26 resultados para Tax exemption
Resumo:
Este trabalho consiste em um estudo de caso sobre os patrocínios culturais incentivados realizados por uma organização da iniciativa privada que não tem a cultura como seu negócio-fim. Sua proposta é oferecer uma visão do papel desta, dos motivadores para que exerça responsabilidade social utilizando a cultura, o processo de escolha dos projetos patrocinados e os critérios que norteiam a opção por cada um deles. A pesquisa utilizou como base a análise de editais de patrocínio de diversas empresas, dados estatísticos acerca das características dos projetos inscritos e aprovados no processo da instituição escolhida e entrevistas com os protagonistas deste processo. Para contextualizar o estudo, é traçado um panorama histórico da atuação do Estado brasileiro na área cultural, através de suas políticas públicas e, principalmente, das leis de incentivo à cultura. Como fundamentação teórica, conceitos como cultura, política cultural e responsabilidade social são explorados, assim como a importância de indicadores como ferramentas de trabalho e a distinção entre mecenato e patrocínio.
Resumo:
The objective of this paper is to identify and analyze the main problems in the taxation—regarding both taxes themselves and compliance costs of taxation—of civil society organizations in Brazil. This study is qualitative descriptive research. A multiple case study with 26 organizations was performed. The results show that the problems mainly affect organizations with lower revenue and that do not work in the areas of education, health or social care. The main problems involve the taxation of the payroll and the difficulties related to obtaining and maintaining certifications. The study concludes with suggestions for the improvement of the regulatory framework.
Resumo:
Recent advances in dynamic Mirrlees economies have incorporated the treatment of human capital investments as an important dimension of government policy. This paper adds to this literature by considering a two period economy where agents are di erentiated by their preferences for leisure and their productivity, both private information. The fact that productivity is only learnt later in an agent's life introduces uncertainty to agent's savings and human capital choices and makes optimal the use of multi-period tie-ins in the mechanism that characterizes the government policy. We show that optimal policies are often interim ine cient and that the introduction of these ine ciencies may take the form of marginal tax rates on labor income of varying sign and educational policies that include the discouragement of human capital acquisition. With regards to implementation, state-dependent linear taxes implement optimal savings, while human capital policies may require labor income taxes that depend directly on agents' schooling.
Resumo:
The optimal taxation of goods, labor and capital income is considered in a two period model where: i) private information changes through time; ii) savings are not observed, and; iii) savings a§ect preferences conditional on the realization of types. The simultaneous appearance of these three elements cause optimal commodity taxes to depend on o§-equilibrium savings. As a consequence, separability no longer su¢ ces for the uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz (AS) to obtain. If preferences are homothetic AS is partially restored: taxes are uniform within periods, however, future consumption is taxed at a higher rate than current consumption.
Resumo:
Sabatini (2002) and Roberts and Wibbles (1999) Pointed Out That Voters in Latin American Countries are no Longer Choosing According to Their Ideological Preferences. Ashworth and Heyndels (2002) Showed That the Tax Choice In Oecd Countries Does not Follow the Ideological Pattern of Party Preferences. the Most Robust Result of This Work Shows That the Tax Choice in Latin American Countries Still Depends on This Ideological Preference. We Also Verified That Changes in the Tax Structure Depend on Changes Both in the Tax Burden and the Openness of the Economy
Resumo:
REPETRO, the special tax regime for importing and exporting goods for the exploration and drilling of oil and gas, aims at bringing foreign assets to Brazil enjoying a suspension or even an exemption of taxes, so that Brazilian industry may profit from about 8 billion American dollars in investments. The creation of normative devices as well as the management of the REPETRO model are under the exclusive responsibility of the Brazilian Internal Revenue Services. REPETRO was created in 1999 and is composed of the following customs treatments: importation of goods with suspension of taxes by use of the drawback special regime, suspension mode for national exporting industry; exportation with fictitious exit for the national industry; temporary admission of goods or assets used in oil exploration and production, attending to the needs of both the national and foreign market. Considering the inability of the Brazilian government in restructuring its foreign trade model so that a strong investment in technology could provide for the sector¿s needs, we must ask how we can change REPETRO to help the various companies in the oil business? The issue is very important for one of our main economic activities, though not enough studied. The energy sector has a strategic importance for the development and the economic independence of any country. The winds of globalization lead Brazil to open its economy in the last decade and the national policy for exploration and drilling (E&D) was altered. The government created a new agency dedicated to market control and energy policies, the National Agency for Oil and Biofuels (ANP). With the opening of the market, Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. - Petrobras, the Brazilian giant, lost the monopoly of the oil business. The P-50 Platform, with a capacity for 180,000 barrels per day, was imported based on REPETRO. When it began operating on April 21st, 2006, Brazil achieved self-sufficiency in oil production. The present work intends to estimate the main variables affecting the importation and exportation of goods and assets for E&D, showing how REPETRO works. We also intend to look at the results yielded by the REPETRO model for the development of the production of oil and gas in Brazil, as well as show proposals for its modernization. It has been established that even though since its implementation the REPETRO model has brought fiscal advantages through the reduction of tax costs relating to foreign commerce operations and the incentive of investments in the E&D area with the increase in the national oil production there remain the following limitations: lack of preparation and of knowledge of the model; lack of adjustement of the model to the reality of actitity of E&D of oil and gas; taxes over the pre-operational stage or investment in oil production stage; non-allowance of full access by the national industry to the supply of goods and products relating to the industrialization of goods allowed by REPETRO; other fiscal and administrative difficulties. We conclude that the REPETRO model is important for the development of the area of E&D of oil and gas, but not completely effective. It is necessary to change it or create a new model based on a new perspective of the customs treatment of the activities of exploration and production, minimizing administrative procedures relating to the operations of exportation and importation.
Resumo:
This paper will examine the effects of tax incentives for small businesses on employment level evaluating a program with this purpose implemented in Brazil in the 1990s. We first develop a theoretical framework which guides both the de nition of the parameters of interest and their identi cation. Selection problems both into the treatment group and into the data sample are tackled by combining fixed effects methods and regression discontinuity design on alternative sub-samples of a longitudinal database of manufacturing firms. The results show that on the one hand the size composition of the treated fi rms may be changed due to the survival of some smaller firms that would have exited had it not been eligible to the program. On the other hand, the treated firms who do not depend on the program to survive do employ more workers.
Resumo:
We investigate the efficiency of equal sacrifice tax schedules in an economy which primitives are exactly those in Mirrlees (1971): a continuum of individuals with identical preferences defined over consumption and leisure who differ with respect to their labor market productivity. Using a separable specification for preferences we derive the minimum equal sacrifice allocation and recover the tax schedule that implements it. The separable specification allows us to use the methodology developed by Werning (2007b) to check whether the schedule is efficient, that is, whether there is no alternative tax schedule that raises more revenue while delivering less utility to no one. We find that inefficiency does not arise for most parametrizations we use to approximate the US economy. For the few cases for which inefficiency does arise, it does so only for very high levels of income and marginal tax rates.
Resumo:
If household choices can be rationalized by the maximization of a well defined utility function, allowing spouses to file individually or jointly is equivalent to offering the envelope of the two tax schedules. If, instead, household ’preferences’ are constantly being redefined through bargaining, the option to file separately may affect outcomes even if it is never chosen. We use Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) separate spheres bargaining model to assess the impact of filing options on the outcomes of primary and secondary earners. Threat points of the household’s bargain are given for each spouse by the utility that he or she attains as a follower of a counter-factual off-equilibrium Stackelberg game played by the couple. For a benchmark tax system which treats a couple’s average taxable income as if it were that of a single individual, we prove that if choices are not at kinks, allowing couples to choose whether to file jointly or individually usually benefits the secondary earner. In our numeric exercises this is also the case when choices are at kinks as well. These findings are, however, quite sensitive to the details of the tax system, as made evident by the examination of an alternative tax system.
Resumo:
In an economy which primitives are exactly those in Mirrlees (1971), we investigate the efficiency of labor income tax schedules derived under the equal sacrifice principle. Starting from a given government revenue level, we use Werning’s (2007b) approach to assess whether there is an alternative tax schedule to the one derived under the equal sacrifice principle that raises more revenue while delivering less utility to no one. For our preferred parametrizations of the problem we find that inefficiency only arises at very high levels of income. We also show how the multipliers of the Pareto problem may be extracted from the data and used to find the implicit marginal social weights associated with each level of income.
Resumo:
Tax enforcement costs constrain the government s ability to observe economic transactions, giving rise to hard-to-tax (HTT) markets. In these markets transactions are untaxed and consumers are better o¤ than in taxed markets. This paper studies a novel approach to combat evasion in HTT markets: consumer auditing, which rewards consumers for re- questing transaction receipts. We develop a Hotelling-type spatial model of sales taxation to analyze the welfare and distributional e¤ects of the implementation of this policy. We and that consumer auditing allows for a lower tax rate and greater provision of the public good in the economy. We show that this policy not only can enhance welfare, but also equalize utilities of consumers across markets
Resumo:
This paper aims to evaluate the impact on employment growth of a tax incentive program targeting Brazilian manufacturing small businesses (SIMPLES). This evaluation is conducted for two distinct periods: for the year 1997, when the program was first implemented, and for the year 1999, when the eligibility rule was modified to allow the eligibility of a broader group of firms. The evaluation takes into account two distinct channels through which the charted effects operate. The first is the employment variation in the firms that became eligible for the incentives, and the second is the change in the survival probability experienced by the same group of firms. Moreover, each of these channels can be activated either by the tax reduction dimension of the program or by its dimension of red tape simplification. Our results identify positive effects on employment growth for the tax incentive program only in the dimension of red tape simplification and its effects on the 1997 sample.