The minimum moral content of law : a critique of Hart's descriptive theory of positive and natural law

Review of H.L.A. Hart's account of the minimum moral content of law - assesses its consistency with the methodology provided in his description of the focal meaning or central case of law - particular focus is Hart's consideration of the ultimate end of man - how difficulties faced by Hart's account of the minimum moral content of law can be overcome.

On legal positivism's word and our 'form-of-(non-)living'

This paper is about two stories. The more reassuring one states that byestablishing that a norm is valid because of its source, not its merit, legal positivism is, in its various forms, perhaps one of the greatest achievements in Western legal theory and practice. From constitutionalism to human rights policies, from criminal to international law and free trade agreements, from contracts to torts and e-commerce, legal validity, predictability, and coherence have found their most powerful ally in positivist thought. This contribution argues that it is time for a different, neorealist story: the metaphysical, ontological and biopolitical essence of its language demonstrates that legal positivism has in fact played a fundamental role in the substitution of action with behaviour, and consequently, in the normalisation of humankind’s self-annihilating animality as post-historical and post-political ‘form-of-(non-)living.’

The tangled web internet plagiarism and international students` academic writing

This study explores the notion of plagiarism and the Internet from 11 English as Second Language (ESL) teachers and 186 first-year ESL students at South-Coast University in Melbourne, Australia. Data collection was by a questionnaire and semi-structured interviews, and coded using SPSS and N*Vivo software to ascertain trends in response. The most significant difference in response related to the concept of the Internet as copyrightable space. ESL teachers in this study regarded cyberspace as a limitless environment for ‘cut and paste’ plagiarism in students’ academic writing, whereas ESL students considered the Internet a ‘free zone’ and not governed by legal proprietary rights. These conflicting views, it is suggested, relate to differing notions of authorship and attribution: the Romantic notion protected by legal theory and sanctions versus literary theory and techno-literacy notions of authorship. This research highlights the need to reformulate plagiarism policies in light of global and technological perspectives of authorship and attribution of text.

Offender rehabilitation : a normative framework for forensic psychologists

Community protection from offenders is addressed through punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and/or rehabilitation. The current public policy debate about community protection refers to community rights as opposed to offender rights as if the two are mutually exclusive. However, in this article it will be argued that offender rehabilitation can enhance community protection if it addresses community rights and offender rights. The author proposes a normative framework to guide forensic psychologists in offender rehabilitation. The normative framework considers psychological theory—the risk-need model to address community rights and the good lives model to address offender rights. However, forensic psychologists operate within the context of the criminal justice system and so legal theory will also be considered. Therapeutic jurisprudence can balance community rights and offender rights within a human rights perspective. The proposed normative framework guides forensic psychologists in the assessment of risk, the treatment of need, and the management of readiness in balancing community rights and offender rights. Within a human rights perspective, forensic psychologists have a duty to provide offenders with the opportunity to make autonomous decisions about whether to accept or reject rehabilitation.

Where the home in valley meets the damp dirty prison : a human rights perspective on therapeutic jurisprudence and the rule of forensic psychologists in correctional settings

The roles of forensic psychologists in coerced environments such as corrections include that of treatment provider (for the offender) and that of organizational consultant (for the community). This dual role raises ethical issues between offender rights and community rights; an imbalance results in the violation of human rights. A timely reminder of a slippery ethical slope that can arise is the failure of the American Psychological Association to manage this balance regarding interrogation and torture of detainees under the Bush administration. To establish a “bright-line position” regarding ethical practice, forensic psychologists need to be cognizant of international human rights law. In this endeavor, international covenants and a universal ethical code ought to guide practice, although seemingly unresolveable conflicts between the law and ethics codes may arise. A solution to this problem is to devise an ethical framework that is based on enforceable universally shared human values regarding dignity and rights. To this end, the legal theory of therapeutic jurisprudence can assist psychologists to understand the law, the legal system, and their role in applying the law therapeutically to support offender dignity, freedom, and well-being. In this way, a moral stance is taken and the forensic role of treatment provider and/or organizational consultant is not expected to trump the prescriptions and the proscriptions of the law.

R v Middendorp

This book brings together feminist academics, lawyers and activists to present an impressive collection of alternative judgments in a series of Australian legal cases.

Imago veritas falsa: for a (post-)Schmittian decisionist theory of law, legal reasoning, and judging

For decades, while approaching the ‘normativism/pragmatism’ divide and discussing the legitimacy of (and opportunity for) the judge to act as a ‘social engineer’, socio-legal scholars have tried to ascertain whether the jurist should also consider the impact of his/her activity on society at large, and if so, why and to what extent. The present contribution understands instead the law in terms of a structurally incomplete image (imago veritas falsa) which always needs the decisive intervention of the legal interpreter to exercise its performative instances. In particular, by adopting an unconventional theoretico-philosophical approach that transcends the classic boundaries of foundationalist metaphysics as expressed by the dichotomy of Western logic, this paper argues for the necessity of a tertium comparationis capable of explaining that the real essence of law, legal reasoning, and judging is neither that of normativism, nor of pragmatism, but rather of (post-)Schmittian decisionism.

Legal ethics is (just) normal ethics: towards a coherent system of legal ethics

The standards governing how lawyers ought to conduct themselves consist of a number disparate principles and rules, which are devoid of an overarching rationale. We argue that legal ethics is not a stand-alone social construct. Rather, it is the application of normal ethical principles so far as they relate to the law. Approached in this manner, legal ethics becomes a far more coherent and justifiable institution. In this paper we apply general moral theory to several key dilemmas facing lawyers. This results in outcomes which some may find counter-intuitive. We conclude that lawyers should not do pro bono work; that the first cab rank off the rank principle is unsound and that there is no relevant difference between expressly misleading the court and putting the other side to the proof of its case.

The legal profession and the business of law

‘Professional Responsibility and Ethics’ is one of the ‘Priestley 11’ law subjects compulsorily undertaken by Australian law students who aspire to be admitted to practice. Many of the brightest join the major corporate law firms. Nevertheless, there is little theoretical analysis of how those firms are functioning to affect the professional and ethical conduct of their practitioners in the neoliberal state. In this article it is argued that in the mature and highly competitive marketplace for legal services, rather than working as autonomous professionals, corporate lawyers are now finding themselves working more and more as functionaries subservient to the dictates of their corporate clients. Drawing on interviews with Australian major law firm corporate lawyers and Charles Derber’s theory on the proletarianisation of professional workers, it is argued that corporate lawyers are losing key elements of their professional identity in the impetus to maintain the client list and the profit motive. Furthermore, as the balance of power in the corporate legal sector is shifting from law firms to clients, the professional ethics of law firm lawyers are at risk of being compromised as they find themselves being reduced to little more than ‘flush’ factory fodder for the major corporations.

Betwixt And between – Practical legal training practitioners – Scholarship of (which) practice?

I am interested in how Australian lawyers who teach lawyers’ skills at the post-graduate pre-admission stage (“PLT practitioners) engage in scholarly activities regarding their teaching practice. This presentation will relate Bourdieu’s ‘reflexive sociology of law’ to my doctoral research in which I focus on how PLT practitioners engage in scholarly activities around their teaching work. Drawing on Kemmis’s ‘practice table’, Bourdieu and Passeron’s theory of ‘reproduction’ in education and culture, and de Certeau’s theory of ‘practice in everyday life’, I will describe how PLT practitioners’ professional identity, as lawyers, constrains scholarship around teaching and mentoring practice.

The positive criteria of legal norms: law between facts and norms

Whether an abstract jurisprudence of law can be developed such that law is neutral with respect topositive choices, or whether law is necessarily informed by social facts, values and assumptions, with reference to the work of Jurgden Habermas, countering that author's claim of neutrality.

O where are you going? O do you imagine? Reproduction and response : a reflexive sociology of scholarship of teaching and learning in practical legal training

My doctoral research studies Australian PLT practitioners’ engagement with scholarship of teaching and learning. I argue that many PLT practitioners are motivated to engage with scholarship of teaching and learning in their work. There are, however, individual and extra-individual impediments.
PLT practitioners are lawyers that teach in institutional practical legal training (“PLT”). Satisfactory completion of mandatory PLT is an eligibility requirement for admission to the Australian legal profession. The PLT requirement is additional to academic legal qualifications. PLT is undertaken at a post-graduate level with, or after, the academic law degree.
My study investigates PLT practitioners’ motivations and capabilities to engage with scholarship of teaching and learning (“SoTL”). I study organisational symbolic support for SoTL in PLT, and organisational allocation of resources to SoTL in PLT.
The study involves individual and extra-individual domains of PLT practitioners’ work. It considers how social structures (e.g. “the juridical”) are inscribed into individuals’ practices (“teaching”) and, conversely, whether practices influence social structures.
My research adopts qualitative methodologies. These involve inter-disciplinary exchanges between law, legal education, practice research, sociology of law, cultural theory, and theory and practice of teaching and learning. My theoretical framework draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s “reflexive sociology”, and Michel de Certeau’s “heterological science”.
I sourced data from documents, and semi-structured interviews with 36 Australian PLT practitioners. Documentary sources include statutory instruments, speeches, reports, practice directions, histories, and scholarly publications.
To analyse the data I adopted Kelle’s characterisation of “theoretical sensitivity”, drawing on “explicit” and “emergent” analysis strategies derived from “grounded theory”. The explicit strategies were based on my theoretical framework. The emergent strategy involved sensitivity to non-explicit concepts and theories that emerged from the data. Computer-aided qualitative data analysis software expedited these methods.
My findings to date question dominant legal structures’ readiness for change, the implications of this for teaching and learning in PLT, and in particular for PLT practitioners’ engagement with SoTL in PLT.
The espoused rationale for mandatory PLT (in statutes) is improvement for the protection of clients, the administration of justice, and to assure quality legal services. The tacit rationale is improved quality of legal education, and experiences, for lawyers-to-be. My thesis argues dominant structures in legal education impede the espoused and tacit objectives, and impede PLT practitioners’ engagement with scholarship of teaching and learning.

The planning theory and natural law

The practical, normative dimension of planning is a plausible source of the ‘family resemblances’ noted by a number of legal theorists between Scott Shapiro’s Planning Theory and natural law jurisprudence. Foremost among these resemblances is Shapiro’s contention that the law, necessarily, has a moral aim. The moral aim thesis is at first glance surprising given Shapiro’s intention to defend exclusive legal positivism and unequivocal rejection of what he takes to be the core commitments of natural law theory. Shapiro’s claim, however, is that although the law necessarily has a moral aim, this does not entail that it is successful in satisfying that aim. In order to assess this thesis, it is helpful to compare the Planning Theory with contemporary natural law approaches. Bringing Shapiro’s Planning Theory into dialogue with contemporary natural law theories can demonstrate some of the Planning Theory’s weaknesses as an alternative explanation of the ultimate grounds of the authoritativeness of legal norms. Some of these weaknesses, moreover, are instructive beyond the specific contours of the Planning Theory insofar as they generalise to other legal positivist approaches. In section one I consider Shapiro’s treatment of the so-called ‘Possibility Puzzle’ regarding the grounding relation between authoritative norms and legal authority. Shapiro’s denial of the capacity of earlier jurisprudential theories to resolve this puzzle overlooks what is – I suggest – a plausible solution developed by John Finnis on the basis of Joseph Raz’s theory of practical reason and norms. Section two then demonstrates why Shapiro’s attempt to combine a robust construal of the social facts thesis with a commitment to the thesis that law necessarily has a moral aim is ultimately unsuccessful.