Quantitative Information Flow, Relations and Polymorphic Types

This paper uses Shannon's information theory to give a quantitative definition of information flow in systems that transform inputs to outputs. For deterministic systems, the definition is shown to specialise to a simpler form when the information source and the known inputs jointly determine the inputs. For this special case, the definition is related to the classical security condition of non-interference and an equivalence is established between non-interference and independence of random variables. Quantitative information flow for deterministic systems is then presented in relational form. With this presentation, it is shown how relational parametricity can be used to derive upper and lower bounds on information flows through families of functions defined in the second order lambda calculus.

Information Flow for ALGOL-like Languages

In this paper we present an approach to information flow analysis for a family of languages. We start with a simple imperative language. We present an information flow analysis using a flow logic. The paper contains detailed correctness proofs for this analysis. We next extend the analysis to a restricted form of Idealised Algol, a call-by-value higher-order extension of the simple imperative language (the key restriction being the lack of recursion). The paper concludes with a discussion of further extensions, including a probabilistic extension of Idealised Algol.

Quantified Interference: Information Theory and Information Flow

The paper investigates which of Shannon’s measures (entropy, conditional entropy, mutual information) is the right one for the task of quantifying information flow in a programming language. We examine earlier relevant contributions from Denning, McLean and Gray and we propose and motivate a specific quantitative definition of information flow. We prove results relating equivalence relations, interference of program variables, independence of random variables and the flow of confidential information. Finally, we show how, in our setting, Shannon’s Perfect Secrecy theorem provides a sufficient condition to determine whether a program leaks confidential information.