Incomplete contracts and the problem of social harm

We construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative extemality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. We analyze several kinds of rights, including damages, injunctions, and rights to exclude (arising from covenants or land ownership). There are cases in which allocating any of these basic rights to the first mover-i.e., first-party rights-is dominated by second-party rights, and cases in which the reverse is true. A Coasian result (efficiency regardless of the rights allocation) only holds under a limited set of conditions. As corollaries of a theorem ranking the basic rights regimes, a number of results emerge contradicting conventional wisdom, including the relative inefficiency of concentrated land ownership and the relevance of the generator's identity. We conclude with a mechanism and a new rights regime that each yield the first best in all cases.

The impact on the stationary state income of a pay-as-you-go system of social security

A model of overlapping generations in continuous time is composed. IndividuaIs pass through two distinct time periods during their life times. During the first period, they work, save and have a death probability equal to zero. During the second, from the periods T after birth, their probability of death changes to p and then they retire. Capital stock and the stationary state in come are calculated for two situations: in the first, people live from their accumulated capital after retirementj in the second, they live from a state transfer payment through income taxo To simplify matters, in this preliminary version, it is supposed that there is no population growth and that the instantaneous elasticity substitution of consumption is unitary.

Formation of social capital in Eastern Europe : explaining the gap vis-à-vis developed countries

Recent Eurobarometer survey data are used to document and explain the leveI of social capital in thirteen new members and fifteen current members of the European Union. Social capital in Eastern Europe - measured by participation in clubs and organization, intensity of networks or altruistic behavior - lags behind that in developed countries. The differences in individual-leveI determinants cannot fully account for the gap at the aggregate leveI. Once we also include aggregate measures of economic development and quality of institutions, the gap disappears. This implies that the EU enlargement will contribute to a convergence in social capital, assuming that it contributes to the economic and institutional development of Eastern European countries. A necessary condition is that both, formal and informal institutions and their interaction should be regarded in this process.

The impact of social security reform on occupational and retirement behavior : a quantitative assessment for Brazil

Population ageing is a problem that countries will have to cope with within a few years. How would changes in the social security system affect individual behaviour? We develop a multi-sectoral life-cycle model with both retirement and occupational choices to evaluate what are the macroeconomic impacts of social security reforms. We calibrate the model to match 2011 Brazilian economy and perform a counterfactual exercise of the long-run impacts of a recently adopted reform. In 2013, the Brazilian government approximated the two segregated social security schemes, imposing a ceiling on public pensions. In the benchmark equilibrium, our modelling economy is able to reproduce the early retirement claiming, the agents' stationary distribution among sectors, as well as the social security deficit and the public job application decision. In the counterfactual exercise, we find a significant reduction of 55\% in the social security deficit, an increase of 1.94\% in capital-to-output ratio, with both output and capital growing, a delay in retirement claims of public workers and a modification in the structure of agents applying to the public sector job.