Is enterprise value affected by political nominations for a regulatory agency's presidency?

Economists have argued that regulation is the appropriate approach to maintain output in its economically efficient level in a natural monopoly, and that can be achieved by submitting these companies to regulatory agencies’ decisions. The autonomous agencies are, however, not free in an absolute sense, and it is important to ask what the priorities of the new administration are. One answer is that it is designed to give leeway and powers of discretion to unbiased professionals with expertise in their field. In practice, however, professional experts might often be politically motivated. The objective of this study is to investigate whether political nominations to the presidency of regulatory agencies, rather than technical appointments, affect the level of regulatory risk. In order to achieve this purpose, an event study was performed, where the regulatory risk in a political nomination will be compared to a technical nomination, in terms of abnormal return.

Gender stereotypes in politics: what changes when a woman becomes the local political leader?

This study documents how the presence of a woman in an executive political role affects the gender stereotype of women in politics. We use Brazilian electoral data and restrict our focus to close mayoral races (using an RDD design) in which the top two candidates are of opposite sexes. Our most important result was a reduction in the number of candidates and votes for female mayoral candidates after a woman is elected, regardless of her eligibility status for reelection. This negative result is linked only to the position of mayor and not to other political positions (councilor, state or federal deputy). In addition, our results may be interpreted as evidence that voters do not use their update on women as local leaders to change their beliefs on women’s ability to run for other political positions. Finally, female mayors do not appear to have a role model effect on younger cohorts of women. We also note that our results are not influenced by differences in mayoral policies (generally and specifically for women), which could influence voters’ gender stereotypes.

The role of media networks in compensating political biases: evidence from radio networks in Brazil

A central question in political economy is how to incentivize elected socials to allocate resources to those that need them the most. Research has shown that, while electoral incentives lead central governments to transfer fewer funds to non-aligned constituencies, media presence is instrumental in promoting a better allocation of resources. This study evaluates how these two phenomena interact by analyzing the role of media in compensating political biases. In particular, we analyze how media presence, connectivity and ownership affect the distribution of federal drought relief transfers to Brazilian municipalities. We find that municipalities that are not aligned with the federal government have a lower probability of receiving funds conditional on experiencing low precipitation. However, we show that the presence of radio stations compensates for this bias. This effect is driven by municipalities that have radio stations connected to a regional network rather than by the presence of local radio stations. In addition, the effect of network-connected radio stations increases with their network coverage. These findings suggests that the connection of a radio station to a network is important because it increases the salience of disasters, making it harder for the federal government to ignore non-allies. We show that our findings are not explained by the ownership and manipulation of media by politicians.

Implicit corporate political activity and elite formation

Nesta tese, analisamos como a elite empresarial progressista criou a organização da sociedade civil Rede Nossa São Paulo (RNSP), alcançando mudanças institucionais significativas, permitindo assim a consolidação da elite na esfera política. A pesquisa resultou em três artigos. O primeiro artigo discute como a RNSP se tornou um forte ator político na cidade de São Paulo e também no Brasil. Para abordar esta questão, mostramos como a RNSP usou a história retórica para se tornar um ator central na esfera política. No segundo artigo, propomos o conceito de atividade política corporativa implícita (ICPA), complementar a atividade política corporativa. Conceituamos ICPA como elites empresariais em conjunto com organizações da sociedade civil agindo para influenciar o governo. Com os limites entre o governo, as empresas e organizações da sociedade civil difusos; entendemos que este conceito é extremamente importante para chamar a atenção e criar novos caminhos para a pesquisa sobre a influência das empresas no governo. No último artigo, mostramos os micro fundamentos da ICPA. Especificamente, como as elites empresariais e corporações influenciam a RNSP e, indiretamente, o governo. Concluindo, contribuímos para a literatura sobre a influência das empresas no governo e na esfera pública indiretamente, por meio de organizações da sociedade civil. Teoricamente, estendemos a literatura de teoria institucional, história e poder

Political budget cycles in a fiscal federation : the effect of partisan voluntary transfers

This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.

Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

WTO-plus commitments on the elimination of export duties: evidence of a two-tier membership?

This descriptive paper examines the prevalence of ‘WTO-plus’ commitments in accession protocols of newly acceded Members, with a focus on commitments on the elimination of export duties. It presents preliminary results of a mapping exercise carried out with respect to these commitments and seeks to answer two questions. First, can any general conclusions be drawn as to the prevalence of these commitments or are they, per definition, country-specific. Second, has the political nature of the WTO accession process allowed for the creation of a two-tier membership. The first question is answered by relying on data gathered as part of the ongoing PhD-research project conducted by the author. The project aims to construct a typology of WTO-plus commitments to allow for a more detailed analysis of the relationship between these commitments and the baseline obligations in the covered agreements. The accession of China to the WTO is commonly considered as the prime example of the inclusion of WTO-plus obligations in accession protocols. The paper tries to answer the question whether this particular accession was truly unique in nature, or whether the inclusion of “Plus” obligations is less exceptional than often assumed. Additionally, the accession protocols of other recently acceded-Members are examined to establish whether the hypothesis holds. In the PhD-research project this comparative methodology will also be applied to map WTO-plus commitments in other areas, such as anti-dumping and transparency. The second question will be answered in two stages. In a preliminary stage, international institutional law will be used to by analyzing the way in which the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body has dealt with this type of WTO-plus commitment in its jurisprudence. The second stage deals with the question of hierarchy: Accession Protocols are negotiated with the WTO Membership, by each country willing to accede to the WTO. This poses questions as to their exact position in the system of WTO law. To establish whether evidence of a two-tier membership is present, one first has to turn back to the question whether Accession Protocols are a separate (or independent) legal instrument or an “integral part” of the WTO system of covered agreements. If newly acceded Members do not benefit from the general exceptions in order to balance their more stringent, WTO-plus, obligations, this may support the conclusion that the membership of the World Trade Organization is becoming, in fact, two-tiered.

Signaling in political budget cycles: How far are you willing to go?

This paper analyzes how heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and character, a¤ects political budget cycles. Competency is the e¢ciency in running the government. Character is the degree of opportunism. In this expanded space, previous results in the literature on the separating nature of the signaling equilibrium hold if heterogeneity in opportunism is low. With high heterogeneity in opportunism, no separating equilibrium exists. Rather, the equilibrium is partially pooling: only extreme types can be distinguished.

Reelection incentives and political corruption : evidence from Brazil’s municipal audit reports

This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil’s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.

2014 World Cup live blog: political protestor invades field at US vs Belgium

Retirado do Vice News.

Why designate market makers? affirmative obligations and market quality

We study why most financiaI markets designate one or more agents who precommit to provide more liquidity than they would endogenously choose, and identify two reasons that such affirmative obligations can improve welfare. The first relies on the insight that the informational component of the competi tive bid-ask spread represents a transfer across traders, not a social cost to completing trades. As such, this trading cost dissuades efficient trading, while a restriction on spread widths encourages efficient trading. Secondly, a restriction on spread widths encourages traders to become informed, which speeds the rate at which market prices move toward true asset values in the wake of information events. We consider the setting where competition ensures that affirmative obligations impose net trading losses on designated market makers that must be compensated by side payments, as observed on the Euronext limit order market, and also the setting where the designated market maker is allowed some advantages relative to limit order traders so that profits can be eamed during tranquil periods to offset losses incurred when affirmative obligations are binding, as observed on the NYSE.