54 resultados para Endogenous switching regression
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We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.
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Neste trabalho propomos a aplicação das noções de equilíbrio da recente literatura de desenho de mecanismo robusto com aquisição de informação endógena a um problema de divisão de risco entre dois agentes. Através deste exemplo somos capazes de motivar o uso desta noção de equilíbrio, assim como discutir os efeitos da introdu ção de uma restrição de participação que seja dependente da informação. A simplicidade do modelo nos permite caracterizar a possibilidade de implementar a alocação Pareto efiente em termos do custo de aquisição da informação. Além disso, mostramos que a precisão da informação pode ter um efeito negativo sobre a implementação da alocação efi ciente. Ao final, sao dados dois exemplos específicos de situações nas quais este modelo se aplica.
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The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how policymakers’ credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine how credibility affects the outcome of a disinflation in a model with endogenous timedependent pricing rules. Both the initial degree of price ridigity, calculated optimally, and, more notably, the changes in contract length during disinflation play an important role in the explanation of the effects of imperfect credibility. We initially evaluate the costs of disinflation in a setup where credibility is exogenous, and then allow agents to use Bayes rule to update beliefs about the “type” of monetary authority that they face. In both cases, the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation, but the pattern of the output path is more realistic in the case with learning.
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Using national accounts data for the revenue-GDP and expenditureGDP ratios from 1947 to 1992, we examine three central issues in public finance. First, was the path of public debt sustainable during this period? Second, if debt is sustainable, how has the government historically balanced the budget after shocks to either revenues or expenditures? Third, are expenditures exogenous? The results show that (i) public deficit is stationary (bounded asymptotic variance), with the budget in Brazil being balanced almost entirely through changes in taxes, regardless of the cause of the initial imbalance. Expenditures are weakly exogenous, but tax revenues are not; (ii) the behavior of a rational Brazilian consumer may be consistent with Ricardian Equivalence; (iii) seigniorage revenues are critical to restore intertemporal budget equilibrium, since, when we exclude them from total revenues, debt is not sustainable in econometric tests.
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The paper proposes an alternative general equilibrium formulation of financial asset economies with transactions costs. Transaction costs emerge endogenously at equilibrium and reflect agents decisions of intermediating financial activities at the expense of providing labor services. An equilibrium is shown to exist in the case of real asset structures.
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This paper analyses the equilibrium structure of protection in Mercosul, developing empirical analyses based on the literature ensuing from the sequence of models set forth by Grossman and Helpman since 1994. Not only Mercosul’s common external tariff (CET) may be explained under a political economy perspective, but the existence of deviations, both at the level of the external tariffs and at that of the internal ones, make it interesting to contrast several structures under this approach. Different general equilibrium frameworks, in which governments are concerned with campaign contributions and with the welfare of the average voter, while organized special-interest groups care only about the welfare of their members, are used as the theoretical basis of the empirical tests. We build a single equation for explaining the CET and two fourequations systems (one equation for each member) for explaining deviations from the CET and from the internal free trade between members. The results (at the two-digit level) shed an interesting light on the sectoral dynamics of protection in each country; notably, Brazil seems to fit in better in the model framework, followed by Uruguay. In the case of the CET, and of deviations from it, the interaction between the domestic lobbies in the four countries plays a major role. There is also suggestion that the lobby structure that bid for deviations, be they internal or external, differs from the one which bid for the CET.
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We study the implications of the absence of arbitrage in an two period economy where default is allowed and assets are secured by collateral choosen by the borrowers. We show that non arbitrage sale prices of assets are submartingales, whereas non arbitrage purchase prices of the derivatives (secured by the pool of collaterals) are supermartingales. We use these non arbitrage conditions to establish existence of equilibrium, without imposing bounds on short sales. The nonconvexity of the budget set is overcome by considering a continuum of agents. Our results are particularly relevant for the collateralized mortgage obligations(CMO) markets.
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vVe examine the problem of a buyer who wishes to purehase and eombine ti. objeets owned by n individual owners to realize a higher V'illue. The owners are able to delay their entry into the sale proeess: They ean either seU now 01' seU later. Among other assumptions, the simple assumptions of compef'if'irnl, · .. that the presenee of more owners at point of sale reduees their surplus .. · and di..,(Jyun,fúl,g lead to interesting results: There is eostly delay in equilibdum. rvIoreover, with suffidently strong eompetition, the probability of delay inereases with n. Thus, buyers who diseount the future \\i11 faee inereased eosts as the number of owners inereases. The souree of transaetions eosts is the owners' desire to dis-eoordinate in the presenee of eompetition. These eosts are unrelated to transaetions eosts eurrently identified in the literature, spedfieally those due to asymmetrie information, 01' publie goods problems where players impose negative externalities on eaeh other by under-eontributing.
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In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.
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O presente estudo apresenta um modelo de previsão do preço e do volume comercializado no mercado transoceânico de minério de ferro. Para tanto, foi desenvolvido um modelo VAR, utilizando, além das variáveis endógenas com um lag de diferença, o preço do petróleo Brent e um índice de produção industrial. Após testar raiz unitária das variáveis e constatar que nenhuma era estacionária, o teste de cointegração atestou que existia relação de longo prazo entre as mesmas que era estacionária, afastando a possibilidade de uma regressão espúria. Como resultado, a modelagem VAR apresentou um modelo consistente, com elevada aderência para a previsão do preço e do volume negociado de minério de ferro no mercado transoceânico, não obstante ele tenha apresentado alguma imprecisão no curto prazo.
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This paper analyses general equilibrium models with finite heterogeneous agents having exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty. It is shown that there exists a recursive equilibrium with the state space consisting of the past aggregate portfolio distribution and the current state of the nature and that it implements the sequential equilibrium. We establish conditions under which the recursive equilibrium is continuous. Moreover, we use the continuous recursive relation of the aggregate variables to prove that if the economy has two types of agents, the one who commits persistent mistakes on the expectation rules of the future endogenous variables is driven out of the market by the others with correct anticipations of the variables, that is, the rational expectations agents.
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Este trabalho elabora um modelo para investigação do padrão de variação do crescimento econômico, entre diferentes países e através do tempo, usando um framework Markov- Switching com matriz de transição variável. O modelo desenvolvido segue a abordagem de Pritchett (2003), explicando a dinâmica do crescimento a partir de uma coleção de diferentes estados – cada qual com seu sub-modelo e padrão de crescimento – através dos quais os países oscilam ao longo do tempo. A matriz de transição entre os diferentes estados é variante no tempo, dependendo de variáveis condicionantes de cada país e a dinâmica de cada estado é linear. Desenvolvemos um método de estimação generalizando o Algoritmo EM de Diebold et al. (1993) e estimamos um modelo-exemplo em painel com a matriz de transição condicionada na qualidade das instituições e no nível de investimento. Encontramos três estados de crescimento: crescimento estável, ‘milagroso’ e estagnação - virtualmente coincidentes com os três primeiros de Jerzmanowski (2006). Os resultados mostram que a qualidade das instituições é um importante determinante do crescimento de longo prazo enquanto o nível de investimento tem papel diferenciado: contribui positivamente em países com boa qualidade de instituições e tem papel pouco relevante para os países com instituições medianas ou piores.
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Em modelos de competição de preços, somente um custo de procura positivo por parte do consumidor não gera equilíbrio com dispersão de preços. Já modelos dinâmicos de switching cost consistentemente geram este fenômeno bastante documentado para preços no varejo. Embora ambas as literaturas sejam vastas, poucos modelos tentaram combinar as duas fricções em um só modelo. Este trabalho apresenta um modelo dinâmico de competição de preços em que consumidores idênticos enfrentam custos de procura e de switching. O equilíbrio gera dispersão nos preços. Ainda, como os consumidores são obrigados a se comprometer com uma amostra fixa de firmas antes dos preços serem definidos, somente dois preços serão considerados antes de cada compra. Este resultado independe do tamanho do custo de procura individual do consumidor.