Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.

Trade Liberalization and Regional Impacts on Residual Wage Inequality: Evidence from Brazil

O objetivo deste trabalho é entender mais sobre o papel da liberalização sobre a desigualdade salarial, mais precisamente, sobre a desigualdade residual dos salários. Usando a abertura comercial brasileira, a extensa redução tarifária que ocorreu entre 1987 e 1995, é investigado empiricamente se os diferentes níveis de exposição ao comércio entre os estados contribuíram para os diferentes movimentos da desigualdade. Os resultados indicam que estados mais expostos à liberalização comercial experimentaram um aumento relativo da desigualdade residual dos salários ou, de forma equivalente, uma menor redução. Estes resultados enriquecem a discussão dos efeitos da abertura comercial sobre a desigualdade.

Income inequality and human capital development

Investimentos em capital humano são essenciais para o desenvolvimento econômico de um pais. No Brasil, diversas fontes apontam para a falta de mão de obra qualificada como sendo uma das causas de um fraco crescimento econômico. Esta dissertação explora as teorias que ligam desigualdade de renda com performance econômica. A parte empírica se foca em uma das teorias apresentadas, a de imperfeições no mercado de credito. De acordo com esta teoria, mercados de credito imperfeitos são fracos alocadores de recursos e não possibilitam que indivíduos de baixa renda invistam no próprio capital humano. No Brasil, há uma escassez de estudos empíricos focados em testar os canais através dos quais a desigualdade de renda afeta o crescimento, trazendo significância para esta dissertação. Os resultados apresentados aqui foram obtidos através da pesquisa familiar – POF – realizada pelo IBGE. Os dados mostram que investimentos em educação crescem como percentual do orçamento com o aumento da renda familiar. Aumentos de renda para classes de renda já elevadas não provocam igual aumento nas despesas educacionais. Os dados sugerem a existência de uma restrição orçamentária para Brasileiros de baixa e média renda independente da região. Foram encontradas fortes evidencias de que classes de baixa e média renda no Brasil tem acesso limitado ao mercado de credito. Portanto, existe evidencia de que redistribuição aumentaria o gasto agregado em educação

Credit borrowing constraints in a DSGE framework: income vs. housing

Credit market in Brazil distinguishes from advanced economies in many aspects. One of them is related to collaterals for households borrowing. This work proposes a DSGE framework, based on Gerali et al.(2010), to analyse one pecularity of Brazillian credit market: payroll-deducted personal loans. To original model, we added the possibility to households contract long term debt and compare to differents types of credit constrains: one based on housing and other based on future income. We callibrate and estimate the model to Brazil, using Bayesian technique. Results show that, in a economy where credit constraints are based on income, responses to shocks appear to be stronger, at first, but dissipate faster. This occurs because income responds quickly to shock than housing prices, so does amount available to loans. In order to smooth consumption, agents compensate lower income and borrowing by increasing working hours, restoring loans and debt in a shorter time.

Inequality of opportunity in daycare and preschool services in Brazil

In this paper we measure inequality of opportunity in daycare and preschool services in Brazil. For this purpose, we construct an opportunity index that modifies the human opportunity index proposed in the literature and used in Barros et al. (2009) to measure inequality in basic opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Specifically, we construct an opportunity measure that includes not only attendance but also parental choice not to enroll children in daycare or preschool, using data from a supplementary questionnaire included in the 2006 version of Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD). The results show that there are large differences between our opportunity index and the human opportunity index for children aged 0-3 years old and considerably smaller differences for children aged 4-6 years old, which suggests that preschool may be closer to a basic opportunity than daycare.

Financial constraints and house prices: an international perspective

In this paper, we show substantial empirical evidence that house prices are more sensitive to shocks to percapita income, in countries where housing finance is more developed. This result is consistent with the theoretical framework developed in the paper, where we study the impact ofprogressive relaxation of financiai constraints on housing demand and equilibrium house prices. Our results are consistent with recent literature on financiai constraints and business investment, which argues that the investment of less constrained firms can be more sensitive to changes in cash flow. More broadly, our results challenge the traditional view that financiai development leads to smaller fluctuations in key economic variables. The policy implications are c1ear and important. Even iffinancial development is desirable for other reasons, the potential associated increase in volatility should be an explicit policy concern.

Construction of facilities under asymmetric information: do constitutional constraints matter?

This paper studies construction of facilities in a federal state under asymmetric information. A country consists of two regions, each ruled by a local authority. The federal government plans to construct a facility in one of the regions. The facility generates a local value in the host region and has spillover effects in the other region. The federal government does not observe the local value because it is the local authority's private information. 80 the federal governrnent designs an incentive-compatible mechanism, specifying if the facility should be constructed and a balanced scheme of interregional transfers to finance its cost. The federal governrnent is constitutionally constrained to respect a given leveI of each region's welfare. We show that depending upon the facility's local value and the spillover effect, the governrnent faces different incentive problems. Moreover, their existence depends crucially on how stringent constitutional constraints are. Therefore, the optimal mechanism will also depend upon these three features of the model.

A theoretical connection between inflation and income inequality

This work investigates the effects of inflation on income distribution. We use a dynamic shopping-time model to show that a differentiated access to transacting technologies by poor and rich consumers is enough to generate a positive link between inflation and the Gini coefficient of income distribution.

Measurements of income inequality: a critique. Inflation and income inequality: a link through the job- search process

In this paper I claim that, in a long-run perspective, measurements of income inequality, under any of the usual inequality measures used in the literature, are upward biased. The reason is that such measurements are cross-sectional by nature and, therefore, do not take into consideration the turnover in the job market which, in the long run, equalizes within-group (e.g., same-education groups) inequalities. Using a job-search model, I show how to derive the within-group invariant-distribution Gini coefficient of income inequality, how to calculate the size of the bias and how to organize the data in arder to solve the problem. Two examples are provided to illustrate the argument.

Neighborhood feedbacks, endogenous stratification, and income inequality

This paper explores the evolution of the cross-section income distribution in economies where endogenous neighborhood formation interacts with positive within-neighborhood feedback effects. We study an economy in which the economic success of adults is determined by the characteristics of the families in the neighborhood in which a person grows up. These feedbacks take two forms. First, the tax base of a neighborhood affects the leveI of education investment in offspring. Second, the effectiveness of education investment is affected by a neighborhood's in come distribution, reflecting factors such as role model or labor market connection effects. Conditions are developed under which endogenous stratification, defined as the tendency for families wi th similar incomes to choose to form common communities, will occur. When families are allowed to choose their neighborhoods, wealthy families will have an incentive to segregate themselves from the rest of the population. This resulting stratification is supported by house price differences between ricli and poor communities. Endogenous stratification can lead to pronounced intertemporal inequality as different families provide very different interaction environments for offspring. When the transformation of human capital into in come exhibits constant retums to scale, cross-section in come differences may also grow across time. As a result, endogenous stratification and neighborhood feedbacks can interact to produce long run inequality.

Inequality treatment effects

This paper presents semiparametric estimators for treatment effects parameters when selection to treatment is based on observable characteristics. The parameters of interest in this paper are those that capture summarized distributional effects of the treatment. In particular, the focus is on the impact of the treatment calculated by differences in inequality measures of the potential outcomes of receiving and not receiving the treatment. These differences are called here inequality treatment effects. The estimation procedure involves a first non-parametric step in which the probability of receiving treatment given covariates, the propensity-score, is estimated. Using the reweighting method to estimate parameters of the marginal distribution of potential outcomes, in the second step weighted sample versions of inequality measures are.computed. Calculations of semiparametric effciency bounds for inequality treatment effects parameters are presented. Root-N consistency, asymptotic normality, and the achievement of the semiparametric efficiency bound are shown for the semiparametric estimators proposed. A Monte Carlo exercise is performed to investigate the behavior in finite samples of the estimator derived in the paper.

Does liquidity constraints matter for Ricardian equivalence?

The paper analysis a general equilibrium model with two periods, several households and a government that has to finance some expenditures in the first period. Households may have some private information either about their type (adverse selection) or about some action levei chosen in the first period that affects the probability of certain states of nature in the second period (moral hazard). Trade of financiai assets are intermediated by a finite collection of banks. Banks objective functions are determined in equilibrium by shareholders. Due to private information it may be optimal for the banks to introduce constraints in the set of available portfolios for each household as wellas household specific asset prices. In particular, households may face distinct interest rates for holding the risk-free asset. The government finances its expenditures either by taxing households in the first period or by issuing bonds in the first period and taxing households in the second period. Taxes may be state-dependent. Suppose government policies are neutml: i) government policies do not affect the distribution of wealth across households; and ii) if the government decides to tax a household in the second period there is a portfolio available for the banks that generates the Mme payoff in each state of nature as the household taxes. Tben, Ricardian equivalence holds if and only if an appropriate boundary condition is satisfied. Moreover, at every free-entry equilibrium the boundary condition is satisfied and thus Ricardian equivalence holds. These results do not require any particular assumption on the banks' objective function. In particular, we do not assume banks to be risk neutral.