A time-varying markov-switching model for economic growth

This paper investigates economic growth’s pattern of variation across and within countries using a Time-Varying Transition Matrix Markov-Switching Approach. The model developed follows the approach of Pritchett (2003) and explains the dynamics of growth based on a collection of different states, each of which has a sub-model and a growth pattern, by which countries oscillate over time. The transition matrix among the different states varies over time, depending on the conditioning variables of each country, with a linear dynamic for each state. We develop a generalization of the Diebold’s EM Algorithm and estimate an example model in a panel with a transition matrix conditioned on the quality of the institutions and the level of investment. We found three states of growth: stable growth, miraculous growth, and stagnation. The results show that the quality of the institutions is an important determinant of long-term growth, whereas the level of investment has varying roles in that it contributes positively in countries with high-quality institutions but is of little relevance in countries with medium- or poor-quality institutions.

On the cost of sympathy : a alternative model of insurance markets

The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.