose the intensity of preschool education, how long to stay in formal school, labor effort and consumption, and there are exogenous distortions to these four decisions. The model matches the data very well and closely reproduces the paths of schooling, hours worked, relative prices and GDP. We find that the reduction in distortions to early education in the period was large and made a very strong contribution to human capital accumulation. However, due to general equilibrium effects of labor market taxation, marginal modification in the incentives for early education in 2008 had a smaller impact than those for formal education. This is because the former do not decisively affect the decision to join the labor market, while the latter do. Without labor taxation, incentives for preschool are significantly stronger.

Restrição ao crédito educacional e investimentos em capital humano no Brasil: evidências através dos retornos à educação

Este artigo procura identificar o papel de restrição ao crédito sobre a decisão de investimento em capital humano no Brasil. Para tanto é usada a hipótese de que custos diretos e de oportunidade de estudar afetam pessoas restritas e não restritas por crédito de forma diferente. Enquanto o custo de oportunidade afeta a todos de forma similar, o custo direto afeta mais fortemente aqueles restritos ao crédito. A partir da estimação de taxas de retorno à educação com o uso de diferentes variáveis instrumentais é possível lançar luz sobre o papel da restrição ao crédito sobre escolaridade. Ao comparar as taxas de retorno utilizando como instrumento a oferta relativa de professores (Proxy dos custos diretos) e salário mediano dos jovens (variável de custo de oportunidade), encontramos uma acentuada diferença no ponto estimado, indicando a existência de efeito da restrição sobre escolaridade. Entretanto, o mau desempenho do segundo instrumento no segundo estágio torna problemática a comparação.