Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Impacts of the proposals for tariff reductions in non-agricultural market access (Nama)

O Estudo Visa Avaliar os Impactos de Propostas Alternativas de Redução da Proteção Tarifária de Bens Não-Agrícolas Sobre a Economia Brasileira Usando um Modelo de Equilíbrio Geral Computável. Foram Simulados os Impactos da Implementação de Cortes Tarifários de Acordo com Diferentes Coeficientes para a Fórmula Suíça. as Simulações Foram Realizadas com o Modelo Gtap e Todos os Choques Tarifários Foram Calculados a Partir de Informações da Base de Dados Macmap. Além de Analisar Resultados Macroeconômicos e Setoriais, Também foi Testada a Sensibilidade dos Resultados em Relação ao Aumento das Elasticidades de Armington e À Ocorrência de uma Simultânea Liberalização de Tarifas Sobre Bens Agrícolas.

The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.

Campaign donation and government contracts in Brazilian states

A corporate firm may influence policies in its favor by transferring money to political candidates. However, empirical studies which document evidence about the return on campaign donations are rare (Großer, Reuben and Tymula, 2013). In this paper we estimate the net expected return of a campaign donation in eight Brazilian states using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to separate the return of winning and losing state deputy candidates in the electoral coalition in 2006. Our results show that that the net return is quite high (i.e., the investment of donor firms is almost 2% of the net expected return), and is larger among traditional electoral parties than any other parties, on average. Looking at the heterogeneity of local executive and legislative levels, we find that net returns are higher when donor firms finance deputies within a governor’s electoral coalition than deputies outside this coalition.

Performance of incentive contracts in highway PPP projects in Brazil

Private-Public Partnerships (P.P.P.) is a new contractual model institutionalized in 2004 that could be used to remedy to the infrastructure deficit in Brazil. In a context of a principal and agent relation, the public partner goal is to give incentives to the private partner in the contract so that their interests are aligned. This qualitative research presents the findings of an empirical study examining the performance of incentive PPP contracts in Brazil in the highway sector. The goal is to explain how the contracting parties can align their interests in an environment of asymmetric information. Literature identified the factors that can influence PPP design and efficient incentive contracts. The study assesses the contribution of these factors in the building of PPP contracts by focusing on the case of the first and only PPP signed in the highway sector in Brazil which is the MG-050. The first step is to describe the condition of the highway network and the level of compliance of the private partner with the contract PPP MG-050. The second step is to explain the performance of the private partner and conclude if the interests of both partners were aligned in contractual aspects. On the basis of these findings and the analysis of the contract, the study formulates suggestions to improve the draft of PPP contracts from the perspective of the incentive theory of contracts.

Non-monotone insurence contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of t.his paper is to show the possibility of a non-monot.one relation between coverage and risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuou.'l parameter which is correlated with lenience and, for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cost of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and implies a positive correlation between coverage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the sep be broken, but also the monotonicity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (Iow) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case t,here are some coverage leveIs associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation bet,ween coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to disentangle single crossing and non single crossing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function of riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric informat, ion), coverage is a monotone function of riskiness, this also gives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirica! tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variabIes (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variabIes conditioning on ali observabIe variabIes. We show that this may be t,he case when the omitted variabIes have a non-monotonic reIation with t,he observable ones. Moreover, because this non-monotonic reIat,ion is deepIy reIated with the failure of the SCP in one-dimensional screening problems, the existing lit.erature on asymmetric information does not capture t,his feature. Hence, our main result is to point Out the importance of t,he SCP in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Predicting Amazon Deforestation through the deterninants of demand for agricultural land

This paper develops a model of deforestation pressure in the Amazon. It is based on the determinants of demand for agricultural land, i.e. the interactions between population dynamics, urbanization and the growth of local markets, land prices, and government spending and policies. The mo deI is estimated using data from the period 1970 - 1985, and predictions for the period 1985 - 2010 are made under explicit assumptions about the underlying factors of deforestation. The predictions indicate that economic growth in the Amazon is likely to continue at high rates even if the federal government abandons its aggressive development policy. Deforestation will be much smaller if they do, though, since the active development policies tend to promote wasteful use of land.

Informal labor contracts: an analysis of the Brazilian experience

For representing an expressive souree of labor absorption, the jobs with informal labor eontraet have been reeeiving a eonsiderable attention among the speeialists in the Brazilian labor rnarket. This paper presents, eoneisely, some stylized faets about this labor rnarket segment, as well as some oftheir most eommon interpretations. We argue that sue h interpretations are, in general, not very integrated and a model trying to make them eompatible is developed. The model ineorporates both segmentation and workers with heterogeneity in qualifieation. The results of the analysis are shown to be eompatible with most of the observed faets.

Incomplete contracts and the problem of social harm

We construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative extemality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. We analyze several kinds of rights, including damages, injunctions, and rights to exclude (arising from covenants or land ownership). There are cases in which allocating any of these basic rights to the first mover-i.e., first-party rights-is dominated by second-party rights, and cases in which the reverse is true. A Coasian result (efficiency regardless of the rights allocation) only holds under a limited set of conditions. As corollaries of a theorem ranking the basic rights regimes, a number of results emerge contradicting conventional wisdom, including the relative inefficiency of concentrated land ownership and the relevance of the generator's identity. We conclude with a mechanism and a new rights regime that each yield the first best in all cases.

Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.

Workplace diversity and incentive contracts : theory and evidence

This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

Como criar possibilidades de financiamento para a agricultura familiar adotando o Plano ABC Nacional?

Ao longo dos últimos anos, através do aprimoramento das políticas agrícolas, observaram-se aumentos consistentes dos recursos orçamentários destinados à Agricultura Familiar, através do Pronaf. O incremento dos recursos efetivamente aplicados e o número cada vez maior de contratos também são realidade e podem ser vistos em todas as regiões do País. De acordo com os dados divulgados pelo Banco Central do Brasil, através do Anuário Estatístico do Crédito Rural (2014), foram aplicados no Brasil em 2004 aproximadamente R$ 4,39 bilhões, já em 2012 foram pouco mais de R$ 16,35 bilhões, ou seja, incremento de 272% no intervalo analisado. Em relação ao número de contratos, o crescimento foi em torno de 35,5% no mesmo período. A importância da Agricultura Familiar no contexto atual é corroborada no âmbito internacional pela Resolução 66/222, de 28.03.2012, da Assembleia-Geral, que conferiu à Organização das Nações Unidas para Alimentação e Agricultura (FAO) o mandato de implementar o Ano Internacional da Agricultura Familiar (AIAF) neste ano de 2014, em parceria com os governos dos países membros bem como com outros organismos internacionais e organizações não-governamentais atuantes no tema da agricultura e da segurança alimentar. Concomitantemente, diante da crescente preocupação com as questões ambientais, o Plano Setorial de Mitigação e de Adaptação às Mudanças Climáticas para a Consolidação de uma Economia de Baixa Emissão de Carbono na Agricultura - Plano ABC - é uma importante parte do compromisso voluntário assumido pelo Brasil em 2009, na 15ª Conferência das Partes – COP15 ocorrida em Copenhague, na redução da emissão de gases de efeito estufa até 2020. Parte desse compromisso assumido precisa ser atendido pela agricultura familiar, o que aumenta a responsabilidade da mesma para questões que vão além do fornecimento de alimentos, matérias primas e geração de energia etc. O Programa ABC, instrumento pelo qual os agricultores brasileiros podem acessar crédito para implementar tecnologias de baixas emissões de carbono, já está integrado nas ações previstas na Política de Crédito Agropecuário Brasileiro. Porém, ainda se observam vários desafios no Programa ABC, como aumentar o repasse desses recursos, não obstante ao aumento das operações contratadas pelos produtores nos últimos anos. O objetivo do estudo é investigar como a agricultura familiar pode contribuir com o Plano ABC e nos compromissos voluntários assumidos pelo País para a redução de emissão dos gases de efeito estufa no setor agropecuário. Para atingir esse objetivo, realizou-se uma revisão da bibliografia e das linhas de crédito disponíveis pelos bancos públicos e privados relacionadas ao Programa ABC e ao Pronaf. Conclui-se que há sinergias entre algumas linhas de crédito do Pronaf e também do Fundo Constitucional de Financiamento do Nordeste - FNE - Sudene com as tecnologias previstas no Plano ABC. Nesse sentido, o Plano ABC prevê a aplicação de tecnologias de redução de emissões em cerca de 4,97 milhões de ha ocupados pela agricultura familiar, sendo recursos do Pronaf previstos para fomentar tal aplicação, através das linhas Pronaf Eco e Pronaf Floresta. Contudo, verificou-se que tais linhas do Pronaf contemplam o uso de recursos para diversas outras atividades não relacionadas diretamente àquelas previstas no Plano ABC ou capazes de reduzir emissões de gases de efeito estufa. Dessa forma, não há como assegurar que a aplicação de recursos nessas linhas seja direcionada para tecnologias e ações que reduzam emissões, nem tão pouco há como monitorar o volume de recursos do Pronaf aplicados de fato em atividades aderentes ao Plano ABC. Portanto, sugere-se a criação/incorporação de novas linhas de crédito ao Pronaf, como por exemplo, Pronaf ABC Eco e o Pronaf ABC Floresta. Além disso, apresentou-se estudo de caso para o município de Bragança Paulista (SP), onde verificou-se que a utilização dos recursos do Programa ABC poderia ser usada para recomposição de áreas de preservação permanente ou de reserva legal, importantes na preservação das nascentes e rios da região. Essa possibilidade é de elevada importância no contexto e nas discussões atuais sobre a escassez dos recursos hídricos que abastecem grandes cidades, a exemplo do que vem ocorrendo na região metropolitana do Estado de São Paulo. Como conclusão, identifica-se alguns gargalos e apresenta-se algumas sugestões de melhorias para aumentar a utilização e eficácia do Programa ABC, como promover com mais ênfase apoio das assistências técnicas junto aos produtores, priorizar as ações previstas no Plano ABC em algumas regiões do País e aumentar a atuação mais direcionada do Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário (MDA) para difusão e incorporação das tecnologias de uma agricultura de baixa emissão de carbono no segmento da agricultura familiar.