Globalization, Agency, and Institutional Innovation: The Rise of Public-Private Partnerships in Global Governance

Public and private actors increasingly cooperate in global governance, a realm previously reserved for states and intergovernmental organizations (IOs). This trend raises fascinating theoretical questions. What explains the rise in public-private institutions and their role in international politics? Who leads such institutional innovation and why? To address the questions, this paper develops a theory of the political demand and supply of public-private institutions and specifies the conditions under which IOs and non-state actors would cooperate, and states would support this public-private cooperation. The observable implications of the theoretical argument are evaluated against the broad trends in public-private cooperation and in a statistical analysis of the significance of demand and supply-side incentives in public-private cooperation for sustainable development. The study shows that public-private institutions do not simply fill governance gaps opened by globalization, but cluster in narrower areas of cooperation, where the strategic interests of IOs, states, and transnational actors intersect.

Soft money : private foundations of party politics

In the area of campaign financing in federal elections, one of the most controversial issues is that of soft money. Soft money refers to those funds raised by the national party organizations for use on various grassroots and party-building activities. but which are not subject to the restraints of federal campaign finance law. Critics contend that these party-building activitie, such as generic television advertising, voter registration and get-out-the vote drives, provide ancillary benefits to federal candidates and should, therefore, be subject to federal contribution and expenditure limits. Critics further argue that because these funds are not subject to federal law and do benefit federal candidates, the national parties raise monies in amounts and from sources, such as corporations and unions, that are prohibited under federal law. Efforts to gain a better understanding of soft money have been hampered by a lack of data, as the national parties were not required to disclose their soft money receipts and transactions until 1991. The purpose of this study is to analyze data recently made available in an attempt to add the import of empirical evidence to the debate over soft money. The nature, size and timing of soft money contributions are investigated and national party soft money disbursements are examined. The findings suggest that any attempts to reform the soft money system must first consider its compensatory benefits. Most prominently, this includes the extent to which soft money has promoted the resurgence of the national party organizations in the context of election politics.

Bringing Japanese manufacturing systems to America: the feasibility of implementing just-in-time production in the United States

This paper addresses the feasibility of implementing Japanese manufacturing systems in the United States. The recent success of Japanese transplant companies suggests that Just-In-Time (JIT) production is possible within America's industrial environment. Once American workers receive proper training, they have little difficulty participating in rapid setup procedures and utilizing the kanban system. Japanese transplants are gradually developing Japanese-style relationships with their American supplier companies by initiating long-term, mutually beneficial agreements. They are also finding ways to cope with America's problem of distance, which is steadily decreasing as an obstacle to JIT delivery. American companies, however, encounter Significant problems in trying to convert traditionally organized, factories to the JIT system. This paper demonstrates that it is both feasible and beneficial for American manufacturers to implement JIT production techniques. Many of the difficulties manufacturers experience center around a general lack of information about JIT. Once a company realizes its potential for setup-time reduction, a prerequisite for the JIT system, workers and managers can work together to create a new process for handling equipment changeover. Significant results are possible with minimal investment. Also, supervisors often do not realize that the JIT method of ordering goods from suppliers is compatible with current systems. This "kanban system" not only enhances current systems but also reduces the amount of paperwork and scheduling involved. When arranging JlT delivery of supplier goods, American manufacturers tend to overlook important aspects of JIT supplier management. However, by making long-tenn commitments, initiating the open exchange of information, assisting suppliers in reaching new standards of performance, increasing the level of conununication, and relying more on suppliers' engineering capabilities, even American manufacturers can develop Japanese-style supplier relationships that enhance the effectiveness of the system.