Business cycles in emerging economies : the role of interest rates

This paper documents the empirical relation between the interest rates that emerging economies face in international capital markets and their business cycles. It shows that the patterns observed in the data can be interpreted as the equilibrium of a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy, in which (i) firms have to pay for a fraction of the input bill before production takes place, and (ii) preferences generate a labor supply that is independent of the interest rate. In our sample, interest rates are strongly countercyclical, strongly positively correlated with net exports, and they lead the cycle. Output is very volatile and consumption is more volatile than output. The sample includes data for Argentina during 1983-2000 and for four other large emerging economies, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and Philippines, during 1994-2000. The model is calibrated to Argentina’s economy for the period 1983-1999. When the model is fed with actual US interest rates and the actual default spreads of Argentine sovereign interest rates, interest rates alone can explain forty percent of output fluctuations. When simulated technology shocks are added to the model, it can account for the main empirical regularities of Argentina’s economy during the period. A 1% increase in country risk causes a contemporaneous fall in output of 0.5 ’subsequent recovery. An increase in US rates causes output to fall by the same on impact and by almost 2% two years after the shock. The asymetry in the effect of shocks to US rates and country risk is due to the fact that US interest rates are more persistent than country risk and that there is a significant spillover effect from US interest rates to country risk.

Signaling in political budget cycles: How far are you willing to go?

This paper analyzes how heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and character, a¤ects political budget cycles. Competency is the e¢ciency in running the government. Character is the degree of opportunism. In this expanded space, previous results in the literature on the separating nature of the signaling equilibrium hold if heterogeneity in opportunism is low. With high heterogeneity in opportunism, no separating equilibrium exists. Rather, the equilibrium is partially pooling: only extreme types can be distinguished.

Common factors in Latin America's business cycles

This paper constructs new business cycle indices for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico based on common dynamic factors extracted from a comprehensive set of sectoral output, external trade, fiscal and financial variables. The analysis spans the 135 years since the insertion of these economies into the global economy in the 1870s. The constructed indices are used to derive a business cyc1e chronology for these countries and characterize a set of new stylized facts. In particular, we show that ali four countries have historically displayed a striking combination of high business cyc1e volatility and persistence relative to advanced country benchmarks. Volatility changed considerably over time, however, being very high during early formative decades through the Great Depression, and again during the 1970s and ear1y 1980s, before declining sharply in three of the four countries. We also identify a sizeable common factor across the four economies which variance decompositions ascribe mostly to foreign interest rates and shocks to commodity terms of trade.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.