Creditor's protection and bank loans: lack of competition hamprers bankruptcy reform's effects

This dissertation investigates how credit institutions’ market power limits the effects of creditor protection rules on the interest rate and the spread of bank loans. We use the Brazilian Bankruptcy Reform of June/2005 (BBR) as a legal event affecting the institutional environment of the Brazilian credit market. The law augments creditor protection and aims to improve the access of firms to the credit market and to reduce the cost of borrowing. Either access to credit or the credit cost are also determined by bank industry competition and the market power of suppliers of credit. We derive a simple economic model to study the effect of market power interacting with cost of lending. Using an accounting and operations dataset from July/2004 to December/2007 provided by the Brazilian Central Bank, we estimate that the lack of competition in the bank lending industry hinders the potential reducing effect of the BBR on the interest rate of corporate loans by approximately 30% and on the spread by approximately 23%. We also find no statistical evidence that the BBR affected the concentration level of the Brazilian credit market. We present a brief report on bankruptcy reforms around the world, the changes in the Brazilian legislation and on some recent related articles in our introductory chapter. The second chapter presents the economic model and the testable hypothesis on how the lack of competition in the lending market limits the effects of improved creditor protection. In this chapter, we introduce our empirical strategy using a differences-in-differences model and we estimate the limiting effect of market power on the BBR’s potential to reduce interest rates and on the spread of bank loans. We use the BBR as an exogenous event that affects collateralized corporate loans (treatment group) but that does not affect clean consumer loans (control group) to identify these effects, using different concentration measures. In Chapter 3, we propose a two-stage empirical strategy to handle the H–Statistics proposed by Panzar and Rosse as a measure of market competition. We estimate the limiting effects of the lack of competition in replacing the concentration statistics by the H–Statistics. Chapter 4 presents a structural break test of the concentration index and checks if the BBR affects the dynamic evolution of the concentration index.

Global stabilizing feedback law for a problem of biological control of mosquito-borne diseases

The control of the spread of dengue fever by introduction of the intracellular parasitic bacterium Wolbachia in populations of the vector Aedes aegypti, is presently one of the most promising tools for eliminating dengue, in the absence of an efficient vaccine. The success of this operation requires locally careful planning to determine the adequate number of mosquitoes carrying the Wolbachia parasite that need to be introduced into the natural population. The latter are expected to eventually replace the Wolbachia-free population and guarantee permanent protection against the transmission of dengue to human. In this paper, we propose and analyze a model describing the fundamental aspects of the competition between mosquitoes carrying Wolbachia and mosquitoes free of the parasite. We then introduce a simple feedback control law to synthesize an introduction protocol, and prove that the population is guaranteed to converge to a stable equilibrium where the totality of mosquitoes carry Wolbachia. The techniques are based on the theory of monotone control systems, as developed after Angeli and Sontag. Due to bistability, the considered input-output system has multivalued static characteristics, but the existing results are unable to prove almost-global stabilization, and ad hoc analysis has to be conducted.

The distortion of currencies misalignments on trade Instruments: or why currencies wars are not over

The negotiations of mega agreements between the US and the Pacific countries (TPP) and between the US and the EU (TTIP) are raising the attention of experts on international trade law and economics. TPP and TTIP are proclaimed to be the designers of the rules for the XXI Century. Old trade instruments such as tariffs are said to be no more important for TTIP because tariffs are negligible among those partners but significant to for TPP. Another relevant agreement in negotiation is between the EU and Mercosul, where tariffs are the most important issue in discussion. The main purpose of this paper is to shows that tariff are important for all these agreements, not because of its nominal value, but because the impacts of exchange rate misalignments on tariffs are so significant that all concessions can be distorted by overvalued and by devaluated currencies. The article is divided into several sections: the first gives an introduction to the issue; the second explains the methodologies used to determine exchange rate misalignments and also presents some results for Brazil, US and China; the third summarizes the methodology applied to calculate the impacts of exchange rate misalignments on the level of tariff protection through an exercise of “misalignment tariffication” and examines the effects of exchange rate variations on tariffs and their consequences for the multilateral trading system; the fourth creates a methodology to estimate exchange rates against a basket of currencies (a virtual currency of the World) and a proposal to deal with persistent and significant misalignments related to trade rules. The fifth presents some estimates for the main PTAs. The conclusions are present in the last section

Barreiras regulatórias: um novo desafio para a governança da OMC

Over the last decades, there is an increasing concern around what should be the role played by the World Trade Organization before the proliferation of preferential and plurilateral trade agreements (PTAs). Moreover, the expansion of the trade agenda through issues not encompassed by the WTO agreements, such as sustainability and global value chains led to a process of fragmentation of international trade law, strengthening the false idea that there would be a complete antagonism between preferentialism and multilateralism. As tariff preferences have diminished in importance, non-tariff measures as domestic regulation have become relatively more significant as determinants of market access and the conditions of competition. Given this equation, and regarding the importance to safeguard the progress achieved by the multilateral trade system, the present article seeks to elucidate some points considered relevant to the regulatory barriers subject and, therefore, address the role that can be attributed to the WTO as a key to effective governance of trade regulatory cooperation

Trade rules and exchange rate misalignments : in search for a WTO solution e medidas compensatórias

The debate on the link between trade rules and rules on exchange rates is raising the attention of experts on international trade law and economics. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the impacts of exchange rate misalignments on tariffs as applied by the WTO – World Trade Organization. It is divided into five sections: the first one explains the methodology used to determine exchange rate misalignments and also presents its results for Brazil, US and China; the second summarizes the methodology applied to calculate the impacts of exchange rate misalignments on the level of tariff protection through an exercise of “misalignment tariffication”; the third examines the effects of exchange rate variations on tariffs and their consequences for the multilateral trading system; the fourth one creates a methodology to estimate exchange rates against a currency of the World and a proposal to deal with persistent and significant misalignments related to trade rules. The conclusions are present in the last section