Central bank balance sheet concerns and credible optimal escape from the Liquidity trap

I show that when a central bank is financially independent from the treasury and has balance sheet concerns, an increase in the size or a change in the composition of the central bank's balance sheet (quantitative easing) can serve as a commitment device in a liquidity trap scenario. In particular, when the short-term interest rate is up against the zero lower bound, an open market operation by the central bank that involves purchases of long-term bonds can help mitigate the deation and a large negative output gap under a discretionary equilibrium. This is because such an open market operation provides an incentive to the central bank to keep interest rates low in future in order to avoid losses in its balance sheet.

Contagion and regulation in endogenous bank networks

We develop a simple model of endogenous bank networks to study financial contagion and how leverage regulation may affect it. Banks maximize expected profit by choosing the optimal allocation of resources between three different classes of assets. An interbank network arise as result of loans between banks, creating a direct channel of contagion in the financial system. Contagion may occur when the realized return of the risky asset is sufficiently low to make a bank insolvent, subsequently triggering a cascade effect that propagates through default in interbank loans. Contrary to what would be expected, our results show that despite forcing banks to deleverage, increasing minimum capital requirements may lead to a system with higher aggregate levels of default.

Gender in international economic development projects: how is gender being institutionalized in the Inter-American Development Bank?

O Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento, o Banco Mundial, e outras organizações financiam iniciativas para acelerar o desenvolvimento da região da América Latina e Caribe. Antes do final da década de 80, vários projetos e políticas dessas instituições careciam de considerações ligadas à gênero e foram criticadas por essa falta (Flora, 1998). Em 1987, o BID publicou um documento sobre uma nova política operacional sobre mulheres e desenvolvimento e vem desde então buscando institucionalizar gênero e criar indicadores para medir os impactos relacionados à gênero em seus projetos. O objetivo dessa dissertação é explorar o tema de gênero no contexto do desenvolvimento internacional através de uma análise de como o Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento inclui gênero em suas operações. Após uma revisão literária sobre a importância de gênero e de bancos de desenvolvimento, essa dissertação irá analisar de que maneira gênero é incluído nas discussões dos projetos do Banco à nível institucional. A pesquisa será feita através de documentação disponível para o público geral, documentos internos e entrevistas em vídeo com pessoal do BID. Após uma análise dos dados coletados, recomendações para ações futuras serão dadas.

What happens after the Central Bank of Brazil increases the target interbank rate by 1%?

In this paper I use Taylor's (2001) model and Vector Auto Regressions to shed some light on the evolution of some key macroeconomic variables after the Central Bank of Brazil, through the COPOM, increases the target interest rate by 1%. From a quantitative perspective, the best estimate from the empírical analysis, obtained with a 1994 : 2 - 2004 : 2 subsample of the data, is that GDP goes through an accumulated decline, over the next four years, around 0.08%. Innovations to interest rates explain around 9.2% of the forecast erro r of GDP.

A model of private bank-note issue

A random-matching model (ofmoney) is formulated in which there is complete public knowledge of the trading histories of a subset of the population, called the banking sector, and no public knowledge of the trading histories of the complement of that subset, called the non bank sector. Each person, whether a banker or a non banker, is assumed to have the technological capability to create indivisible and durable objects called notes. If outside money is indivisible and sufficiently scarce, then the optimal mechanism is shown to have note issue and note destruction (redemption) by members of the banking sector.

The effects of credit risk transfer on bank monitoring and firm financing

This paper examines the efects of the transfer of credit risk associated with bank loans. We are interested in (a) whether the transfer of credit risk has any impact on the intensity with which banks monitor their borrowers and (b) whether credit risk transfer infuences the amount of financing that is provided to firms in an economy. Our model first develops conditions under which bank finance is available to firrms, mainly in the spirit of Holmstrom/Tirole (1997). We then introduce projects with uncorrelated pay-offs and argue that one possible economic rationale for credit risk transfer is diversi¯cation. We analyze whether and how within this scenario the transfer of the credit risk of loans changes a bank's incentives to monitor its debtors. Finally we investigate whether and what kind of impact this may have on the amount of ¯nancing available to firms in an economy. Our results indicate that the monitoring incentives are being eroded indeed and that credit risk transfer can increase the overall amount of obtainable funds in an economy.

Bank relationships: effect on the availability and marginal cost of credit for firms in Argentina

The paper provides evidence on what affects at the margin the cost and availability of bank credit for firms in Argentina. We study in particular how banks use different pieces of private and public information to screen firms and overcome informational asymmetries in the credit market. Some private information is transferable, like balance sheet data. Private information generated in relationships is not. To capture the closeness of bank relationships, we resort to the concentration of bank credit and the number of credit lines in a bank. We also consider public information available in the Central de Deudores. The cost of credit is measured using overdrafts, the most expensive line of credit, at the bank that charges the highest rate for overdrafts. We find that the cost of credit is smaller for a firm with a close relationship to the marginal bank. Firms with large assets, a high sales/assets ratio, and a low debt/assets ratio pay a lower interest rate at the margin. A good credit history (no debt arrears and no bounced checks) and collateral also reduce the marginal interest rate. The availability of credit is measured by unused credit lines as a proportion of total liabilities with the main bank. The availability of credit depends positively on a close relationship with the main bank. Large assets, a high return over assets, a high sales/assets ratio, a low debt/assets ratio, a good credit history, and collateral lead to higher credit availability. Our measure of unused credit lines is less ambiguous than traditional measures like leverage, which may indicate financial distress rather than availability of credit.

Contágio no modelo de Allen e Gale com infraestrutura bancária endógena

Neste trabalho investigamos a formação de network considerando agentes cautelosos. O modelo consiste em duas regiões com (n/2) bancos em cada, onde a interligação entre eles ocorre através e depósitos interbancários. Cada banco está sujeito a corrida bancária, ou devido a um choque negativo de agentes impacientes, ou devido a contaminação da corrida de um banco pertencente a infraestrutura bancária. Os bancos podem tentar eliminar a possibilidade de contágio ao fazer um número alto de inter-ligações. Para isso, é necessário uma coordenação entre todos os bancos. Se um banco não se prevenir de um contágio, ele impõe a todos os outros a possibilidade de contágio no pior cenário. Há duas regiões bem definidas de equilíbrio de nash simétrico com network estável, uma na qual todos os bancos se previnem do cenário de contágio no pior cenário e a outra na qual nenhum banco se previne. Devido ao problema de coordenação, o equilíbrio com contágio no pior cenário pode ocorrer mesmo sendo pareto dominado pelo equilíbrio sem contágio. Sob certas condições, o equilíbrio com contágio ocorre com um network pareto eficiente. Neste caso o network eficiente é diferente do network mais resiliente ao contágio.

Creditor's protection and bank loans: lack of competition hamprers bankruptcy reform's effects

This dissertation investigates how credit institutions’ market power limits the effects of creditor protection rules on the interest rate and the spread of bank loans. We use the Brazilian Bankruptcy Reform of June/2005 (BBR) as a legal event affecting the institutional environment of the Brazilian credit market. The law augments creditor protection and aims to improve the access of firms to the credit market and to reduce the cost of borrowing. Either access to credit or the credit cost are also determined by bank industry competition and the market power of suppliers of credit. We derive a simple economic model to study the effect of market power interacting with cost of lending. Using an accounting and operations dataset from July/2004 to December/2007 provided by the Brazilian Central Bank, we estimate that the lack of competition in the bank lending industry hinders the potential reducing effect of the BBR on the interest rate of corporate loans by approximately 30% and on the spread by approximately 23%. We also find no statistical evidence that the BBR affected the concentration level of the Brazilian credit market. We present a brief report on bankruptcy reforms around the world, the changes in the Brazilian legislation and on some recent related articles in our introductory chapter. The second chapter presents the economic model and the testable hypothesis on how the lack of competition in the lending market limits the effects of improved creditor protection. In this chapter, we introduce our empirical strategy using a differences-in-differences model and we estimate the limiting effect of market power on the BBR’s potential to reduce interest rates and on the spread of bank loans. We use the BBR as an exogenous event that affects collateralized corporate loans (treatment group) but that does not affect clean consumer loans (control group) to identify these effects, using different concentration measures. In Chapter 3, we propose a two-stage empirical strategy to handle the H–Statistics proposed by Panzar and Rosse as a measure of market competition. We estimate the limiting effects of the lack of competition in replacing the concentration statistics by the H–Statistics. Chapter 4 presents a structural break test of the concentration index and checks if the BBR affects the dynamic evolution of the concentration index.

Bank transactions tax: pathway to the single tax ideal: a modern tax technology, the Brazilian experience with a bank transactions tax (1993-2007)

Lançado por Marcos Cintra nos EUA, é mais uma contribuição ao debate envolvendo os impostos e a ideia do Imposto Único.

The corporate financial effects of corporate social responsibility, as executed by, and impacted upon, Prime Bank Limited, Bangladesh

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is being implemented in the corporate world at an ever increasing rate, benefitting societies around the world. Several theories have been proposed that contend that the corporations who are implementing CSR programs also benefit financially, making the relationship a symbiotic one. This paper analyzes the financial health of Prime Bank Limited, Bangladesh, (PBL) over a period of a decade in order to determine if PBL has indeed benefited financially from implementing its CSR program. The analysis focuses on examining PBL’s internal and external financial indicators over an extended period of time to determine what the net effect, if any, that the CSR program has had on them. This analysis concludes that the evidence does not support the claim of a causal relationship between CSR spending and positive effects upon PBL, as measured by PBL’s financial indicators.

Bank networks and firm credit: an agent based model approach

Starting from the idea that economic systems fall into complexity theory, where its many agents interact with each other without a central control and that these interactions are able to change the future behavior of the agents and the entire system, similar to a chaotic system we increase the model of Russo et al. (2014) to carry out three experiments focusing on the interaction between Banks and Firms in an artificial economy. The first experiment is relative to Relationship Banking where, according to the literature, the interaction over time between Banks and Firms are able to produce mutual benefits, mainly due to reduction of the information asymmetry between them. The following experiment is related to information heterogeneity in the credit market, where the larger the bank, the higher their visibility in the credit market, increasing the number of consult for new loans. Finally, the third experiment is about the effects on the credit market of the heterogeneity of prices that Firms faces in the goods market.