Speculative attacks on debts, dollarization and optimum currency areas

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the discussion of the financial aspects of dollarization and optimum currency areas. Based on the model of self-fulfilling debt crisis developed by Cole and Kehoe [4], it is possible to evaluate the comparative welfare of economies, which either keep their local currency and an independent monetary policy, join a monetary union or adopt dollarization. In the two former monetary regimes, governments can issue debt denominated, respectively, in local and common currencies, which is completely purchased by national consumers. Given this ability, governments may decide to impose an inflation tax on these assets and use the revenues so collected to avoid an external debt crises. While the country that issues its own currency takes this decision independently, a country belonging to a monetary union depends on the joint decision of all member countries about the common monetary policy. In this way, an external debt crises may be avoided under the local and common currency regimes, if, respectively, the national and the union central banks have the ability to do monetary policy, represented by the reduction in the real return on the bonds denominated in these currencies. This resource is not available under dollarization. In a dollarized economy, the loss of control over national monetary policy does not allow adjustments for exogenous shocks that asymmetrically affect the client and the anchor countries, but credibility is strengthened. On the other hand, given the ability to inflate the local currency, the central bank may be subject to the political influence of a government not so strongly concerned with fiscal discipline, which reduces the welfare of the economy. In a similar fashion, under a common currency regime, the union central bank may also be under the influence of a group of countries to inflate the common currency, even though they do not face external restrictions. Therefore, the local and common currencies could be viewed as a way to provide welfare enhancing bankruptcy, if it is not abused. With these peculiarities of monetary regimes in mind, we simulate the levels of economic welfare for each, employing recent data for the Brazilian economy.

A study of behavioral finance: background, theories and application

Behavioral finance, or behavioral economics, consists of a theoretical field of research stating that consequent psychological and behavioral variables are involved in financial activities such as corporate finance and investment decisions (i.e. asset allocation, portfolio management and so on). This field has known an increasing interest from scholar and financial professionals since episodes of multiple speculative bubbles and financial crises. Indeed, practical incoherencies between economic events and traditional neoclassical financial theories had pushed more and more researchers to look for new and broader models and theories. The purpose of this work is to present the field of research, still ill-known by a vast majority. This work is thus a survey that introduces its origins and its main theories, while contrasting them with traditional finance theories still predominant nowadays. The main question guiding this work would be to see if this area of inquiry is able to provide better explanations for real life market phenomenon. For that purpose, the study will present some market anomalies unsolved by traditional theories, which have been recently addressed by behavioral finance researchers. In addition, it presents a practical application of portfolio management, comparing asset allocation under the traditional Markowitz’s approach to the Black-Litterman model, which incorporates some features of behavioral finance.

Riscos, crises e confiança : uma análise do gerenciamento de riscos sobre segurança da informação em uma empresa brasileira de grande porte

Por muito tempo, os programas de qualidade e gestão vêm dominando o cenário de soluções para a melhoria das organizações. Nesse contexto, têm sido constantes os modismos e, ao mesmo tempo, o consumo de muitas soluções. E o mercado parece se nutrir desses pacotes. De pacote em pacote, a gestão nas companhias vem se desenvolvendo e se especializando e, junto como isso, os métodos e técnicas da boa gestão. A gestão de riscos, especificamente, vem nesse contexto. Apresenta-se como uma solução em gestão, mas parece se estabelecer como ponto de convergência e de influência na otimização e garantia de processos produtivos, de gestão e de suporte, abrangendo uma gama de possibilidades em diversas disciplinas do mundo empresarial, desde finanças até os aspectos de fraudes e distúrbios cotidianos. Na sequência da gestão de riscos, vem a gestão de crises. Esta, o hemisfério dos riscos transformados em impactos verdadeiros e com danos visíveis para a organização. A gestão de crises pressupõe a gestão dos riscos consumados e que, claramente, afetam a organização e seu contexto, tanto interno quanto externo. No ponto final dessa lógica, aparece a confiança como aquilo que sela o pacto da organização e seus stakeholders, como resultado da boa ou má gestão de riscos e crises. Este estudo é, então, sobre riscos, crises e confiança e sobre o entendimento de como a gestão sobrepõe esses elementos e como isso se aplica às organizações, especificamente a uma grande organização do mercado brasileiro. Após revisão bibliográfica, é feita uma pesquisa para se analisar como está sendo a aplicação dos conceitos e práticas de riscos e crises em uma grande empresa, entrevistando-se o principal executivo da companhia responsável pela gestão de riscos na área de segurança da informação e outro responsável pela gestão de crises. É feita uma pesquisa para se entender a percepção de empregados e gerentes da companhia estudada sobre os conceitos e práticas de gestão de riscos e crises e suas aplicações na companhia. Também é feita uma abordagem sobre confiança, extrapolando-se esse conceito para uma idéia de confiabilidade dessas práticas e propondo uma forma de medir essa confiabilidade, identificada como uma lacuna na gestão de crises. Ao final, é feita uma análise sobre o quanto a aplicação desses conceitos e práticas são sistemáticos ou não, de acordo com as hipóteses e suposições definidas, constatando-se o 9 caráter operacional e a aplicação recente das práticas, um tanto deslocada do modelo de referência proposto para o estudo e com pouca visibilidade por parte dos empregados, principalmente no que tange a percepção de efetividade das práticas adotadas.

Why economics should be a modest and reasonable science

Unlike the methodological sciences such as mathematics and decision theory, which use the hypothetical-deductive method and may be fully expressed in complex mathematical models because their only truth criterion is logical consistency, the substantive sciences have as their truth criterion the correspondence to reality, adopt an empirical-deductive method, and are supposed to generalize from and often unreliable regularities and tendencies. Given this assumption, it is very difficult for economists to predict economic behavior, particularly major financial crises.

A cross-country study on trade credit supply and financial crisis

O objetivo deste trabalho de pesquisa é investigar a oferta de crédito comercial durante períodos de crise financeira em seis países diferentes: Brasil, França, Alemanha, Itália, Espanha e Reino Unido, foram utilizadas informações de empresas de capital aberto entre 2000 e 2011. A literatura internacional documenta que durante o pico de crises financeiras a oferta de crédito comercial aumenta pois as companhias usam o crédito comercial como substituto e/ou complemento ao crédito bancário, apesar de após o momento de pico esta oferta diminui significantemente porque as empresas enfrentam problemas de liquidez causado por escassez de crédito. Mesmo que somente existam evidências pontuais de que a oferta de crédito comercial aumentou durante a crise financeira global de 2008, o efeito pós-crise é perceptível durante a crise Europeia de 2011, pois as empresas europeias diminuíram a oferta de crédito comercial, também evidenciando que estas companhias estavam confrontando problemas de administração de liquidez. Em relação ao uso de crédito comercial como ferramenta de transmissão de capital, nenhuma evidência foi encontrada para provar sua existência em tempo de crise financeira.

Do capital controls boost resilence to crises?

Os controles de capitais estão novamente em voga em razão dos países emergentes reintroduzirem essas medidas nos últimos anos face a abundante entrada de capital internacional. As autoridades argumentam que tais medidas protegem as economias no caso de uma “parada abrupta” desses fluxos. Será demonstrado que os controles de capitais parecem fazer com que as economias emergentes (EMEs) fiquem mais resistentes diante de uma crise financeira (por exemplo, uma queda na atividade econômica seguida de uma crise é menor quando o controle é maior). No entanto, os controles de capitais parecem deixar as economias emergentes (EMEs) também mais propícias a uma crise. Deste modo, as autoridades devem ser cautelosas na avaliação quanto aos riscos e benefícios relativos a aplicação das medidas dos controles de capitais.

Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias

Crises bancárias podem implicar uma alta redistribuição de recursos em uma sociedade. O interesse público em manter os bancos em funcionamento demanda o desenho de regimes eficazes de resolução, pois a falência desordenada desses intermediários pode ser uma fonte de risco sistêmico. O Banco Central, autoridade responsável por zelar pela higidez do sistema financeiro, pode se valer de diversos instrumentos para reestruturar ou liquidar um banco em dificuldade financeira. De modo a prevenir a propagação do risco sistêmico, as regras jurídicas conferem ao Banco Central uma ampla margem de discricionariedade no julgamento de quais bancos merecem receber assistência financeira e na escolha dos métodos de resolução bancária. O caráter globalizado das finanças exige uma maior coordenação entre autoridades domésticas na resolução de bancos que operam em múltiplas jurisdições. Algumas iniciativas de órgãos internacionais no período pós-crise de 2007-2008 têm buscado instituir, em nível global, um marco normativo para gerenciamento de crises bancárias, através da harmonização de regimes domésticos de resolução. O histórico de crises do sistema financeiro brasileiro levou ao desenvolvimento de uma rede de proteção bancária em momentos anteriores à crise financeira global de 2007-2008. Assim, o sistema financeiro brasileiro apresentou bom funcionamento mesmo nas fases mais agudas. Não tendo experimentado uma crise sistêmica no período recente, o Brasil não está passando por reformas profundas na estrutura institucional do seu sistema financeiro, a exemplo de países como Estados Unidos e Reino Unido. No entanto, desafios impostos pela crescente globalização das finanças e peculiaridades locais motivam reformas e mudanças discretas nos padrões de governança da rede de proteção brasileira. Através da reconstituição da atuação do Banco Central em três momentos de crise no Brasil, o presente trabalho busca analisar criticamente a rede de proteção bancária brasileira e os mecanismos jurídicos de accountability da autoridade financeira no exercício da supervisão e administração de crises bancárias.

Simulation -based smoothing and filtering in factor stochastic volatility models : two econometric applications (July-2001)

The past decade has wítenessed a series of (well accepted and defined) financial crises periods in the world economy. Most of these events aI,"e country specific and eventually spreaded out across neighbor countries, with the concept of vicinity extrapolating the geographic maps and entering the contagion maps. Unfortunately, what contagion represents and how to measure it are still unanswered questions. In this article we measure the transmission of shocks by cross-market correlation\ coefficients following Forbes and Rigobon's (2000) notion of shift-contagion,. Our main contribution relies upon the use of traditional factor model techniques combined with stochastic volatility mo deIs to study the dependence among Latin American stock price indexes and the North American indexo More specifically, we concentrate on situations where the factor variances are modeled by a multivariate stochastic volatility structure. From a theoretical perspective, we improve currently available methodology by allowing the factor loadings, in the factor model structure, to have a time-varying structure and to capture changes in the series' weights over time. By doing this, we believe that changes and interventions experienced by those five countries are well accommodated by our models which learns and adapts reasonably fast to those economic and idiosyncratic shocks. We empirically show that the time varying covariance structure can be modeled by one or two common factors and that some sort of contagion is present in most of the series' covariances during periods of economical instability, or crisis. Open issues on real time implementation and natural model comparisons are thoroughly discussed.

Essays on banking theory and history of financial arrangements

Esta tese contém dois capítulos, cada um lidando com a teoria e a história dos bancos e arranjos financeiros. No capítulo 1, busca-se extender uma economia Diamond-Dybvig com monitoramento imperfeito dos saques antecipados e realizar uma comparação do bem estar social em cada uma das alocações possíveis, como proposto em Presscott and Weinberg(2003). Esse monitoramento imperfeito é implementado a partir da comunicação indireta ( através de um meio de pagamento) entre os agentes e a máquina de depósitos e saques que é um agregado do setor produtivo e financeiro. A extensão consiste em estudar alocações onde uma fração dos agentes pode explorar o monitoramento imperfeito e fraudar a alocação contratada ao consumirem mais cedo além do limite, usando múltiplos meios de pagamento. Com a punição limitada no período de consumo tardio, essa nova alocação pode ser chamada de uma alocação separadora em contraste com as alocações agregadoras onde o agente com habilidade de fraudar é bloqueado por um meio de pagamento imune a fraude, mas custoso, ou por receber consumo futuro suficiente para tornar a fraude desinteressante. A comparação de bem estar na gama de parâmetros escolhida mostra que as alocações separadoras são ótimas para as economias com menor dotação e as agregadoras para as de nível intermediário e as ricas. O capítulo termina com um possível contexto histórico para o modelo, o qual se conecta com a narrativa histórica encontrada no capítulo 2. No capítulo 2 são exploradas as propriedade quantitativas de um sistema de previsão antecedente para crises financeiras, com as váriaveis sendo escolhidas a partir de um arcabouço de ``boom and bust'' descrito mais detalhadamente no apêndice 1. As principais variáveis são: o crescimento real nos preços de imóveis e ações, o diferencial entre os juros dos títulos governamentais de 10 anos e a taxa de 3 meses no mercado inter-bancário e o crescimento nos ativos totais do setor bancário. Essas variáveis produzem uma taxa mais elevada de sinais corretos para as crises bancárias recentes (1984-2008) do que os sistemas de indicadores antecedentes comparáveis. Levar em conta um risco de base crescente ( devido à tendência de acumulação de distorções no sistema de preços relativos em expansões anteriores) também provê informação e eleva o número de sinais corretos em países que não passaram por uma expansão creditícia e nos preços de ativos tão vigorosa.

Optimal exchange rate policy, optimal incomplete taxation and business cycles

Implementation and collapse of exchange rate pegging schemes are recur- rent events. A currency crisis (pegging) is usually followed by an economic downturn (boom). This essay explains why a benevolent government should pursue Þscal and monetary policies that lead to those recurrent currency crises and subsequent periods of pegging. It is shown that the optimal policy induces a competitive equilibrium that displays a boom in periods of below average de- valuation and a recession in periods of above average devaluation. A currency crisis (pegging) can be understood as an optimal policy answer to a recession (boom).

Immigration as a strategic vector for the socio-economic and institutional development of Brazil

Brazil has demonstrated resilience in relation to the recent economic crises and has an auspicious development potential projected for the coming decades, which, linked to the globalization process, provides important opportunities for our people. Gradually we have established ourselves as one of the leading nations in the world and we have become a reference in questions linked to economic equilibrium, development, energy, agriculture and the environment. This international recognition favors the exchange of experiences with other cultures, governments and organizations, bringing with it the possibility of stimulating a dynamic process of development and innovation.

Co-ordination failure, moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures

We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor coordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor's incentives leads to excessive 'rollover failure' by creditors when sovereign default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures and relate this to the current debate on revising international financial architecture. Paper prepared for Bank of England Conference on "The Role of the Official and Private Sectors in Resolving International Financial Crises", London, and for the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Sao Paolo, Brazil. (Preliminary draft circulated for comments, please do not cite without reference to the authors).

Inflation targeting, credibility and coordination aspects

There are plenty of economic studies pointing out some requirements, like the inexistence of fiscal dominance, for inflation targeting framework be implemented in successful (credible) way. Essays on how public targets could be used in the absence of such requirements are unusual. In this papel' we appraise how central banks could use inflation targeting before soundness economic fundamentaIs have been achieved. First, based on concise framework, where confidence crises and imperfect information are neglected, we conclude that less ambitious (greater) target for inflation increases the credibility in the precommitment. Optimal target is higher than the one obtained using the Cukierman-Liviatan [7] model, where increasing credibility effect is not considered. Second, extending the model to make confidence crises possible, multiple equilibria solutions becomes possible too. In this case, to set greater targets for inflation may stimulate confidence crises and reduce the policymaker credibility. On the other hand, multiple (bad) equilibria may be avoided. The optimal target depends on the likelihood of each equilibrium be selected. Finally, when perturbing common knowledge uniqueness is restored even considering confidence crises, as in Morris-Shin[ 14]. The first result, i.e. less ambitious target for inflation increases credibility in precommitment, is also recovered. Adding a precise public signal, cOOl'dinated self-fulfilling actions and equilibrium multiplicity may still exist for some lack of common knowledge (as in Angeleto and Weming[l]). In this case, to set greater targets for inflation may stimulate confidence crisis again, reducing the policymaker credibility. From another aspect, multiple (bad) equilibria may be avoided. Optimal policy prescriptions depend on the likelihood of each equilibrium be selected. Results also indicate that more precise public information may open the door for bad equilibrium, contrary to the conventional wisdom that more central oank transparency is always good when considering inflation targeting framework.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

A note on financial regulation and the brazilian response to the 2008‐09 financial crisis

Brazil was frequently criticized for its interventionist and heavy financial regulation up until the 2008‐09 world financial crisis.  According to the neo‐liberal or pro‐market view that predominated in academic and financial circles during the early 2000s, economic development came together with financial deepening, which in its turn could only be achieved through financial liberalization and deregulation. The currency crises of the 1990s notwithstanding, by the mid‐2000s Brazil’s segmented financial market and its restrictive reserve and capital requirements were seen as a symbol of inefficiency and backwardness by most financial specialists.  To the luck of the Brazilian population, most of the advices of such specialists were ignored by the Brazilian authorities, so that, when the 2008 financial crisis hit the world economy, Brazil still had powerful and efficient instruments to deal with the problem.  The objective of this note is to present the mains aspects of the Brazilian financial regulation and how they helped the economy to deal with the consequences of 2008‐09 financial meltdown.