Partial economic reforrns and financial crises: an emerging markets perspective

The recent emerging market experiences have posed a challenge to the conventional wisdom that unsustainable fiscal deficits are the key to understanding financial crises in these countries. The health of the domestic banking system has emerged as the main driving force behind the perverse dynamics of partial reforms. The current paper shares this view and uses a model of contractual inefliciencies in the banking sector to understand the dynamics of these reforms. We find that the threat of a large exchange rate devaluation depends on the stock of international reserves relative to the stock of domestic credit that must be extended by the Central Bank in response to a large capital outflow. Moreover, if a country has a weak banking sector but high net reserve ratios, the capital flow reversal might only increase the vulnerability to a currency crisis without necessarily causing it. The results are in accordance with much of the empiricalliterature on the determinants of financiaI crises in emerging markets. Some aspectsof the recent policy debate on the introduction of capital controls are also analysed.

Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages of economic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.

Why banks want to be complex

We investigate whether and how bank complexity affects performance and systemic risk. We base the analysis on a complexity measure that captures diversification and diversity, controlling for size and other bank characteristics. We find that more complex banks exhibit a higher profitability, lower risk, and higher market share. Moreover, we show an inversely U-shaped relation between bank complexity and banks’ sensitivity to systemic shocks. The evidence challenges the view that higher bank complexity is per se bad and is consistent with theoretical models that show that diversity in the banking system is critical for financial stability.

Financial governance: the Brazilian experience on prudential regulation and its impacts on the effects of the 2008 financial crisis

The Brazilian economy was severely hit by the 2008 crisis. In the beginning of the crisis, the vast majorities of the economic agents and authorities thought that Brazil could face some sort of decoupling since some macroeconomic fundamentals were very good. What we saw, however, was that the Brazilian economy was not decoupled, and expectations faced a huge deterioration soon after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 15th. Two aspects regarding the impact of crisis in Brazil, however, deserve a great deal of attention: (a) although deep, the impact did not last for a long time. Actually, the GDP growth experienced a good recovery in the second quarter of 2009, showing that the health of the Brazilian economy was good; (b) the Brazilian banking system performed very well during the crisis, although we cannot say the system was not in danger in the worst time of the crisis. In spite of the confidence crisis faced by the banking system 1, it showed a great deal of resilience. In this aspect, we argue that the restructure faced by the banking system in the aftermath of the Real Plan, as well as the development of a solid supervision regulation helped a lot the system to avoid the systemic crisis that was an open possibility to the Brazilian banking system in the end of 2008. These notes, thus, discusse why the Brazilian banking system performed pretty well in the 2008 financial crisis and how the Brazilian banking (and prudential) regulation can be taken as responsible for this good performance. More specifically, the paper back to the middle of the 1990s, when the Real Plan was implemented, in order to understand the role played by the restructuring of the Brazilian financial system in helping to pave the way to the great resilience experienced by the Brazilian banking system during the 2008 crisis. More specifically, the prudential regulation that was implemented in Brazil in the aftermath of the Real Plan seems to play a decisive role in the resilience of the system nowadays.