Estimation of random coefficients logit demand models: an application to the Brazilian fixed income fund market

Estimation of demand and supply in differentiated products markets is a central issue in Empirical Industrial Organization and has been used to study the effects of taxes, merges, introduction of new goods, market power, among others. Logit and Random Coefficients Logit are examples of demand models used to study these effects. For the supply side it is generally supposed a Nash equilibrium in prices. This work presents a detailed discussion of these models of demand and supply as well as the procedure for estimation. Lastly, is made an application to the Brazilian fixed income fund market.

Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

Beyond common priors

One property (called action-consistency) that is implicit in the common prior assumption (CPA) is identified and shown to be the driving force of the use of the CPA in a class of well-known results. In particular, we show that Aumann (1987)’s Bayesian characterization of correlated equilibrium, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)’s epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, and Milgrom and Stokey (1982)’s no-trade theorem are all valid without the CPA but with action-consistency. Moreover, since we show that action-consistency is much less restrictive than the CPA, the above results are more general than previously thought, and insulated from controversies around the CPA.

Contágio no modelo de Allen e Gale com infraestrutura bancária endógena

Neste trabalho investigamos a formação de network considerando agentes cautelosos. O modelo consiste em duas regiões com (n/2) bancos em cada, onde a interligação entre eles ocorre através e depósitos interbancários. Cada banco está sujeito a corrida bancária, ou devido a um choque negativo de agentes impacientes, ou devido a contaminação da corrida de um banco pertencente a infraestrutura bancária. Os bancos podem tentar eliminar a possibilidade de contágio ao fazer um número alto de inter-ligações. Para isso, é necessário uma coordenação entre todos os bancos. Se um banco não se prevenir de um contágio, ele impõe a todos os outros a possibilidade de contágio no pior cenário. Há duas regiões bem definidas de equilíbrio de nash simétrico com network estável, uma na qual todos os bancos se previnem do cenário de contágio no pior cenário e a outra na qual nenhum banco se previne. Devido ao problema de coordenação, o equilíbrio com contágio no pior cenário pode ocorrer mesmo sendo pareto dominado pelo equilíbrio sem contágio. Sob certas condições, o equilíbrio com contágio ocorre com um network pareto eficiente. Neste caso o network eficiente é diferente do network mais resiliente ao contágio.

A general-equilibrium closed-form solution to the welfare costs of inflation (Forthcoming, Revista Brasileira de Economia)

This work presents closed-form solutions to Lucasís (2000) generalequilibrium expression for the welfare costs of ináation, as well as to the di§erence between the general-equlibrium measure and Baileyís (1956) partial-equilibrium measure. In Lucasís original work only numerical solutions are provided.

On uniqueness of equilibrium in the Kyle Model

A longstanding unresolved question is whether the one-period Kyle Model of an informed trader and a noisily informed market maker has an equilibrium that is different from the closed-form solution derived by Kyle (1985). This note advances what is known about this open problem.