Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth

This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization.

Public investment in basic education and economic growth

The main objective of this paper was to visualize the relation between government spending on basic education and the human capital accumulation process, observing the impacts of this spending on individual investments in higher education, and on economic growth. It is used an overlapping-generations model where the government tax the adult generation and spent it in basic education of the next generations. It was demonstrated that the magnitude of the marginal effect of government spending in basic education on growth crucially depends on public budget constrains. The paper explains why some countries with a lot of public investment in basic education growth at low rates. In that sense if a country has only a lot of public investment in basic education without investment in higher education it may growth at low rates because the taxation can cause distortions in the agents incentives to invest in higher education.

Inflationary financing of public investment and economic growth

a theoretical model is constructed in order to explain particular historical experiences in which inflation acceleration apparently helped to spur a period of economic growth. Government financed expenditures affect positively the productivity growth in this model so that the distortionary effect of inflation tax is compensated by the productive effect of public expenditures. We show that for some interval of money creation rates there is an equilibrium where money is valued and where steady state physical capital grows with inflation. It is also shown that zero inflation and growth maximization are never the optimal policies.

Public debt and the limits of fiscal policy to increase economic growth

Research that seeks to estimate the effects of fiscal policies on economic growth has ignored the role of public debt in this relationship. This study proposes a theoretical model of endogenous growth, which demonstrates that the level of the public debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio should negatively impact the effect of fiscal policy on growth. This occurs because government indebtedness extracts part of the savings of the young to pay interest on the debts of the older generation, who are no longer saving. Therefore, the payment of debt interest assumes an allocation exchange role between generations that is similar to a pay-as-you-go pension system, which results in changes in the savings rate of the economy. The major conclusions of the theoretical model were tested using an econometric model to provide evidence for the validity of this conclusion. Our empirical analysis controls for timeinvariant, country-specific heterogeneity in the growth rates. We also address endogeneity issues and allow for heterogeneity across countries in the model parameters and for cross-sectional dependence.

A time-varying markov-switching model for economic growth

This paper investigates economic growth’s pattern of variation across and within countries using a Time-Varying Transition Matrix Markov-Switching Approach. The model developed follows the approach of Pritchett (2003) and explains the dynamics of growth based on a collection of different states, each of which has a sub-model and a growth pattern, by which countries oscillate over time. The transition matrix among the different states varies over time, depending on the conditioning variables of each country, with a linear dynamic for each state. We develop a generalization of the Diebold’s EM Algorithm and estimate an example model in a panel with a transition matrix conditioned on the quality of the institutions and the level of investment. We found three states of growth: stable growth, miraculous growth, and stagnation. The results show that the quality of the institutions is an important determinant of long-term growth, whereas the level of investment has varying roles in that it contributes positively in countries with high-quality institutions but is of little relevance in countries with medium- or poor-quality institutions.

The Chandler-Furtado case: a decolonial reframing of a North/South (dis)encounter

A partir de uma perspectiva descolonial das bordas do Sul, este trabalho mostra que, apesar de Alfred Chandler e o brasileiro Celso Furtado terem muito a contribuir para a construção de um campo de estratégia multipolar, foi somente o primeiro que se tornou uma autoridade em gestão estratégica. Ao longo de mais de 50 anos Chandler e Furtado pesquisaram sobre o mesmo objeto, mas a partir de diferentes perspectivas. Contudo, defendemos que suas pesquisas são partes inseparáveis de um mesmo fenômeno, da mesma maneira que modernidade e colonialidade são, e que é necessário a descolonialidade para promover o encontro a que se propõe fazer este trabalho. Chandler defendia nos anos 60 que a grande corporação, liderada pelos gestores, era o grande motor do capitalismo americano; enquanto que no Sul, Furtado argumentava que o estado, através de planejamento e investimento, deveria liderar a saída do Brasil da condição de subdesenvolvimento, a qual lhe fora imposta principalmente pelo Norte. A crise atual da hegemonia americana sugere que devemos recuperar os argumentos de Furtado e discutir a difusão assimétrica do conhecimento e das instituições em administração na América Latina durante o período da Guerra Fria. Neste trabalho propomos uma estrutura com três níveis de análise para reavaliar este (des)encontro entre Chandler-Furtado através de perspectivas independentes: a grande narrativa da Guerra Fria, o conhecimento subalterno e a identidade nacional. Nosso objetivo é promover um mundo multipolar através dos campos da administração e gestão estratégica.

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century

Lucas (1987) has shown a surprising result in business-cycle research: the welfare cost of business cycles are very small. Our paper has several original contributions. First, in computing welfare costs, we propose a novel setup that separates the effects of uncertainty stemming from business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation. Second, we extend the sample from which to compute the moments of consumption: the whole of the literature chose primarily to work with post-WWII data. For this period, actual consumption is already a result of counter-cyclical policies, and is potentially smoother than what it otherwise have been in their absence. So, we employ also pre-WWII data. Third, we take an econometric approach and compute explicitly the asymptotic standard deviation of welfare costs using the Delta Method. Estimates of welfare costs show major differences for the pre-WWII and the post-WWII era. They can reach up to 15 times for reasonable parameter values -β=0.985, and ∅=5. For example, in the pre-WWII period (1901-1941), welfare cost estimates are 0.31% of consumption if we consider only permanent shocks and 0.61% of consumption if we consider only transitory shocks. In comparison, the post-WWII era is much quieter: welfare costs of economic growth are 0.11% and welfare costs of business cycles are 0.037% - the latter being very close to the estimate in Lucas (0.040%). Estimates of marginal welfare costs are roughly twice the size of the total welfare costs. For the pre-WWII era, marginal welfare costs of economic-growth and business- cycle fluctuations are respectively 0.63% and 1.17% of per-capita consumption. The same figures for the post-WWII era are, respectively, 0.21% and 0.07% of per-capita consumption.

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century

Lucas(1987) has shown a surprising result in business-cycle research: the welfare cost of business cycles are very small. Our paper has several original contributions. First, in computing welfare costs, we propose a novel setup that separates the effects of uncertainty stemming from business-cycle uctuations and economic-growth variation. Second, we extend the sample from which to compute the moments of consumption: the whole of the literature chose primarily to work with post-WWII data. For this period, actual consumption is already a result of counter-cyclical policies, and is potentially smoother than what it otherwise have been in their absence. So, we employ also pre-WWII data. Third, we take an econometric approach and compute explicitly the asymptotic standard deviation of welfare costs using the Delta Method. Estimates of welfare costs show major diferences for the pre-WWII and the post-WWII era. They can reach up to 15 times for reasonable parameter values = 0:985, and = 5. For example, in the pre-WWII period (1901-1941), welfare cost estimates are 0.31% of consumption if we consider only permanent shocks and 0.61% of consumption if we consider only transitory shocks. In comparison, the post-WWII era is much quieter: welfare costs of economic growth are 0.11% and welfare costs of business cycles are 0.037% the latter being very close to the estimate in Lucas (0.040%). Estimates of marginal welfare costs are roughly twice the size of the total welfare costs. For the pre-WWII era, marginal welfare costs of economic-growth and business-cycle uctuations are respectively 0.63% and 1.17% of per-capita consumption. The same gures for the post-WWII era are, respectively, 0.21% and 0.07% of per-capita consumption.

The impact of OFDI on economic growth countries. An econometric approach using panel data and time-series evidence

The thesis at hand adds to the existing literature by investigating the relationship between economic growth and outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) on a set of 16 emerging countries. Two different econometric techniques are employed: a panel data regression analysis and a time-series causality analysis. Results from the regression analysis indicate a positive and significant correlation between OFDI and economic growth. Additionally, the coefficient for the OFDI variable is robust in the sense specified by the Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA). On the other hand, the findings of the causality analysis are particularly heterogeneous. The vector autoregression (VAR) and the vector error correction model (VECM) approaches identify unidirectional Granger causality running either from OFDI to GDP or from GDP to OFDI in six countries. In four economies causality among the two variables is bidirectional, whereas in five countries no causality relationship between OFDI and GDP seems to be present.

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century and beyond

The main objective of this paper is to propose a novel setup that allows estimating separately the welfare costs of the uncertainty stemming from business-cycle uctuations and from economic-growth variation, when the two types of shocks associated with them (respectively,transitory and permanent shocks) hit consumption simultaneously. Separating these welfare costs requires dealing with degenerate bivariate distributions. Levis Continuity Theorem and the Disintegration Theorem allow us to adequately de ne the one-dimensional limiting marginal distributions. Under Normality, we show that the parameters of the original marginal distributions are not afected, providing the means for calculating separately the welfare costs of business-cycle uctuations and of economic-growth variation. Our empirical results show that, if we consider only transitory shocks, the welfare cost of business cycles is much smaller than previously thought. Indeed, we found it to be negative - -0:03% of per-capita consumption! On the other hand, we found that the welfare cost of economic-growth variation is relatively large. Our estimate for reasonable preference-parameter values shows that it is 0:71% of consumption US$ 208:98 per person, per year.

Development, progress and economic growth

Progress was an idea of the 18th century; development, a project of the 20th century that continues into the 21st century. Progress was associated with the advance of reason, development with the fulfillment of the five political objectives that modern societies set for themselves: security, freedom, economic well-being, social justice and protection of the environment. Today we can view progress and development as equivalent. Both were products of the capitalist revolution, and of the economic development that began with it. Economic development or growth, in its turn, is the process of capital accumulation with the incorporation of technical progress that, mainly through productive sophistication and the increase of the value of labor, increases wages and improves standards of living. The five objectives that define development, as well as the three social instances existing in society change in an interdependent way.

Formation and destruction of coalition groups under economic growth

This paper introduces a model economy in which formation of coalition groups under technological progress is generated endogenously. The coalition formation depends crucially on the rate of arrival of new technologies. In the model, an agent working in the saroe technology for more than one period acquires skills, part of which is specific to this technology. These skills increase the agent productivity. In this case, if he has worked more than one period with the same technology he has incentives to construct a coalition to block the adoption of new technologies. Therefore, in every sector the workers have incentives to construct a coalition and to block the adoption of new technologies. They will block every time that a technology stay in use for more than one period.