Tributação de energia elétrica e bem-estar social: uma análise regional

Os reflexos da tributação sobre o setor elétrico ultrapassam as questões meramente arrecadatórias de estados, municípios e União, envolvem toda a produção do país e o bem-estar de sua população. Neste contexto, e com o intuito de trazer as questões de eficiência e redistributividade ao ambiente de tributação de energia elétrica, o presente trabalho pretende apresentar um panorama da tributação atual do consumo residencial de energia elétrica, principalmente em relação ao ICMS, juntamente com um cálculo simplificado de alíquotas considerando dois modelos de tributação ótima, estabelecidos por F. R. Ramsey e Diamond e Mirrlees, a partir dos quais é possível realizar comparações em relação ao modelo atual e sintetizar uma visão nacional de uma tributação realizada em sua maior parte regionalmente. O primeiro modelo considera apenas eficiência na definição das alíquotas aplicadas aos produtos, partindo da premissa de que todos os consumidores são idênticos e não há preocupações com equidade. As elasticidades necessárias para aplicação do critério de Ramsey são estimadas a partir de dados em painel das 64 distribuidoras de energia elétrica do país, utilizando um modelo em dois estágios com variável instrumental. O segundo modelo, proposto por Diamond e Mirrlees, incorpora a equidade na modelagem, introduzindo a diferenciação entre os indivíduos.

Optimal exchange rate policy, optimal incomplete taxation and business cycles

Implementation and collapse of exchange rate pegging schemes are recur- rent events. A currency crisis (pegging) is usually followed by an economic downturn (boom). This essay explains why a benevolent government should pursue Þscal and monetary policies that lead to those recurrent currency crises and subsequent periods of pegging. It is shown that the optimal policy induces a competitive equilibrium that displays a boom in periods of below average de- valuation and a recession in periods of above average devaluation. A currency crisis (pegging) can be understood as an optimal policy answer to a recession (boom).

Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets

We study optimal labor income taxation in non-competitive labor markets. Firms offer screening contracts to workers who have private information about their productivity. A planner endowed with a Paretian social welfare function tries to induce allocations that maximize its objective. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation of constrained efficient allocations using tax schedules. All allocations that are implementable by a tax schedule display negative marginal tax rates for almost all workers. Not all allocations that are implementable in a competitive setting are implementable in this noncompetitive environment.

Education, preferences for leisure, and the optimal income tax schedule

Recent advances in dynamic Mirrlees economies have incorporated the treatment of human capital investments as an important dimension of government policy. This paper adds to this literature by considering a two period economy where agents are di erentiated by their preferences for leisure and their productivity, both private information. The fact that productivity is only learnt later in an agent's life introduces uncertainty to agent's savings and human capital choices and makes optimal the use of multi-period tie-ins in the mechanism that characterizes the government policy. We show that optimal policies are often interim ine cient and that the introduction of these ine ciencies may take the form of marginal tax rates on labor income of varying sign and educational policies that include the discouragement of human capital acquisition. With regards to implementation, state-dependent linear taxes implement optimal savings, while human capital policies may require labor income taxes that depend directly on agents' schooling.

Essays on household taxation and competition between heterogeneous firms

Essa tese é constituída por três artigos: "Tax Filing Choices for the Household", "Optimal Tax for the Household: Collective and Unitary Approaches" e "Vertical Differentiation and Heterogeneous Firms".

Taxation of couples: a mirrleesian approach for non-unitary households

Optimal tax theory in the Mirrlees’ (1971) tradition implicitly relies on the assumption that all agents are single or that couples may be treated as individuals, despite accumulating evidence against this view of household behavior. We consider an economy where agents may either be single or married, in which case choices result from Nash bargaining between spouses. In such an environment, tax schedules must play the double role of: i) defining households’ objective functions through their impact on threat points, and; ii) inducing the desired allocations as optimal choices for households given these objectives. We find that the taxation principle, which asserts that there is no loss in relying on tax schedules is not valid here: there are constrained efficient allocations which cannot be implemented via taxes. More sophisticated mechanisms expand the set of implementable allocations by: i) aligning the households’ and planner’s objectives; ii) manipulating taxable income elasticities, and; iii) freeing the design of singles’ tax schedules from its consequences on households’ objectives.