Taxing hard-to-tax markets

Tax enforcement costs constrain the government s ability to observe economic transactions, giving rise to hard-to-tax (HTT) markets. In these markets transactions are untaxed and consumers are better o¤ than in taxed markets. This paper studies a novel approach to combat evasion in HTT markets: consumer auditing, which rewards consumers for re- questing transaction receipts. We develop a Hotelling-type spatial model of sales taxation to analyze the welfare and distributional e¤ects of the implementation of this policy. We and that consumer auditing allows for a lower tax rate and greater provision of the public good in the economy. We show that this policy not only can enhance welfare, but also equalize utilities of consumers across markets

The effects of small firm tax incentives on employment levels

This paper aims to evaluate the impact on employment growth of a tax incentive program targeting Brazilian manufacturing small businesses (SIMPLES). This evaluation is conducted for two distinct periods: for the year 1997, when the program was first implemented, and for the year 1999, when the eligibility rule was modified to allow the eligibility of a broader group of firms. The evaluation takes into account two distinct channels through which the charted effects operate. The first is the employment variation in the firms that became eligible for the incentives, and the second is the change in the survival probability experienced by the same group of firms. Moreover, each of these channels can be activated either by the tax reduction dimension of the program or by its dimension of red tape simplification. Our results identify positive effects on employment growth for the tax incentive program only in the dimension of red tape simplification and its effects on the 1997 sample.

Rational expectations and the service of public debt: a recursive approach

This paper uses dynamic programming to study the time consistency of optimal macroeconomic policy in economies with recurring public deficits. To this end, a general equilibrium recursive model introduced in Chang (1998) is extended to include govemment bonds and production. The original mode! presents a Sidrauski economy with money and transfers only, implying that the need for govemment fmancing through the inflation tax is minimal. The extended model introduces govemment expenditures and a deficit-financing scheme, analyzing the SargentWallace (1981) problem: recurring deficits may lead the govemment to default on part of its public debt through inflation. The methodology allows for the computation of the set of alI sustainable stabilization plans even when the govemment cannot pre-commit to an optimal inflation path. This is done through value function iterations, which can be done on a computeI. The parameters of the extended model are calibrated with Brazilian data, using as case study three Brazilian stabilization attempts: the Cruzado (1986), Collor (1990) and the Real (1994) plans. The calibration of the parameters of the extended model is straightforward, but its numerical solution proves unfeasible due to a dimensionality problem in the algorithm arising from limitations of available computer technology. However, a numerical solution using the original algorithm and some calibrated parameters is obtained. Results indicate that in the absence of govemment bonds or production only the Real Plan is sustainable in the long run. The numerical solution of the extended algorithm is left for future research.

Does liquidity constraints matter for Ricardian equivalence?

The paper analysis a general equilibrium model with two periods, several households and a government that has to finance some expenditures in the first period. Households may have some private information either about their type (adverse selection) or about some action levei chosen in the first period that affects the probability of certain states of nature in the second period (moral hazard). Trade of financiai assets are intermediated by a finite collection of banks. Banks objective functions are determined in equilibrium by shareholders. Due to private information it may be optimal for the banks to introduce constraints in the set of available portfolios for each household as wellas household specific asset prices. In particular, households may face distinct interest rates for holding the risk-free asset. The government finances its expenditures either by taxing households in the first period or by issuing bonds in the first period and taxing households in the second period. Taxes may be state-dependent. Suppose government policies are neutml: i) government policies do not affect the distribution of wealth across households; and ii) if the government decides to tax a household in the second period there is a portfolio available for the banks that generates the Mme payoff in each state of nature as the household taxes. Tben, Ricardian equivalence holds if and only if an appropriate boundary condition is satisfied. Moreover, at every free-entry equilibrium the boundary condition is satisfied and thus Ricardian equivalence holds. These results do not require any particular assumption on the banks' objective function. In particular, we do not assume banks to be risk neutral.

Yet another reason to tax goods

When, in a dynamic model, choices by an agent : i) are not observed, and; ii) affect preferences conditional on the realization of types, new and unexpected features come up in Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal taxation frame- work. In the simplest possible model where a non-trivial filtration may be incorporated, we show how these two characteristics make it neces- sary for IC constraints to be defined in terms of strategies rather than pure announcements. Tax prescriptions are derived, and we are able to show that uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz fails to hold, in general. Clean results regarding capital income taxation are not easy to come about because usual assumption on preferences do not allow for determining which constraints bind at the optimum. However, in the most ’natural’ cases, we show that return on capital ought to be taxed.

Tax reform under fiscal stress: a CGE analysis of the Brazilian tax reform

In spite of a general agreement over the distortion imposed by the current Brazilian tax system, attempts to reform it during the last decade have faced several restrictions to its implementation. Two of these restrictions were particular binding: a) fiscal adjustment restriction (public sector debt cannot increase), b) fiscal federalist restriction (revenues from individual states and municipalities cannot decrease). This paper focuses on a specific reform that overcomes in principle the fiscal federalist restriction. Using Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) model calibrated for the Brazilian economy, I analyze the short and long run macroeconomic effects of this reform subject to the fiscal adjustment restriction. Finally, I look at the redistributive effects of this reform among generations as a way to infer about public opinion’s reaction to the reform. The reform consists basically of replacing indirect taxes on corporate revenues, which I show to be equivalent to a symmetric tax on labor and capital income, by a new federal VAT. The reform presented positive macroeconomic effects both in the short and long run. Despite a substantial increase in the average VAT rate in the first years after the reform, a majority of cohorts experienced an increase in their lifetime welfare, being potentially in favour of the reform.

The distribution of average and marginal effective tax rates in European Union member states

Macro-based summary indicators of effective tax burdens do not capture differences in effective tax rates facing different sub-groups of the population. They also cannot provide information on the level or distribution of the marginal effective tax rates thought to influence household behaviour. I use EUROMOD, an EU-wide tax-benefit microsimulation model, to compute distributions of average and marginal effective tax rates across the household population in fourteen European Union Member States. Using different definitions of ‘net taxes’, the tax base and the unit of analysis I present a range of measures showing the contribution of the tax-benefit system to household incomes, the average effective tax rates applicable to income from labour and marginal effective tax rates faced by working men and women. In a second step, effective tax rates are broken down to separately show the influence of each type of tax-benefit instrument. The results show that measures of effective tax rates vary considerably depending on incomes, labour market situations and family circumstances. Using single averages or macro-based indicators will therefore provide an inappropriate picture of tax burdens faced by large parts of the population.

Flypaper effect revisited : evidence for tax collection efficiency in Brazilian municipalities

This paper has two purposes. First, to construct efficiency scores in tax collection for Brazilian municipalities in 2004, taking into consideration two outputs: amount of per capita local tax collected -tax revenue- and the size of local informal economy- tax base. This methodology eliminates the price- effect of tax collection. Second, using the rules established on the Brazilian Constitution in 1988 to transfer unconditional funds among municipalities as instrument, to estimate the relationship between intergovernmental transfers and efficiency in tax collection. We conclude that transfers affect negatively the efficiency in tax collection, leading to a reinterpretation of the flypaper effect.

Inglorious revolution : sovereign debt, tropical credibility, and financial underdevelopment in imperial Brazil

In 1824 the creation of institutions that constrained the monarch’s ability to unilaterally tax, spend, and debase the currency put Brazil on a path toward a revolution in public finance, roughly analogous to the financial consequences of England’s Glorious Revolution. This credible commitment to honor sovereign debt resulted in successful long-term funded borrowing at home and abroad from the 1820s through the 1880s that was unrivalled in Latin America. Some domestic bonds, denominated in the home currency and bearing exchange clauses, eventually circulated in European financial markets. The share of total debt accounted for by long-term funded issues grew, and domestic debt came to dominate foreign debt. Sovereign debt yields fell over time in London and Rio de Janeiro, and the cost of new borrowing declined on average. The market’s assessment of the probability of default tended to decrease. Imperial Brazil enjoyed favorable conditions for borrowing, and escaped the strong form of “original sin” stressed by recent work on sovereign debt. The development of vibrant private financial markets did not, however, follow from the enhanced credibility of government debt. Private finance in Imperial Brazil suffered from politicized market interventions that undermined the development of domestic capital markets. Private interest rates remained high, entry into commercial banking was heavily restricted, and limited-liability joint-stock companies were tightly controlled. The Brazilian case provides a powerful counterexample to the general proposition of North and Weingast that institutional changes that credibly commit the government to honor its obligations necessarily promote the development of private finance. The very institutions that enhanced the credibility of sovereign debt permitted the systematic repression of private financial development. In terms of its consequences for domestic capital markets, the liberal Constitution of 1824 represented an “inglorious” revolution.

Temporary exchange rate-based stabilization programs under asset market segmentation

This paper analyses the welfare consequences of temporary exchange rate-based stabilization programs. Differently than previous papers, however, here we assume that only a fraction of households participates in asset market transactions. With this asset market segmentation assumption, the effects of temporary programs on welfare may change drastically. Households with access to the bonds market are able to protect themselves better from the changes in the inflation rate – although at the cost of a distortion in their consumption path. As a consequence, they may decrease their inflation tax burden – which would increase for the other group of households. By the other side, when these agents that lack the access to the asset markets are credit constrained, they may welcome the program, since the government Is temporally reducing the inflation tax they have to pay. The temporary program could end up benefiting both groups, what could help to understand their popularity.

Bank transactions tax: pathway to the single tax ideal: a modern tax technology, the Brazilian experience with a bank transactions tax (1993-2007)

Lançado por Marcos Cintra nos EUA, é mais uma contribuição ao debate envolvendo os impostos e a ideia do Imposto Único.

Determinantes da liquidez de corporate bonds no mercado brasileiro

O objetivo desta dissertação é investigar o mercado secundário de debêntures do Brasil, para responder quais as características dos títulos afetam sua liquidez e quais as características de liquidez podem ser observadas nas debêntures brasileiras. Cinco medidas de liquidez foram utilizadas: número de dias que ocorreram transações, número de transações, volume relativo de transações em relação ao montante emitido, diferença entre os preços máximos e mínimos transacionados e a volatilidade do rendimento. Para cada medida de liquidez, verificou-se a influência de oito características das debêntures: rating, volume emitido, prazo de vencimento, segmento do emissor, listagem em bolsa, idade da emissão e tipo de emissão (incentivada e sob instrução de esforços restritos). Foram coletadas 998 emissões públicas de debêntures e suas respectivas transações até 18 meses após a emissão, no período de janeiro de 2007 a agosto de 2015. A base de dados, que somou 53.085 observações, fundamentou-se nas cotações de mercado fornecidas diariamente pelo Sistema Nacional de Debêntures. Como resultado, verificou-se que o volume da emissão, tipo de emissão (incentivada ou restrita) e determinados segmentos são variáveis de liquidez. Adicionalmente constatou-se que, controlando os segmentos dos emissores, debêntures com maior volume emitido são mais líquidas. E mais, a relação entre idade e liquidez não é clara e a diferença entre preços máximos e mínimos das transações não é uma medida de liquidez apropriada. Por fim, verificou-se que a grande concentração de títulos emitidos sob esforços restritos reduziu a liquidez do mercado em comparação com o estudo de Sheng e Saito (2008), apesar do aumento do volume emitido no período. Em contrapartida, a emissão de títulos incentivados elevou o nível de transações no mercado secundário.