Modelling and Administration of Contract-Based Systems

Mirroring the paper versions exchanged between businesses today, electronic contracts offer the possibility of dynamic, automatic creation and enforcement of restrictions and compulsions on agent behaviour that are designed to ensure business objectives are met. However, where there are many contracts within a particular application, it can be difficult to determine whether the system can reliably fulfil them all; computer-parsable electronic contracts may allow such verification to be automated. In this paper, we describe a conceptual framework and architecture specification in which normative business contracts can be electronically represented, verified, established, renewed, etc. In particular, we aim to allow systems containing multiple contracts to be checked for conflicts and violations of business objectives. We illustrate the framework and architecture with an aerospace example.

Protocols between programs and proofs

In this paper we describe a new protocol that we call the Curry-Howard protocol between a theory and the programs extracted from it. This protocol leads to the expansion of the theory and the production of more powerful programs. The methodology we use for automatically extracting “correct” programs from proofs is a development of the well-known Curry-Howard process. Program extraction has been developed by many authors, but our presentation is ultimately aimed at a practical, usable system and has a number of novel features. These include 1. a very simple and natural mimicking of ordinary mathematical practice and likewise the use of established computer programs when we obtain programs from formal proofs, and 2. a conceptual distinction between programs on the one hand, and proofs of theorems that yield programs on the other. An implementation of our methodology is the Fred system. As an example of our protocol we describe a constructive proof of the well-known theorem that every graph of even parity can be decomposed into a list of disjoint cycles. Given such a graph as input, the extracted program produces a list of the (non-trivial) disjoint cycles as promised.

On Compositional Modelling

Many solutions to AI problems require the task to be represented in one of a multitude of rigorous mathematical formalisms. The construction of such mathematical models forms a difficult problem which is often left to the user of the problem solver. This void between problem solvers and the problems is studied by the eclectic field of automated modelling. Within this field, compositional modelling, a knowledge-based methodology for system modelling, has established itself as a leading approach. In general, a compositional modeller organises knowledge in a structure of composable fragments that relate to particular system components or processes. Its embedded inference mechanism chooses the appropriate fragments with respect to a given problem, instantiates and assembles them into a consistent system model. Many different types of compositional modeller exist, however, with significant differences in their knowledge representation and approach to inference. This paper examines compositional modelling. It presents a general framework for building and analysing compositional modellers. Based on this framework, a number of influential compositional modellers are examined and compared. The paper also identifies the strengths and weaknesses of compositional modelling and discusses some typical applications.

Coalition Formation through Motivation and Trust

Cooperation is the fundamental underpinning of multi-agent systems, allowing agents to interact to achieve their goals. Where agents are self-interested, or potentially unreliable, there must be appropriate mechanisms to cope with the uncertainty that arises. In particular, agents must manage the risk associated with interacting with others who have different objectives, or who may fail to fulfil their commitments. Previous work has utilised the notions of motivation and trust in engendering successful cooperation between self-interested agents. Motivations provide a means for representing and reasoning about agents' overall objectives, and trust offers a mechanism for modelling and reasoning about reliability, honesty, veracity and so forth. This paper extends that work to address some of its limitations. In particular, we introduce the concept of a clan: a group of agents who trust each other and have similar objectives. Clan members treat each other favourably when making private decisions about cooperation, in order to gain mutual benefit. We describe mechanisms for agents to form, maintain, and dissolve clans in accordance with their self-interested nature, along with giving details of how clan membership influences individual decision making. Finally, through some simulation experiments we illustrate the effectiveness of clan formation in addressing some of the inherent problems with cooperation among self-interested agents.