Illegal immigration, technology adoption and welfare

A debate in the illegal immigration and technology adoption literature suggests that hiring illegal immigrants may be hindering the adoption of new technology, which in turn harms a country’s productivity growth. This paper analyses an individual firm’s behaviour regarding new technology adoption in the presence of illegal immigrants. We assume a Ricardian economy and analyse immigration of illegal unskilled workers in a model of Cournot duopoly where firms are producing homogenous and non-traded goods, and hiring illegal immigrants. A two-stage simultaneous move game is set up: in Stage 1, given the opportunity of hiring illegal immigrants, an individual firm decides whether to adopt the new technology or not, where technology adoption is costly. In Stage 2, each firm will choose the Cournot output level. Solving this two-stage game, we conclude that (i) given the opportunity of hiring illegal immigrants, an individual firm may adopt the new technology and (ii) in the case of zero tolerance of illegal immigration, technology adoption may increase but such technology adoption is immiserizing as it reduces the total surplus.

Immigration detention in Australia

This thesis explains why immigration detention persists as part of Australia's immigration policy. It argues that this form of incarceration has a long history in Australia, and that it fulfils specific social and political functions. The thesis also demonstrates that immigration detention is punitive and therefore breaches Australia's constitution.

Congestion and optimal immigration policy

This paper presents a model to explain the stylized fact that many countries have a low ratio of migrants in their population while some countries have a high ratio of migrants. Immigration improves the income of the domestic residents, but migrants also increase the congestion of public services. If migrants are unskilled and therefore pay low taxes, and the government does not limit access to these services, then the welfare of the domestic residents decreases with the number of migrants. Visa auctions can lower the cost of immigration control and substitute legal migrants for illegal migrants. If the government decides to limit the access of migrants to public services, immigration control becomes unnecessary and the optimal number of migrants can be very large.

Migration, unemployment and trade

Migration, Unemployment and Trade focuses on the issues of migration, welfare and unemployment in a trade and development framework. Several chapters of the book analyze the implications of internal labor mobility in a model designed to highlight its implications for regional welfare, urban unemployment, rural-urban dichotomy and structural adjustment. An important innovation in this work is the disaggregation of the economy and the use of separate utility functions to highlight non-homogeneity of preferences. The book also deals with international mobility of factors in different frameworks. In particular it concentrates on the highly emotive issue of legal and illegal migration. Thus this work incorporates interesting and important features of labor economics and factor mobility into trade and distortion theory.

The Εffects of censoring and the spiral of silence on focus group interviews: a case study of discussions on immigration

Focus groups assess the oral expressions of opinions of participants on a particular topic under discussion. They have several advantages over other qualitative research methodologies such as depth interviews because focus groups can discover people's attitudes and motivations while revealing the underlying views or values held by them. However, as focus groups elicit more socially expressed and contested opinions and discourses than Individual opinions, their discussions can be contaminated by the situational constraints and social pressures within the group. These include group dynamics, confonnity, censoring, the Group Leader Effect, the Groupthink Syndrome, the effects of the Spiral of Silence, characteristics of group members, and the climate of opinion within the group and in society at the time. This case study examines the effects of these factors on the 'horizontal interactions' between group members during a discussion with undecided voters about immigration, using two situations where focus group members took offence at comments made by another and challenged them, when the topic under discussion was personally relevant to them. Other members of the group, offending or otherwise, then remained silent, retracted their opinions to placate the challenger, and expressed neutral or conciliatory opinions in an effort to return the discussion to a state of equilibrium. It then examines some measures that can reduce such contaminations, including
methodological triangulation, where several methods and methodological
approaches are used to examine a given phenomenon, instead of just one method, such as the sole use of transcripts of focus group discussions.

The simple analytics of optimal growth with illegal migrants

This paper analyses the impact of illegal migration on the optimal path of domestic (resident) consumption. The analysis draws two important conclusions. First, if illegal migrants and domestic labour are perfect substitutes, illegal migration necessarily lowers the long-run per capita consumption of domestic residents. Second, if illegal migrants and domestic labour are imperfect substitutes, the effect on the long-run per capita domestic consumption is ambiguous, however, in the Cobb–Douglas case, the result is clear cut and per capita domestic consumption rises as a result of illegal migration.

Gender blind? Australian immigration policy and practice, 1901-1930

This paper seeks to explore the nature of Australian immigration policies and practices, particularly their impact on women, from federation in 1901 to the cessation of large-scale assisted immigration to Australia brought about by the 1930s depression. The characteristics that influenced and affected female immigrants may have differentiated their experiences from those of male immigrants in the same period. Differential treatment of men and women has often been an unstated given in the formulation and implementation of immigration policies. It was as common to non-government organisations (of which there were, and still are, a great many associated with immigration and settlement), as to governments, both federal and state. Several inequities can be identified in the making and implementation of immigration and settlement policies, and in the access to government grants, concessions and services, not only in terms of race, ethnicity, class or occupation (which is well trodden ground in this field) but also in terms of gender.[1] Such differentiation is part of the broader framework of changing conceptions about the place and roles of women in Australian society and their expected contribution to the nation, but it has remained largely unexplicated in this period and field.

Selection, exclusion and assimilation: the project lambert of 1931 on the reform of French immigration policy

The unemployment crisis of 1926-7 focused attention onto the question of immigration. Historians of this period have generally focused on the crisis of public policy and popular antipathies towards foreigners; more recently historians have become attuned to voices of racism. Less attention has been paid to attempts to redress the policy weaknesses through a new legislative regime on immigration. This paper reviews one such proposal, made by Charles Lambert, a deputy from the Rhone, in 1931. Instrumental in a revision of the naturalization law in 1927 to encourage the assimilation of foreigners through the acquisition of French citizenship, Lambert proposed a comprehensive statute on immigration to select “desirable” foreigners and exclude the “undesirables” to promote the assimilation of the “better” elements. The paper argues that his rationale betrays a profound fear of mounting French weakness in the face of economic and demographic decline, and grave anxieties for the future health of the French nation.

Illegal migrants, tourism and welfare : a trade theoretic approach

Many countries receive illegal migrants but are reluctant to accept them due to possible negative externalities. We provide a rationale for not policing illegal migration by linking it to the tourism industry. By paying illegal migrants less than local workers, the relative price of the non-traded goods is shown to be lower than it would be in the absence of such workers. An expansion in tourist trade, under certain intensity conditions, necessarily raises resident welfare and employment. This tourist boom necessarily lowers the welfare of the illegal migrants. It is established that an increase in tourism increases the supply of illegal migrants.