35 resultados para Political socialization
Resumo:
O trabalho ocupa um inegável espaço na vida dos indivíduos, sendo este rico de sentido individual e social, é um meio de produção da vida de cada um ao prover subsistência, criar sentidos existenciais ou contribuir na estruturação da identidade e da subjetividade. O cenário atual de adoção e uso das Tecnologias de Informação e Comunicação pelas organizações e pessoas, demonstra um crescimento da incorporação de dispositivos tecnológicos que têm o potencial de alterar as características espaciais e temporais do trabalho, aumentando a mobilidade do trabalhador. Considerando-se o fato de que o indivíduo ao deslocar-se, ao mover-se pelo espaço, anexa ou remodela sua identidade pessoal, profissional, cultural, social ou política a partir da mobilidade, o objetivo final desta pesquisa foi refletir sobre de que maneira os impactos positivos e negativos gerados pela intensa mobilidade geográfica demandados pelo exercício da profissão, são percebidos por trabalhadores docentes de curso de pós-graduação lato sensu em Administração que se deslocam de um território para outro(s), com a finalidade de exercerem suas atividades docentes. Realizou-se para tanto uma revisão bibliográfica acerca de sentido do trabalho, apresentando, a seguir, algumas reflexões sobre as alterações ocorridas nas relações de trabalho em decorrência de mutações no mundo do trabalho, abordando, por fim, o tema Mobilidade da força de trabalho. Após esta etapa, buscou-se compreender, na ótica desses trabalhadores docentes, por meio de entrevistas pessoais analisadas à luz do método de análise de conteúdo, os caminhos percorridos e significados atribuídos por eles a estas vivências, procurando perceber como os trabalhadores docentes em destaque representam o olhar sobre si e sobre os outros, visando demonstrar o significado (positivo e negativo) da mobilidade espacial, as práticas cotidianas e estratégias de sociabilidade e interação com e no local de destino. Pode-se concluir que, apesar de haver alguns fatores que podem tornar os constantes deslocamentos geográficos destes trabalhadores um elemento negativo para eles, uma vez que são fontes de alta demanda física e mental, geradoras de estresse, sobrecarga, tensão emocional, cansaço, ansiedade, desânimo, frustração e descontentamento em relação ao trabalho, levando-os ao afastamento constante do contexto social, podendo resultar em consequências graves para a saúde deste trabalhador. Estes constantes deslocamentos geográficos tornam-se, contudo, um elemento positivo, uma vez que possibilitam o incremento às suas práticas docentes, por meio das vivências enriquecidas pelos contactos estabelecidos, pelas aprendizagens realizadas e pelas capacidades de relacionamento em meios multiculturais adquiridas, tornando-se espaço de autorrealização, inserção e reconhecimento social, prestígio, status e de senso de utilidade.
Resumo:
The history of independent Brazil may be divided into three major state–society cycles, and, after 1930, five political pacts or class coalitions can be identified. These pacts were nationalist; only in the 1990s did the Brazilian elites surrender to the neoliberal hegemony. Yet, since the mid-2000s they have been rediscovering the idea of the nation. The main claim of the essay is that Brazilian elites and Brazilian society are “national–dependent”, that is, they are ambivalent and contradictory, requiring an oxymoron to define them. They are dependent because they often see themselves as “European” and the mass of the people as inferior. But Brazil is big enough, and there are enough common interests around its domestic market, to make the Brazilian nation less ambivalent. Today Brazil is seeking a synthesis between the last two political cycles – between social justice and economic development in the framework of democracy.
Resumo:
Economists have argued that regulation is the appropriate approach to maintain output in its economically efficient level in a natural monopoly, and that can be achieved by submitting these companies to regulatory agencies’ decisions. The autonomous agencies are, however, not free in an absolute sense, and it is important to ask what the priorities of the new administration are. One answer is that it is designed to give leeway and powers of discretion to unbiased professionals with expertise in their field. In practice, however, professional experts might often be politically motivated. The objective of this study is to investigate whether political nominations to the presidency of regulatory agencies, rather than technical appointments, affect the level of regulatory risk. In order to achieve this purpose, an event study was performed, where the regulatory risk in a political nomination will be compared to a technical nomination, in terms of abnormal return.
Resumo:
This study documents how the presence of a woman in an executive political role affects the gender stereotype of women in politics. We use Brazilian electoral data and restrict our focus to close mayoral races (using an RDD design) in which the top two candidates are of opposite sexes. Our most important result was a reduction in the number of candidates and votes for female mayoral candidates after a woman is elected, regardless of her eligibility status for reelection. This negative result is linked only to the position of mayor and not to other political positions (councilor, state or federal deputy). In addition, our results may be interpreted as evidence that voters do not use their update on women as local leaders to change their beliefs on women’s ability to run for other political positions. Finally, female mayors do not appear to have a role model effect on younger cohorts of women. We also note that our results are not influenced by differences in mayoral policies (generally and specifically for women), which could influence voters’ gender stereotypes.
Resumo:
A central question in political economy is how to incentivize elected socials to allocate resources to those that need them the most. Research has shown that, while electoral incentives lead central governments to transfer fewer funds to non-aligned constituencies, media presence is instrumental in promoting a better allocation of resources. This study evaluates how these two phenomena interact by analyzing the role of media in compensating political biases. In particular, we analyze how media presence, connectivity and ownership affect the distribution of federal drought relief transfers to Brazilian municipalities. We find that municipalities that are not aligned with the federal government have a lower probability of receiving funds conditional on experiencing low precipitation. However, we show that the presence of radio stations compensates for this bias. This effect is driven by municipalities that have radio stations connected to a regional network rather than by the presence of local radio stations. In addition, the effect of network-connected radio stations increases with their network coverage. These findings suggests that the connection of a radio station to a network is important because it increases the salience of disasters, making it harder for the federal government to ignore non-allies. We show that our findings are not explained by the ownership and manipulation of media by politicians.
Resumo:
Nesta tese, analisamos como a elite empresarial progressista criou a organização da sociedade civil Rede Nossa São Paulo (RNSP), alcançando mudanças institucionais significativas, permitindo assim a consolidação da elite na esfera política. A pesquisa resultou em três artigos. O primeiro artigo discute como a RNSP se tornou um forte ator político na cidade de São Paulo e também no Brasil. Para abordar esta questão, mostramos como a RNSP usou a história retórica para se tornar um ator central na esfera política. No segundo artigo, propomos o conceito de atividade política corporativa implícita (ICPA), complementar a atividade política corporativa. Conceituamos ICPA como elites empresariais em conjunto com organizações da sociedade civil agindo para influenciar o governo. Com os limites entre o governo, as empresas e organizações da sociedade civil difusos; entendemos que este conceito é extremamente importante para chamar a atenção e criar novos caminhos para a pesquisa sobre a influência das empresas no governo. No último artigo, mostramos os micro fundamentos da ICPA. Especificamente, como as elites empresariais e corporações influenciam a RNSP e, indiretamente, o governo. Concluindo, contribuímos para a literatura sobre a influência das empresas no governo e na esfera pública indiretamente, por meio de organizações da sociedade civil. Teoricamente, estendemos a literatura de teoria institucional, história e poder
Resumo:
This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.
Resumo:
This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes how heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and character, a¤ects political budget cycles. Competency is the e¢ciency in running the government. Character is the degree of opportunism. In this expanded space, previous results in the literature on the separating nature of the signaling equilibrium hold if heterogeneity in opportunism is low. With high heterogeneity in opportunism, no separating equilibrium exists. Rather, the equilibrium is partially pooling: only extreme types can be distinguished.
Resumo:
This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil’s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.
Resumo:
Retirado do Vice News.