Essays on international prices and the subjacent market structure

Esta tese utiliza a informação contida em preços internacionais para identificar parâmetros de modelos de comércio sob competição imperfeita, desta forma permitindo inferência sobre o comportamento das exportações, sobre os ganhos de troca da abertura comercial e sobre a variedade de bens produzidos domesticamente. Em primeiro lugar, investigamos o repasse cambial, no longo prazo, para os preços praticados por exportadores brasileiros. O foco no longo prazo permite controlar os efeitos da rigidez de preço no curto prazo, de maneira que o repasse incompleto evidencie competição imperfeita com preços flexíveis. Em segundo lugar, calculamos os ganhos de troca de novas variedades de bens importados baseando-nos em estimativas para as elasticidades de substituição desagregadas. Finalmente, qualificamos a ênfase da literatura de comércio em ganhos de eficiência no lugar de ganhos de variedade, demonstrando que a variedade de bens produzidos domesticamente se amplia após aberturas comerciais desde que as firmas tenham uma margem de decisão em bens intermediários ou na qualificação da mão de obra.

Estimando a taxa de juros real neutra brasileira via modelo DSGE

Este trabalho objetiva estimar uma série trimestral para a taxa de juros real neutra brasileira via modelo de Equilíbrio Geral Dinâmico Estocástico (DSGE), para o período compreendido entre o primeiro trimestre de 2000 e o último de 2011. O modelo representa uma economia fechada, com famílias maximizando utilidade do tipo CRRA, firmas maximizando lucro em um mercado de concorrência imperfeita e um governo com política fiscal de orçamento equilibrado e regra de política monetária à la Taylor, em um contexto de rigidez de preços. Neste arcabouço, a taxa de juros real neutra foi calculada com base nos choques de produtividade e de gastos de governo, que foram considerados os mais relevantes para a economia brasileira. Adicionalmente, analisou-se o impacto dos choques de produtividade e gastos do governo sobre a taxa neutra, assim como seu comportamento ao longo do período estimado e sua sensibilidade a calibragens alternativas. Por fim, ao comparar o comportamento do hiato de taxa de juros vis-à-vis à inflação, encontramos correlações negativas de 56% e 83% para todo o período estimado e para uma amostra mais recente (do primeiro trimestre de 2006 até o último de 2011), respectivamente, indicando certa consistência na série obtida.

Three applications of the marginal cost of public funds concept

This paper illustrates the use of the marginal cost of public funds concept in three contexts. First, we extend Parry’s (2003) analysis of the efficiency effects excise taxes in the U.K., primarily by incorporating the distortion caused by imperfect competition in the cigarette market and distinguishing between the MCFs for per unit and ad valorem taxes on cigarettes. Our computations show, contrary to the standard result in the literature, that the per unit tax on cigarettes has a slightly lower MCF than the ad valorem tax on cigarettes. Second, we calculate the MCF for a payroll tax in a labour market with involuntary unemployment, using the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) efficiency wage model as our framework. Our computations, based on Canadian labour market data, indicate that incorporating the distortion caused by involuntary unemployment raises the MCF by 25 to 50 percent. Third, we derive expressions for the distributionally-weighted MCFs for the exemption level and the marginal tax rate for a “flat tax”, such as the one that has been adopted by the province of Alberta. This allows us to develop a restricted, but tractable, version of the optimal income tax problem. Computations indicate that the optimal marginal tax rate may be quite high, even with relatively modest pro-poor distributional preferences.

Optimal monetary policy under administered prices

This work aims to analyze the interaction and the effects of administered prices in the economy, through a DSGE model and the derivation of optimal monetary policies. The model used is a standard New Keynesian DSGE model of a closed economy with two sectors companies. In the first sector, free prices, there is a continuum of firms, and in the second sector of administered prices, there is a single firm. In addition, the model has positive trend inflation in the steady state. The model results suggest that price movements in any sector will impact on both sectors, for two reasons. Firstly, the price dispersion causes productivity to be lower. As the dispersion of prices is a change in the relative price of any sector, relative to general prices in the economy, when a movement in the price of a sector is not followed by another, their relative weights will change, leading to an impact on productivity in both sectors. Second, the path followed by the administered price sector is considered in future inflation expectations, which is used by companies in the free sector to adjust its optimal price. When this path leads to an expectation of higher inflation, the free sector companies will choose a higher mark-up to accommodate this expectation, thus leading to higher inflation trend when there is imperfect competition in the free sector. Finally, the analysis of optimal policies proved inconclusive, certainly indicating that there is influence of the adjustment model of administered prices in the definition of optimal monetary policy, but a quantitative study is needed to define the degree of impact.

A model of competition and interbank network formation

This work aims to understand the interaction between competition and network formation in the banking market. Combining Matutes and Padilla (1994) and Matutes and Vives (2000), we build a model of imperfect bank competition for deposits in which an interbank relationship network is a key strategic decision: it affects banks’ profit and risk position. The competition level exerts influence in the banking network structure since it affects the network outcomes. As result, we have that different competition levels imply different network topologies. Specifically, greater competition imply denser networks. Finally, when we allow for the possibility of collusion, the denser network can come out in the least competitive environment.

Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty

This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the classic Coumot model of oligopolistic competition. It shows, in particular, how one can map all Coumot equilibrium (which includes the monopoly and the null solutions) with only a function of uncertainty aversion coefficients of producers. The effect of variations in these parameters over the equilibrium quantities are studied, also assuming exogenous increases in the number of matching firms in the game. The Cournot solutions under uncertainty are compared with the monopolistic one. It shows principally that there is an uncertainty aversion level in the industry such that every aversion coefficient beyond it induces firms to produce an aggregate output smaller than the monopoly output. At the end of the artic/e equilibrium solutions are specialized for Linear Demand and for Coumot duopoly. Equilibrium analysis in the symmetric case allows to identify the uncertainty aversion coefficient for the whole industry as a proportional lack of information cost which would be conveyed by market price in the perfect competition case (Lerner Index).

Endogenous time-dependent rules and the costs of disinflation with imperfect credibility

This paper examines the output effects of monetary disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules and imperfect credibility of the disinflation policy. We find that these features interact to generate an additional effect on top f the ones obtained with either endogenous time-dependent rules (Bonomo and Carvalho, 2003) or imperfect credibility (Ball, 1995) in isolation. This results in higher output costs of monetary disinflation.

Essays on competition and returns of inside money

In an early paper, Cavalcanti and Wallace (2001) showed, using a computable version of Cavalcanti-Wallace model (CW-1999), that optimal regulation induces banks to pay interests, instead of contracting the money supply in an inside money allocation. Here, we generalize CW in two fashions, assuming inside money allocations, so that banks are supposed to issue money as they find a potential producer wishing to produce. The first generalization allows for seasonality due to real shocks on preferences with persistence and for monetary policy improvement. We found an asymmetric path for interest rates when constraints matter, even when shocks are independent. The second generalization allows for bank competition, in the sense that banks can choose between two different banking nets. We proof the existence of simple stable and unstable equilibria and also verify the existence of multiple equilibria.

On the Impossibility of an Exact Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorem

It is shown that, for almost every two-player game with imperfect monitoring, the conclusions of the classical folk theorem are false. So, even though these games admit a well-known approximate folk theorem, an exact folk theorem may only be obtained for a measure zero set of games. A complete characterization of the efficient equilibria of almost every such game is also given, along with an inefficiency result on the imperfect monitoring prisoner s dilemma.

Relations between regulation, competition policy and consumer protection in telecommunications, electricity and water supply

The purpose of this article is to discuss the relations between regulation, competition policy and consumer protection these relations in three key sectors of Brazil’s infrastructure: telecommunications, electricity and water supply. A study of the literature points to two general principles. First, the need for consumer protection depends on the “degree of sovereignty” enjoyed by consumers, defined in terms of the cost of consumer organization, consumers’ ability to evaluate services, and the level of competition in each sector. Second, the less sovereignty consumers enjoy the more consumer protection institutions are involved with regulation agencies. The evidence for the Brazilian case apparently corroborates these points. In addition, it is important to stress that consumer complaints in regulated sectors seem to have increased more intensely than in others. The article is divided into three sections. Section 1 presents theoretical elements and aspects of the relations between regulation, competition policy and consumer protection evidenced by international experience. Section 2 analyzes the Brazilian experience and in particular the available statistics on consumer complaints about telecommunications, electricity and water supply, submitted to Fundação Procon-SP during the nineties. The last section points to possible configurations of the institutional relations between competition policy, regulation and consumer protection, showing how the existing configuration of these areas in the three infrastructure sectors discussed confirms that the theoretical framework proposed has reasonable predictive power.

Aspects of Brazilian competition policy

Este Trabalho Discute a Evolução da Defesa da Concorrência no Brasil a Partir de uma Perspectiva Histórica e Comparada. para Tanto, Primeiramente são Apresentadas as Transformações Estruturais da Economia Brasileira Assim como as Circunstâncias Internacionais que Fizeram com que a Defesa da Concorrência se Tornasse Relevante, o que Permite Fazer um Contraste com a Evolução de Outros Regimes de Concorrência. em Segundo Lugar, são Apresentados os Desafios e as Peculiaridades da Implementação da Defesa da Concorrência em uma Economia em Desenvolvimento e como Tais Desafios Foram Tratados no Caso Brasileiro. a Principal Conclusão é que as Melhores Práticas dos Países do Ocde não Podem ser Automaticamente Importadas sem a Devida Atenção Às Peculiaridades de uma Economia em Desenvolvimento.

Intellectual property and competition as complementary policies: a test using an ordered probit model

Este Artigo Testa a Proposição da Teoria Econômica de que Propriedade Intelectual e Defesa da Concorrência são Políticas Complementares. um Modelo Probit Ordenado é Utilizado para Estimar os Efeitos Marginais do Uso e Qualidade do Enforcement dos Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual em uma Medida da Gravidade dos Problemas Relacionados À Concorrência. os Resultados Obtidos Reforçam a Noção de que as Políticas de Concorrência e Propriedade Intelectual não são Contraditórias.