Expediting New Program Development: Meeting Market Demand and Leveraging Internal Resources

Expediting new program development can help universities meet student and employer demand while gaining an edge over competitors, but coordinating program development and approval requires careful preparation and execution. This report profiles strategies to measure market demand for new programs, choose programs for accelerated development, and leverage internal resources. The report also suggests ways to structure and staff program development to maximize speed and effectiveness.

The Effectiveness of Golden Handcuffs

Executive compensation includes components intended to acquire and retain executives as well as to align their goals with those of shareholders. This paper focuses on retention compensation, commonly known as "golden handcuffs", including stock options, long-term incentive plans and restricted stock. The extant literature examines CEOs that change jobs despite their golden handcuffs, and argues that such compensation is not an effective means of executive retention. In this paper, I compare the golden handcuffs of a set of CEOs who change jobs to a matched set of those who do not in order to determine the efficacy of such compensation for executive retention. I find that restricted stock is positively related to CEO turnover whereas stock options are negatively related.