Efeitos da utilização de hedges cambiais nos resultados de empresas não financeiras: uma abordagem empírica

A realização de negócios em um mundo globalizado implica em aumentar a exposição das empresas não-financeiras a diversos riscos de origem financeira como câmbio, commodities e taxas de juros e que, dependendo da evolução destas variáveis macroeconômicas, podem afetar significativamente os resultados destas empresas. Existem diversas teorias acadêmicas que abordam sobre os benefícios gerados por programas de gestão de riscos em empresas não-financeiras como redução dos custos de financial distress e custos de agência bem como o uso de estratégias de hedge para fins fiscais. Tais iniciativas contribuiriam, em última instância, para a criação de valor para o negócio e poderiam garantir uma melhor previsibilidade dos fluxos de caixa futuros, tornando as empresas menos vulneráveis a condições adversas de mercado. Este trabalho apresenta dois estudos de caso com empresas não-financeiras brasileiras que possuíam exposições em moeda estrangeira e que não foram identificadas operações com derivativos cambiais durante o período de 1999 a 2005 que foi caracterizado pela alta volatilidade da taxa de câmbio. Através de modelos de simulação, algumas estratégias com o uso de derivativos foram propostas para as exposições cambiais identificadas para cada empresa com o objetivo de avaliar os efeitos da utilização destes derivativos cambiais sobre os resultados das empresas no que se refere à agregação de valor para o negócio e redução de volatilidade dos fluxos de caixa esperados. O trabalho não visa recomendar estratégias de hedge para determinada situação de mercado mas apenas demonstra, de forma empírica, quais os resultados seriam obtidos caso certas estratégias fossem adotadas, sabendo-se que inúmeras outras poderiam ser criadas para a mesma situação de mercado. Os resultados sugerem alguns insights sobre a utilização de derivativos por empresas não-financeiras sendo um tema relativamente novo para empresas brasileiras.

Financial governance: the Brazilian experience on prudential regulation and its impacts on the effects of the 2008 financial crisis

The Brazilian economy was severely hit by the 2008 crisis. In the beginning of the crisis, the vast majorities of the economic agents and authorities thought that Brazil could face some sort of decoupling since some macroeconomic fundamentals were very good. What we saw, however, was that the Brazilian economy was not decoupled, and expectations faced a huge deterioration soon after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 15th. Two aspects regarding the impact of crisis in Brazil, however, deserve a great deal of attention: (a) although deep, the impact did not last for a long time. Actually, the GDP growth experienced a good recovery in the second quarter of 2009, showing that the health of the Brazilian economy was good; (b) the Brazilian banking system performed very well during the crisis, although we cannot say the system was not in danger in the worst time of the crisis. In spite of the confidence crisis faced by the banking system 1, it showed a great deal of resilience. In this aspect, we argue that the restructure faced by the banking system in the aftermath of the Real Plan, as well as the development of a solid supervision regulation helped a lot the system to avoid the systemic crisis that was an open possibility to the Brazilian banking system in the end of 2008. These notes, thus, discusse why the Brazilian banking system performed pretty well in the 2008 financial crisis and how the Brazilian banking (and prudential) regulation can be taken as responsible for this good performance. More specifically, the paper back to the middle of the 1990s, when the Real Plan was implemented, in order to understand the role played by the restructuring of the Brazilian financial system in helping to pave the way to the great resilience experienced by the Brazilian banking system during the 2008 crisis. More specifically, the prudential regulation that was implemented in Brazil in the aftermath of the Real Plan seems to play a decisive role in the resilience of the system nowadays.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Contagion in financial networks: a network theory and agent-based approaches to modeling the spread of risk in financial systems

Esta dissertação estuda a propagação de crises sobre o sistema financeiro. Mais especi- ficamente, busca-se desenvolver modelos que permitam simular como um determinado choque econômico atinge determinados agentes do sistema financeiro e apartir dele se propagam, transformando-se em um problema sistêmico. A dissertação é dividida em dois capítulos,além da introdução. O primeiro capítulo desenvolve um modelo de propa- gação de crises em fundos de investimento baseado em ciência das redes.Combinando dois modelos de propagação em redes financeiras, um simulando a propagação de perdas em redes bipartites de ativos e agentes financeiros e o outro simulando a propagação de perdas em uma rede de investimentos diretos em quotas de outros agentes, desenvolve-se um algoritmo para simular a propagação de perdas através de ambos os mecanismos e utiliza-se este algoritmo para simular uma crise no mercado brasileiro de fundos de investimento. No capítulo 2,desenvolve-se um modelo de simulação baseado em agentes, com agentes financeiros, para simular propagação de um choque que afeta o mercado de operações compromissadas.Criamos também um mercado artificial composto por bancos, hedge funds e fundos de curto prazo e simulamos a propagação de um choque de liquidez sobre um ativo de risco securitizando utilizado para colateralizar operações compromissadas dos bancos.