The consequences of the culture aspect and the power distance in the execution of global strategies in multinational companies in Brazil

One of the challenges presented by the current conjecture in Global Companies is to recognize and understand that the culture and levels in structure of the Power Distance in Organizations in different countries contribute, significantly, toward the failure or success of their strategies. The alignment between the implementation and execution of new strategies for projects intended for the success of the Organization as a whole, rather than as an individual part thereof, is an important step towards reducing the impacts of Power Distance (PDI) on the success of business strategies. A position at odds with this understanding by Companies creates boundaries that increase organizational chasms, also taking into consideration relevant aspects such as, FSAs (Firm-Specific Advantages) and CSAs (Country-Specific Advantages). It is also important that the Organizations based in countries or regions of low Power Distance (PDI) between its individuals be more flexible and prepared to ask and to hear the suggestions from Regional and Local Offices. Thus, the purpose of this study is to highlight the elements of effective strategy implementation considering the relevant aspects at all levels of global corporate culture that justify the influences of power distance when implementing new strategies and also to minimize the impacts of this internal business relationship. This study also recognizes that other corporate and cultural aspects are relevant for the success of business strategies so consider, for instance, the lack of alignment between global and regional/local organizations, the need for competent leadership resources, as well as the challenges that indicate the distance between the hierarchical levels ─ Headquarters and Regional Office ─ as some of the various causes that prevent the successful execution of global strategies. Finally, we show that the execution of the strategy cannot be treated as a construction solely created by the Headquarters or by only one Board and that it needs to be understood as a system aimed at interacting with the surroundings.

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.

Exclusivity contracts and competition : the case of the Brazilian fuels market

Exclusivity contracts can help stations by providing brand-value that allows them to obtain higher profits, relative to unbranded retailers. However, branded retailers may have a stronger negative effect over its competitors’ profits. It is not clear which one of these two effects dominates (brand-value vs competition effect). Therefore, the impact of exclusivity over the number of participants in the downstream market is not determined. In this paper, I empirically study the effects of exclusivity agreements on competition in the Brazilian gasoline sector. In order to do so, I estimate an entry model of endogenous product-type choices using data of retailers’ locations and contract choices along with data from the 2010 Brazilian Census. I use my estimates to simulate entry decisions under two counterfactual scenarios: i) mandatory exclusivity and ii) no exclusivity.