A model of capital accumulation and rent-seeking

A simple model incorporating rent-seeking into the standard neoclassical model of capital accumulation is presented. It embodies the idea that the performance of an economy depends on the efficiency of its institutions. It is shown that welfare is positively affected by the institutional efficiency, although output is not necessarily so. It is also shown that an economy with a monopolistic rent-seeker performs better than one with a competitive rent-seeking industry.

Country factors and the dynamic modeling of capital structure : an empirical study of latin american firms

Desenvolvemos modelos de ajuste parcial e de duration para testar a relevância de fatores específicos de países na determinação da estrutura de capital de empresas listadas nas bolsas de valores brasileira, chilena e mexicana. Utilizamos dados em painel, em um período que se estende do quarto trimestre de 1996 ao segundo trimestre de 2010, abrangendo 4403 observações relacionadas a 139 empresas diferentes. Os resultados obtidos sugerem que a dinâmica da estrutura de capital varia por país e que idiossincrasias locais são determinantes-chave dos níveis de alavancagem das empresas. Não detectamos comportamento explicado pela Teoria de Trade Off entre as empresas brasileiras, chilenas e mexicanas, o que indica que teorias alternativas possam comandar os processos de decisão de financiamento dos gestores latino americanos.

Speed of adjustment of capital structure: empirical study

We analyze the impact of firm-specific characteristics as well as economic factors on the speed of adjustment to the target debt ratio. Using different methods, we document speeds of adjustment ranging from 14.4% to 37%. The results indicate that the speed of adjustment is affected by business-cycle variables: The interaction term related to term spread reveals, as expected, faster adjustment in booms than in recessions and a negative relationship between short term spread and adjustment speed. We also show that the speed of adjustment becomes stationary when the increasing fractions of zero-debt firms are considered.

Beyond ‘best practices': the international regulation of capital markets

It is widely acknowledged that there is considerable international pressure for international ‘best practices’ to be adopted via national legislation. This would occur either by means of model laws or through the passing of country specific legislation that closely replicates foreign legal formats, administrative rules, and or regulation. These attempts to spread the implementation of ‘best practices’ have gained importance in the international debate due to the liberalization of international capital flows. The oversight, country reports, and technical assistance carried out by international organizations along with the growing internationalization of investors have also contributed to this growing pressure. In this respect, due to the constant evolution of transactions and the end objective of making sure that capital markets are developed with just rules, structures, and methods, this article looks to analyze the adoption of standardized models of capital market regulation. Furthermore it looks to examine the motivation and interest of states and other ‘stakeholders’ at the international level.

Effects of capital structure on markups and competitive performance : evidence from Portugal

Este estudo avalia os efeitos da estrutura de capital nas margens de lucro e no desempenho competitivo. Aplica teorias relativas à contra ciclicidade das margens de lucro, e aos resultados do mercado do produto de Chevalier e Scharfstein (1996), a dados portugueses, seguindo a metodologia de Campello (2001). Utilizando dados de painel de empresas pertencentes à indústria transformadora Portuguesa, a análise fornece evidencia para a contra-ciclicidade de margens de lucro e de um efeito conjunto de dívida e recessão económica nas margens de lucro. Tendo por base o recenseamento de empresas Portuguesas, a análise não fornece evidência de uma relação significativa entre a estrutura de capital e o desempenho competitivo.

The spenders-hoarders theory of capital accumulations, wealth distribution and fiscal policy

This paper proposes a simple OLG model which is consistent with the essential facts about consumer behavior, capital accumulation and wealth distribution, and yields some new and surprising conclusions about fiscal policy. By considering a society in which individuais are distinguished according to two characteristics, altruism and wealth preference, we show that those who in the long run hold the bulk of private capital are not so rnuch motivated by dynastic altruism as by preference for wealth. Two types of social segmentation can result with different wcalth distribution. To a large extcnt our results seem to fit reality better than those obtained with standard optimal growth models in which dynastic altruism ( or r ate o f impatience) is the only source of heterogeneity: overaccumulation can appear, public debt and unfunded pensions are not neutra!, estate taxation can improve the welfare of the top wealthy.

Balance of payment crises and capital flows : the role of liquidity

A model of externaI CrISIS is deveIoped focusing on the interaction between Iiquidity creation by financiaI intermediaries and foreign exchange collapses. The intermediaries' role of transforming maturities is shown to result in larger movements of capital and a higher probability of crisis. This resembles the observed cycle in capital fiows: large infiows, crisis and abrupt outfiows. The mo deI highlights how adverse productivity and international interest rate shocks can be magnified by the behavior of individual foreign investors linked together through their deposits in the intermediaries. An eventual collapse of the exchange rate can link investors' behavior even further. The basic model is then extended, quite naturally, to study the effects of capital fiow contagion between countries.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

The implications of embodiment and Putty-Clay to economic development

In this paper we construct and analyze a growth model with the following three ingredients. (i) Technological progress is embodied. (ii) The production function of a firm is such that the firm makes both technology upgrade as well as capital and labor decisions. (iii) The firm’s production technology is putty-clay. We assume that there are disincentives to the accumulation of capital, resulting in a divergence between the social and the private cost of investment. We solve a single firm’s problem in this environment. Then we determine general equilibrium prices of capital goods of different vintages. Using these prices we aggregate firms’ decisions and construct the theoretical analogues of National Income statistics. This generates a relationship between disincentives and per capita incomes. We analyze this relationship and show the quantitative and qualitative roles of embodiment and putty-clay. We also show how the model is taken to data, quantified and used to determine to what extent income gaps across countries can be attributed to disincentives.

Past and future of the bankruptcy law in Brazil and Latin America

This paper studies the Bankruptcy Law in Latin America, focusing on the Brazilian reform. We start with a review of the international literature and its evolution on this subject. Next, we examine the economic incentives associated with several aspects of bankruptcy laws and insolvency procedures in general, as well as the trade-offs involved. After this theoretical discussion, we evaluate empirically the current stage of the quality of insolvency procedures in Latin America using data from Doing Business and World Development Indicators, both from World Bank and International Financial Statistics from IMF. We find that the region is governed by an inefficient law, even when compared with regions of lower per capita income. As theoretical and econometric models predict, this inefficiency has severe consequences for credit markets and the cost of capital. Next, we focus on the recent Brazilian bankruptcy reform, analyzing its main changes and possible effects over the economic environment. The appendix describes difficulties of this process of reform in Brazil, and what other Latin American countries can possibly learn from it.

Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of firms and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

Testing the externalities hypothesis of endogenous growth using cointegration

The initial endogenous growth models emphasized the importance of externaI effects in explaining sustainable growth across time. Empirically, this hypothesis can be confirmed if the coefficient of physical capital per hour is unity in the aggregate production function. Although cross-section results concur with theory, previous estimates using time series data rejected this hypothesis, showing a small coefficient far from unity. It seems that the problem lies not with the theory but with the techniques employed, which are unable to capture low frequency movements in high frequency data. This paper uses cointegration - a technique designed to capture the existence of long-run relationships in multivariate time series - to test the externalities hypothesis of endogenous growth. The results confirm the theory' and conform to previous cross-section estimates. We show that there is long-run proportionality between output per hour and a measure of capital per hour. U sing this result, we confmn the hypothesis that the implied Solow residual can be explained by government expenditures on infra-structure, which suggests a supply side role for government affecting productivity and a decrease on the extent that the Solow residual explains the variation of output.