Uncertainty of aid inflows and the growth relationship

This paper contributes to the literature on aid and economic growth. We posit that it is not the levei of aid flows per se but the stability of such flows that determines the impact of aid on economic growth. Three measures of aid instability are employed. One is a simple deviation from trend, and measures overall instability. The other measures are based on auto-regressive estimates to capture deviations from an expected trend. These measures are intended to proxy for uncertainty in aid receipts. We posit that such uncertainty will influence the relationship between aid and investment and how recipient governments respond to aid, and will therefore affect how aid impacts on growth. We estimate a standard cross-country growth regression including the leveI of aid, and find aid to be insignificant (in line with other results in the literature). We then introduce measures of instability. Aid remains insignificant when we account for overall instability. However, when we account for uncertainty (which is negative and significant), we find that aid has a significant positive effect on growth. We conduct stability tests that show that the significance of aid is largely due to its effect on the volume of investment. The finding that uncertainty of aid receipts reduces the effectiveness of aid is robust. When we control for this, aid appears to have a significant positive influence on growth. When the regression is estimated for the sub-sample of African countries these findings hold, although the effectiveness of aid appears weaker than for the full sample.

Monopolies life cycle, bureaucratization, and Schumpeterian growth

This paper analyzes the links between the internaI organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face dynamic agency costs. These agency costs are due to the formation of vertical collusions within the organization. To respond to the opportunity of internaI collusion, firms go through a whole life cycle, getting more bureaucratized and Iess efficient over time. vVeak creative destruction in the economy facilitates informal collusion inside firms and exacerbates bureaucratization. As bureaucratization affects the firms' profitability and the return to innovation, stationary equilibrium growth depends in turn on the efficiency of collusive side-contracts within firms.

Financial globalization and economic growth

Capital mobility leads to a speed of convergence smaller in an open economy than in a closed economy. This is related to the presence of two capitals, produced with specific technologies, and where one of the capitals is nontradable, like infrastructures or human capital. Suppose, for example, that the economy is relatively less abundant in human capital, leading to a decrease of the remuneration of this capital during the transition. In a closed economy, the remuneration of physical capital will be increasing during the transition. In the open economy, the alternative investment yields the international interest rate, corresponding to the steady state net remuneration of physical capital in the closed economy. The nonarbitrage condition shows a larger difference in the remuneration of the two capitals in the closed economy. It leads to a higher accumulation of human capital and thus to a faster speed of convergence in the closed economy. This result stands in sharp contrast with that of the one-sector neoclassical growth model, where the speed of convergence is smaller in the closed economy.

Skilled labor, unskilled labor, and economic growth

We assess the effects of the imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled labor on economic growth in a model in which physical capital and skilled labor can be accumulated. It is shown that economies with higher substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor have higher levels of income per capita in the transition and in the long-run equilibrium. Furthermore, these economies have a higher level of skilled labor and a higher level of capital intensity in the long-run equilibrium. For certain parameters values, the speed of convergence depends positively on the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor.

Import substitution and economic growth

In spite of Latin America s dismal economic performance between the 1950s and 1980s, the region experienced strong capital deepening. Furthermore, pro- ductivity (measured as TFP) grew at low rates in comparison with the U.S. In this paper, we suggest that all these facts can be explained as a consequence of the restrictive trade regime adopted at that time. Our analytical framework is based on a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model, with scale economies in the capital- intensive sector. We assume an economy that is initially open and specialized in the production of labor-intensive goods. The trade regime is modeled as a move to a closed economy. The model produces results consistent with the Latin American experience. Speci cally, for a su¢ ciently small country, there will be no long-run growth in income per capita, but capital per capita will increase. As a result, measured TFP will fall.

Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages of economic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.