Welfare costs of inflation: the case for interest-bearing money and empirical estimates for Brazil

We provide in this paper a closed fonn for the Welfare Cost of Inflation which we prove to be closer than Bailey's expression to the correct solution of the corresponding non-separable differential equation. Next. we extend this approach to ao economy with interest-bearing money, once again presenting a better appoximation than the one given by Bailey's approach. Fmally, empirical estimates for Brazil are presented.

The welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty in the post-war period

With standard assumptions on preferences and a fully-fledged econometric model we computed the welfare costs of macroeconomic uncertainty for post-war U.S. using the BeveridgeNelson decomposition. Welfare costs are about 0.9% per-capita consumption ($175.00) and marginal welfare costs are about twice as large.

The consistency of welfare judgements with a representative consumer

This paper is about economies with a representative consumer. In general a representative consumer need not exist, although there are several well known sets of sufficient conditions under which Qne will. It is common practice, however, to use the representative consumer hypothesis without specifically assuming any of these. We show, firstly, that it is possible for the utility of the representative consumer to increase when every actual consumer is made worse off. This shows a serious shortcoming of welfare judgements based on the representatíve consumer. Secondly, in economies where this does not occur, there exists a social welfare function, which we construct, which is consistent with welfare judgements based on the utility of the representative consumer. Finally we provide a converse to Samuelson' s 1956 representative consumer result, which relates it to Scitovsky's community indifference curves.

An intra-household approach to the welfare costs of inflation

The literature on the welfare costs of in‡ation universally assumes that the many-person household can be treated as a single economic agent. This paper explores what the heterogeneity of the agents in a household might imply for such welfare analyses. First, we show that allowing for a single-unity or for a multi-unity transacting technology impacts the money demand function and, therefore, the welfare costs of in‡ation. Second, we derive su¢cient conditions that make the welfare assessments which depart directly from the knowledge of the money demand function (as in Lucas (2000)) robust under this alternative setting. Third, we compare our general-equilibrium measure with Bailey’s (1956) partial-equilibrium one.

Public expenditures taxation and welfare measurement

this article addresses the welfare and macroeconomics effects of fiscal policy in a frarnework where govemment chooses tax rates and the distribution of revenues between consumption and investment. We construct and simulate a model where public consumption affects individuaIs' utility and public capital is an argument of the production function. The simulations suggest that by simply reallocating expenditures from consumption to investment, the govemment can increase the equilibrium leveIs of capital stock, hours worked, output and labor productivity. Funhennore, we 'show that the magnitude and direction of the long run impact of fiscal policy depends on the size of the elasticity of output to public capital. If this parameter is high enough, it may be the case that capital stock, within limits, increases with tax rates.

Two additions to Lucas's "inflation and welfare"

This work adds to Lucas (2000) by providing analytical solutions to two problems that are solved only numerically by the author. The first part uses a theorem in control theory (Arrow' s sufficiency theorem) to provide sufficiency conditions to characterize the optimum in a shopping-time problem where the value function need not be concave. In the original paper the optimality of the first-order condition is characterized only by means of a numerical analysis. The second part of the paper provides a closed-form solution to the general-equilibrium expression of the welfare costs of inflation when the money demand is double logarithmic. This closed-form solution allows for the precise calculation of the difference between the general-equilibrium and Bailey's partial-equilibrium estimates of the welfare losses due to inflation. Again, in Lucas's original paper, the solution to the general-equilibrium-case underlying nonlinear differential equation is done only numerically, and the posterior assertion that the general-equilibrium welfare figures cannot be distinguished from those derived using Bailey's formula rely only on numerical simulations as well.

An intra-household approach to the welfare costs of inflation (Revised Version, Forthcoming 2006, Estudos Econômicos)

The literature on the welfare costs of ináation universally assumes that the many-person household can be treated as a single economic agent. This paper explores what the heterogeneity of the agents in a household might imply for such welfare analyses. First, we show that allowing for a one-person or for a many-person transacting technology impacts the money demand function and, therefore, the welfare costs of ináation. Second, more importantly, we derive su¢ cient conditions under which welfare assessments which depart directly from the knowledge of the money demand function (as in Lucas (2000)) are robust (invariant) under the number of persons considered in the household. Third, we show that Baileyís (1956) partial-equilibrium measure of the welfare costs of ináation can be obtained as a Örst-order approximation of the general-equilibrium welfare measure derived in this paper using a many-person transacting technology.

An empirical approach toward understanding the linkage between legal and financial institutions

Researchers have made different attempts to investigate the interaction between the quality and efficiency of a country’s institutions and a country’s economic performance. Within this framework, emphasis has been put on the relationship between the legal institutions and the financial system as essential factors in creating and enhancing overall economic growth. The link between legal institutions and the financial systems, however, is still somewhat controversial. This paper reports on a survey administered to 1,362 participants regarding preferences for investment under different legal and financial institutions. Results suggest that the performance of a country‘s legal institutions affects the willingness to invest money in that country and that people of different gender, age, political traditions, and professional experience react differently to these institutions.

Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth

This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization.

Organizações comunitárias de provisão social nos Estados Unidos e França

Documento de pesquisa que aborda o perfil, a dimensão e a magnitude das organizações comunitárias de provisão social na França e nos Estados Unidos, relacionando suas formas de vinculação, dinâmicas e identidades em face da esfera governamental e da esfera privada capitalista, apontando: (i) tipos dominantes de atores e como funcionam seus quadros em relação ao Estado e aos interesses capitalistas no mercado; (ii) recursos mobilizados na interação com o poder político e poder econômico (Estado e empresas capitalistas) quando recebem doações: significado do trabalho voluntariado e das iniciativas de geração de ocupação e renda (associativismo/cooperativismo) e (iii) fins visados e valores expressos. São discutidas as formas de atuação de base, participação local em cada país e é analisada, comparativamente, a questão do significado desses agentes no quadro atual dos atuais sistemas de bem-estar (Welfare State) na sociedade civil norte-americana e francesa.

Federalismo fiscal: uma análise das relações intergovernamentais quanto ao atendimento das demandas sociais - o caso brasileiro

Este trabalho tem por objetivo analisar as relações entre as esferas de governo no Brasil, quanto ao provimento das demandas sociais. O foco do estudo reside nas relações que resultam em externalidades negativas, significando perdas para o bem-estar coletivo, que vai de encontro às pretensões da nova Carta Constitucional, promulgada em 1988. O exame das relações intergovernamentais é realizado sob a perspectiva de internalização das instituições ao modelo de análise, promovendo uma maior compreensão quanto aos comportamentos adotados pelas unidades federativas e, por conseguinte, seus resultados nos cenários político, econômico e social, em função do jogo federativo que se faz presente.

Sale of credit portfolio and risk : the case of financial institutions in Brazil

Este estudo analisa se as vendas de carteiras de crédito são utilizadas por instituições financeiras para gestão de risco, de acordo com Stanton(1998) e Murray(2001) ou para captação recursos, como apontado em Cebenoyan e Strahan(2001) e Dionne e Harchaoui(2003). Duas hipóteses foram testadas quanto às vendas de carteira de crédito: 1) implicam em melhor rating na carteira remanescente; ou 2) promovem alavancagem financeira - com piora na carteira remanescente -, controlando para a existência de coobrigação e para quem esses ativos foram transferidos. A amostra inclui informações trimestrais de 145 instituições financeiras do primeiro trimestre de 2001 ao segundo trimestre de 2008. Os resultados oferecem evidências empíricas de que as instituições financeiras utilizam estas vendas para melhora do rating da carteira de crédito remanescente, ou seja, elas transferem, em sua maioria, ativos de baixa qualidade, garantindo bons ratings e melhorando a liquidez. Adicionalmente, seguindo a proposta Dionne e Harchaoui(2003) - que além de testar, evidenciam que exigências regulatórias promovem alavancagem em ativos de alto risco - foi observada a relação entre o Índice de Basiléia e rating da carteira de crédito. As conclusões foram semelhantes às encontradas por Dionne e Harchaoui(2003): quanto mais adequada – maior Índice de Basiléia - uma instituição financeira for, maiores as chances de ela possuir uma carteira de crédito com qualidade ruim.

Distributive politics in Latin América: the impact of democracy, eletions and globalization on the welfare state

A tese busca examinar dois desenvolvimentos de grandes conseqüências na América Latina nas últimas três décadas do século XX. Ela procura testar as teorias sobre políticas distributivas examinando os efeitos da democracia e da globalização no estado de bem-estar na América Latina utilizando dados de séries temporais para 15 países entre 1973 e 2000.

Hybrid political institutions and governability: the budgetary process in Brazil

In this paper we take a close look at some of the particular pathways by which majoritarian and consensual institutions affect governability. We demonstrate that the mix of majoritarian and consensual institutions found within a country can influence these pathways quite dramatically, such that they produce rather different consequences for governability, even when these pathways are relatively similar in nature. Particularly, we focus on the rules governing the relationship between the President and the Legislature, especially the appropriation of amendments proposed by legislators. In some presidential countries, the president possesses a partial veto (or a line-item veto) which allows him/her to approve or strike appropriations, which legislators introduce in amendments. Concentrating on the case of Brazil, we argue and demonstrate that whether or not the president can use this tool to sustain governing majorities (i.e., to increase governability) depends on the kind of amendment introduced by legislators. One kind, individual amendment, is linked to the majoritarian institution of a powerful presidency and therefore helps to increase governability. A second kind, collective amendment, is linked to consensual institutions and actually does not enhance legislative support for the Executive.

Inflation, welfare and public expenditures

This paper studies welfare effects of monetary policy in an overlapping generations model with capital and no form of taxation other than inflation. Public expenditures have a positive effect on labor productivity. The main result of the paper is that an expansive monetary policy can be welfare improving, at least for ìsmall enoughî inflation rates, and that there is an optimal inflation rate. Growth maximization, however, is never optimal. Steady-state capital and output increase with inflation, reproducing the so-called Tobin effect. For large inflation rates, however, the government authorities cannot affect real variables and there are only nominal effects.