Comparing equilibrium real interest rates : different approaches to measure Brazilian rates

Despite the difficulties involved in the precise determination of equilibrium real interest rates, it seems clear that nominal interest rates has been higher in Brazil than in similar emerging economies. This paper aims to shed light on the possible reasons for this feature of the Brazilian economy. We extend Miranda and Muinhos (2003) one-country study to a sample of 20 countries, using many methods to compare measures of the real interest: (i) extracting equilibrium interest rates from IS curves; (ii) extracting steady state interest rates from marginal product of capital; (iii) capturing relevant variables and the fixed effects having real interest rates as dependent variable in a panel for emerging countries; and (iv) extracting inflation expectation from the spread between fixed rate and inflation-indexed treasure notes.

Modified value stream mapping of airport check-in procedures

In June 2014 Brazil hosted the FIFA World Cup and in August 2016 Rio de Janeiro hosts the Summer Olympics. These two seminal sporting events will draw tens of thousands of air travelers through Brazil’s airports, airports that are currently in the midst of a national modernization program to address years of infrastructure neglect and insufficient capacity. Raising Brazil’s major airports up to the standards air travelers experience at major airports elsewhere in the world is more than just a case of building or remodeling facilities, processes must also be examined and reworked to enhance traveler experience and satisfaction. This research paper examines the key interface between airports and airline passengers—airport check-in procedures—according to how much value and waste there is associated with them. In particular, the paper makes use of a value stream mapping construct for services proposed by Martins, Cantanhede, and Jardim (2010). The uniqueness of this construct is that it attributes each activity with a certain percentage and magnitude of value or waste which can then be ordered and prioritized for improvement. Working against a fairly commonly expressed notion in Brazil that Brazil’s airports are inferior to the airports of economically advanced countries, the paper examines Rio’s two major airports, Galeão International and Santos Dumont in comparison to Washington D.C.’s Washington National and Dulles International airports. The paper seeks to accomplish three goals: - Determine whether there are differences in airport passenger check-in procedures between U.S. and Brazilian airports in terms of passenger value - Present options for Brazilian government or private sector authorities to consider adopting or implementing at Brazilian airports to maximize passenger value - Validate the Martins et al. construct for use in evaluating the airport check-in procedures Observations and analysis proved surprising in that all airports and service providers follow essentially the same check-in processes but execute them differently yet still result in similar overall performance in terms of value and waste. Although only a few activities are categorized as completely wasteful (and therefore removed in the revised value stream map of check-in activities), the weighting and categorization of individual activities according to their value (or waste) presents decision-makers a means to prioritize possible corrective actions. Various overall recommendations are presented based on this analysis. Most importantly, this paper demonstrates the viability of using the construct developed by Martins et al to examine airport operations, as well as its applicability to the study of other service industry processes.

On the positive correlation between income inequality and unemployment

Several empirical studies in the literature have documented the existence of a positive correlation between income inequalitiy and unemployment. I provide a theoretical framework under which this correlation can be better understood. The analysis is based on a dynamic job search under uncertainty. I start by proving the uniqueness of a stationary distribution of wages in the economy. Drawing upon this distribution, I provide a general expression for the Gini coefficient of income inequality. The expression has the advantage of not requiring a particular specification of the distribution of wage offers. Next, I show how the Gini coefficient varies as a function of the parameters of the model, and how it can be expected to be positively correlated with the rate of unemployment. Two examples are offered. The first, of a technical nature, to show that the convergence of the measures implied by the underlying Markov process can fail in some cases. The second, to provide a quantitative assessment of the model and of the mechanism linking unemployment and inequality.

Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency

We argue that it is possible to adapt the approach of imposing restrictions on available plans through finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996), to encompass models with default and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) the concept of almost finite-time solvency. We show that the conditions imposed in these two papers to rule out Ponzi schemes implicitly restrict actions to be almost finite-time solvent. We define the notion of equilibrium with almost finite-time solvency and look on sufficient conditions for its existence. Assuming a mild assumption on default penalties, namely that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, we prove that existence is guaranteed (and Ponzi schemes are ruled out) when actions are restricted to be almost finite-time solvent. The proof is very simple and intuitive. In particular, the main existence results in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) are simple corollaries of our existence result.

Inflation targeting, credibility and confidence crises

We study the interplay between the central bank transparency, its credibility, and the ination target level. Based on a model developed in the spirit of the global games literature, we argue that whenever a weak central bank adopts a high degree of transparency and a low target level, a bad and self conrmed type of equilibrium may arise. In this case, an over-the-target ination becomes more likely. The central bank is considered weak when favorable state of nature is required for the target to be achieved. On the other hand, if a weak central bank opts for less ambitious goals, namely lower degree of transparency and higher target level, it may avoid condence crises and ensure a unique equilibrium for the expected ination. Moreover, even after ruling out the possibility of condence crises, less ambitious goals may be desirable in order to attain higher credibility and hence a better coordination of expectations. Conversely, a low target level and a high central bank transparency are desirable whenever the economy has strong fundamentals and the target can be fullled in many states of nature.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Endogenous collateral

We study an economy where there are two types of assets. Consumers’ promises are the primitive defaultable assets secured by collateral chosen by the consumers themselves. The purchase of these personalized assets by financial intermediaries is financed by selling back derivatives to consumers. We show that nonarbitrage prices of primitive assets are strict submartingales, whereas nonarbitrage prices of derivatives are supermartingales. Next we establish existence of equilibrium, without imposing bounds on short sales. The nonconvexity of the budget set is overcome by considering a continuum of agents.

Formulação de políticas culturais: leis de incentivo e as inovações do Programa Cultura Viva

O presente trabalho analisa a formulação das políticas culturais no Brasil a partir da análise de dois casos bastante distintos: as leis de incentivo, formuladas no início da década de 1990, na esteira do neoliberalismo, e o Programa Cultura Viva, formulado no ano de 2004, no primeiro mandato do Presidente Lula. A partir da análise detalhada do contexto de formulação de cada uma das políticas culturais, bem como dos públicos efetivamente atendidos e dos valores disponibilizados, mostramos tratarse de duas formas de políticas culturais que apontam para diferentes horizontes em termos de cidadania cultural. Na questão das leis de incentivo, analisamos a passagem do modelo fordista de acumulação para a acumulação flexível, relacionando a importância das estratégias de branding para as novas formas da cultura do consumo. No caso do Programa Cultura Viva, analisamos quais os grupos privilegiados, delimitando os alcances e limites dessa política. Em nossa abordagem, apoiamo-nos no referencial gramsciano de hegemonia, relacionando-a fortemente com a cultura numa sociedade de classes. Dada à singularidade do conceito de sociedade civil na abordagem do pensador italiano, além da evidente relevância que essa esfera assume com o ideário neoliberal, faz-se necessário uma análise histórica de sua evolução, na busca de evidências que apontem para uma política emancipatória a partir das ações nessa esfera, e no seu relacionamento com o Estado e o mercado.

Collateral avoids Ponzi schemes in incomplete markets

Without introducing neither debt constraints nor transversality conditions to avoid the possibility of Ponzi schemes, we show existence of equilibrium in an incomplete markets economy with a collateral structure.

Permanência de alunos nos cursos presenciais e a distância em Administração: contribuições para a gestão acadêmica

A educação a distância vem ganhando destaque nos últimos anos em função da capacidade de expansão do ensino superior e também por incluir um grupo de pessoas que, de outra forma, não poderia realizar uma graduação. O objetivo dessa pesquisa é identificar as variáveis que influenciam o processo de permanência dos alunos de Administração, comparando resultados das modalidades presencial e a distância, tomando como caso a Universidade Estadual do Maranhão (Uema). Como principal referencial teórico do presente estudo, escolheu-se o Modelo de Integração do Estudante de Tinto (1975), considerado como a primeira proposta academicamente reconhecida de determinação das variáveis que intervém no processo de evasão e permanência de alunos em um curso de graduação. Um dos componentes do modelo despertou o interesse de comparação entre as duas modalidades (presencial e a distância) de forma especial, qual seja: a integração social, decorrente das interações discentes e docentes, que em geral são pouco exploradas nos estudos empíricos. O método definido para o estudo foi de caráter descritivo e base qualitativa. A submissão do conjunto de variáveis observadas na literatura a uma análise de juízes resultou na definição de três principais Dimensões e 60 Componentes, a saber: (1) Perfil do aluno; (2) Estar-em-rede; e (3) Condições para a permanência. Essas variáveis compuseram o quadro de análise de conteúdo categorial, resultante da aplicação de múltiplos instrumentos de coleta de dados (dois questionários e uma entrevista em profundidade), que foram utilizados na triangulação com dados secundários obtidos no próprio Enade (2009). Como contribuição teórica da presente tese, aponta-se a possibilidade de integração das três visões filosóficas: Cognitivismo, Construtivismo e Conectivismo que se interrelacionam na gestão acadêmica de cursos superiores pela unicidade da educação vislumbrada pelo blended learning como tendência futura para a educação superior. Outras contribuições são apresentadas em relação aos componentes: atributos individuais, trabalho e estágio, contexto familiar, escolaridade anterior, uso das TICs, interação docente e discente, compromisso pessoal e institucional e integração acadêmica.

Non-monotone insurence contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of t.his paper is to show the possibility of a non-monot.one relation between coverage and risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuou.'l parameter which is correlated with lenience and, for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cost of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and implies a positive correlation between coverage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the sep be broken, but also the monotonicity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (Iow) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case t,here are some coverage leveIs associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation bet,ween coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to disentangle single crossing and non single crossing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function of riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric informat, ion), coverage is a monotone function of riskiness, this also gives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirica! tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variabIes (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variabIes conditioning on ali observabIe variabIes. We show that this may be t,he case when the omitted variabIes have a non-monotonic reIation with t,he observable ones. Moreover, because this non-monotonic reIat,ion is deepIy reIated with the failure of the SCP in one-dimensional screening problems, the existing lit.erature on asymmetric information does not capture t,his feature. Hence, our main result is to point Out the importance of t,he SCP in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

A competitive growth model with endogenous fertility

This paper investigates the interaction between endogenous fertility behavior and the distribution of income and wealth arnong farnilies in a competitive market economy. We construct a growth model in which altruistic dynasties are heterogeneous in their initial stocks of physical capital. Dynasties make choices of farnily size along with decisions about consumption and intergenerational transfers. We show that if the rate of time preference is increasing in the number of children and preferences over nurnber of children satisfy a norrnality assumption, all steady states are characterized by equality of capital stocks and consumption arnong families. We also provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the steady state. In order to illustrate these results, we present an example in which preferences over number of children are logarithrnic and the technology is Cobb-Douglas. For this combination of preferences and technology, there exists a unique egalitarian steady state. Moreover, the economy converges to this steady state in only one generation .