Aiming for world peace by promoting 'violence' in education

In order to contribute towards UNESCO’s goal of pursuing world peace, aims of education must transcend the limited scope of national self-interest which has dominated schooling systems in the West for the last two centuries and further back when the survival of each polis in Ancient Greece was of paramount importance. Aims must therefore become different and the environment that is thought best for this to occur is a democratic one. The case is made that such a democratic environment should involve opportunities to evaluate the value of current aims of education and to explore others in light of the pressing need to pursue peace on a global scale. In order to promote such a democratic environment of discussion and debate the notion of ‘violence’ is considered as a potential framework for such a re-evaluation. The sort of ‘violence’ that is called for is in reference to its use by Emmanual Levinas who employed it emotively to misinterpret Kierkegaard. The use of this misapplied term ‘violence’ may nevertheless be of use in initiating the sort of inquiry of a Deweyean type regarded here to be necessary to improve aims of education democratically in order to pursue world peace.

The Assyrians

This chapter seeks to extend earlier works on Mesopotamian democracy to a civilisation that is not only typically excluded from such discussions of democracy in the ancient Near East, but generally considered to be among the region’s most bloodthirsty and bellicose: the Assyrians. On the one hand it cannot be denied that the Assyrians went through periods of aggressive expansion, that they were cruel to at least some of their enemies and that the more militant Assyrian kings struck fear into the hearts of men and women across the region (I:106-110, 113; II:1, 54-6 in: Grayson 1991: 201). On the other hand, however, it is peculiar that the intermittent war-mongering of the Assyrians is seen not only as ‘a modern myth exaggerated beyond all proportion’ (Parpola 2003: 1060), but also seen to exclude them from practicing any form of democracy. This is starkly inconsistent with the contemporary assessment of other societies of the ancient world, such as the Greeks or Romans who were both belligerent and at least nominally democratic. To give one example of this double standard, Jana Pecirkova argues that while the Greek polis enabled the birth of science, philosophy and the rule of law, the Assyrians were not able to distinguish ‘between the rational and the irrational, between reality and illusion’ (Pecirkova 1985: 155). The reason for this, according to Pecrikova, is simple: their ‘only alternative to monarchy … was anarchy … Political decisions were arbitrary in character and not governed by any laws or generally acknowledged and accepted rules’ and the ‘people were the passive subjects of political decision-making’ (Pecirkova 1985: 166-8). This chapter, while cautious not to over-state the democratic tendencies of the Assyrians, takes Pecirkova’s argument to task by examining the complex functioning of power and politics, the checks and balances on monarchical authority, the rule of law and the sophisticated intellectual scene of the three key epochs of ancient Assyrian civilisation.

Pommy media causing a stir in Australia

Two British newspapers - The Guardian and The Mail - have recently begun publishing in Australia. What does this mean and are they being welcomed by the Australian media?

The Assyrians

This chapter seeks to extend earlier works on Mesopotamian democracy to a civilisation that is not only typically excluded from such discussions of democracy in the ancient Near East, but generally considered to be among the region’s most bloodthirsty and bellicose: the Assyrians. On the one hand it cannot be denied that the Assyrians went through periods of aggressive expansion, that they were cruel to at least some of their enemies and that the more militant Assyrian kings struck fear into the hearts of men and women across the region (I:106-110, 113; II:1, 54-6 in: Grayson 1991: 201). On the other hand, however, it is peculiar that the intermittent war-mongering of the Assyrians is seen not only as ‘a modern myth exaggerated beyond all proportion’ (Parpola 2003: 1060), but also seen to exclude them from practicing any form of democracy. This is starkly inconsistent with the contemporary assessment of other societies of the ancient world, such as the Greeks or Romans who were both belligerent and at least nominally democratic. To give one example of this double standard, Jana Pecirkova argues that while the Greek polis enabled the birth of science, philosophy and the rule of law, the Assyrians were not able to distinguish ‘between the rational and the irrational, between reality and illusion’ (Pecirkova 1985: 155). The reason for this, according to Pecrikova, is simple: their ‘only alternative to monarchy … was anarchy … Political decisions were arbitrary in character and not governed by any laws or generally acknowledged and accepted rules’ and the ‘people were the passive subjects of political decision-making’ (Pecirkova 1985: 166-8). This chapter, while cautious not to over-state the democratic tendencies of the Assyrians, takes Pecirkova’s argument to task by examining the complex functioning of power and politics, the checks and balances on monarchical authority, the rule of law and the sophisticated intellectual scene of the three key epochs of ancient Assyrian civilisation.

Two functions of Aristotle's common advantage

This paper identifies two distinct functions of the common advantage in Aristotle’s political thought and argues that distinguishing these functions allows for a reconciliation of the individualist and holist aspects of the Aristotelian account of the polis. I demonstrate that the Aristotelian common advantage functions both as (i) a motivating reason for individuals to enter the polis and (ii) a normative reason — the political good of justice — that provides a criterion for an assessment of the correctness of constitutions (politeiai). The two functions of the common advantage are, I suggest, reconcilable insofar as the Aristotelian polis is best understood as a unity of order rather than a mere aggregation of individual citizens or an organic whole.