The “Lunatic Fringe” -- Barry Goldwater and the Conservative Revolution of the 1960s --

How did conservatives, who had become effectively ostracized by their party following the Great Depression and the societal reforms of the New Deal, regain leverage within the GOP during the 1960s? My hypothesis is two-fold. First, I contend that a small group of conservative activists led by F. Clifton White, in spite of a dearth of resources and manpower, managed to infiltrate Republican infrastructure and “hijack” the delegate- selection process. The distinctly conservative and recalcitrant disposition of the Goldwater delegates demonstrates that these activists succeeded. Second, I argue that in addition to temporarily overpowering the national convention in 1964, conservatives thereafter retained control of the party insofar as subsequent GOP candidates were obliged to garner the support of conservative pockets of the country in order to win the presidential nomination. The resulting rightward shift of the Republican Party following the 1960s is a direct corollary of the conservative takeover outlined in this study.

Soft money : private foundations of party politics

In the area of campaign financing in federal elections, one of the most controversial issues is that of soft money. Soft money refers to those funds raised by the national party organizations for use on various grassroots and party-building activities. but which are not subject to the restraints of federal campaign finance law. Critics contend that these party-building activitie, such as generic television advertising, voter registration and get-out-the vote drives, provide ancillary benefits to federal candidates and should, therefore, be subject to federal contribution and expenditure limits. Critics further argue that because these funds are not subject to federal law and do benefit federal candidates, the national parties raise monies in amounts and from sources, such as corporations and unions, that are prohibited under federal law. Efforts to gain a better understanding of soft money have been hampered by a lack of data, as the national parties were not required to disclose their soft money receipts and transactions until 1991. The purpose of this study is to analyze data recently made available in an attempt to add the import of empirical evidence to the debate over soft money. The nature, size and timing of soft money contributions are investigated and national party soft money disbursements are examined. The findings suggest that any attempts to reform the soft money system must first consider its compensatory benefits. Most prominently, this includes the extent to which soft money has promoted the resurgence of the national party organizations in the context of election politics.