"Sexually transmitted debts":the scope of defences to directors' liability for insolvent trading

The recent demise of prominent Australian corporations, such as GIO Australia Holdings Ltd, One.Tel Ltd, HIH Insurance Ltd and Ansett Australia Ltd, have highlighted the relevance of, inter alia, the Australian insolvent trading provisions embodied in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (formerly Corporations Law). What may not be appreciated, however, is that insolvent trading is not only concerned with large public companies. Many of the insolvent trading cases that come before the courts involve small proprietary companies. Moreover, in many cases these are small “family” companies where there may only be one active director. This gives rise to a difficult issue as to the appropriateness of imposing liability for insolvent trading on a spouse who is, factually, merely a dormant director. This article explores the issue of spousal liability for insolvent trading, particularly focusing on the scope of the current defences to insolvent
trading under s 588H.

Directors' duties to creditors in Australia after spies v the Queen

In August 2000, the High Court handed down its decision in Spies v The Queen . According to most commentators, the decision ended a "quiet revolution" which had been underway since Walker v Wimborne by rejecting the suggestion that directors owe an independent duty to creditors. In this article, the writer responds to this commentary in two ways. First, by contending that the High Court's comments in Spies concerning directors' duties to creditors were merely obiter, thereby leaving open the possibility that an independent duty to creditors will be confirmed in a subsequent case. Secondly, by suggesting that if the commentary to date is correct, then the Spies decision has minimal impact in terms of creditor protection as directors' duties under the Corporations Act 2001 already provide sufficient protection for creditors.

Removal of company directors in a climate of corporate collapses

The string of high-profile corporate collapses recently has provided a fresh insight into many important topics and issues in Australian corporations law. Notwithstanding this, one topic that continues to receive inadequate attention both in Australia and in foreign jurisdictions is the statutory removal of  directors. In an earlier article published in this journal, one of the present authors contributed towards addressing this lack of commentary on the topic by highlighting a number of peculiarities with the provisions under the then Corporations Law regulating the removal of directors in public and proprietary companies. Since that time, the CLERP amendments to the Corporations Law (now Corporations Act 2001) in 2000 introduced some interesting changes to the provisions dealing with the removal of directors in public and proprietary companies. In this article, the authors provide an explanation and critical analysis of these changes, and consider the recent Western Australian Supreme Court decision of Allied & Mining Process Ltd v Boldbow Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 195, which deals with some of the issues raised by the authors in relation to the CLERP amendments. According to the authors, whilst some of the peculiarities raised in the earlier article no longer exist post-CLERP, the current removal provisions still raise some important questions of interpretation.

Directors' duty to use their powers for proper or permissable purposes

This article focuses generally on the interaction among several internal company law doctrines such as the supremacy of the articles of association; that other organs cannot interfere with powers exclusively conferred upon a particular organ; that courts will not readily interfere with internal company matters; that directors are under a duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of the company as a whole and under a duty to use their powers for proper or permissible purposes; and that there are some remedies available to shareholders if directors did not perform their powers for a proper or permissible purpose. The specific aim with the article is to establish when and why the courts will be prepared to set aside decisions by directors if they have taken them for an improper or impermissible purpose. The article concludes that the courts will be prepared to set the decisions of directors aside when they have used a particular power substantially or primarily for an improper or impermissible purpose. When the exercise of directors' powers is challenged under circumstances where there were both permissible and impermissible purposes for exercising a particular power, there is no alternative for the court but to inquire into the complex area of the state of mind of those who acted and the motive on which they acted. This is, in fact, second-guessing the decisions of directors.

Why all directors should be shareholders in the company: the case against "independence"

It is argued that the shift towards more 'independent' directors, in the wake of corporate collapses, is a fundamentally bad move, undermining the rights and powers of minority shareholders - entrenches a second-rate corporate governance model, separation of ownership and control, in company law - rather than suggest cosmetic reform in an attempt to address the problem, it is proposed that all directors must have significant interest in the company they serve - directors' self-interests and the best interests of the company become intertwined - this is a more effective way of tackling the problem of separation of ownership and control

Directors' personal liability-is the proposed amendment to Section 197 acceptable when compared with Hanel v O'Neill?

On 2 June 2005, the Australian Government announced a proposal to amend s. 197 of the Corporations Act. This is to overturn the decision in Hanel v. O'Neill ("Hanel") where the South Australian Supreme Court has expanded the circumstances in which directors of trustee companies can be held personally liable for the debts under the current section 197(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The multiple interpretations presented in Hanel highlighted the uncertainty of s. 197 and this uncertainty is heightened in at least two subsequent cases. The article provides a detailed analysis of how the decision in Hanel is affecting the directors' freedom of management and suggests some precautionary measures that the directors could take as protection against creditor's actions under s. 197. The author welcomes the proposed amendment because the new section will create certainty for directors as to. the scope of their potential personal liability, but contends that the substance of the proposed s. 197 is not acceptable as there is potential for abuse by directors of certain trustee companies.

Some care, little responsibility? Promoting directors'and managers' legal accountability for Occupational Health and Safety in the workplace

Health and safety at work remains a serious and under-recognised problem in Australia. This paper argues for the importance of increasing the individual responsibility and accountability of senior managers and directors of corporations for the development and maintenance of occupational health and safety (OHS) standards in the workplace. In order to do so, the paper first sets out the range of statutory and general law duties and liabilities to which directors and senior managers are subject, considers to what extent these obligations have relevance in the OHS area and argues for the extension of these duties and liabilities in some circumstances. The paper then goes on to argue for a better legislative model for the legal responsibility of managers and officers, supported by the increased prosecution of individuals in appropriate circumstances, as well as acknowledging the benefits of a broader range of non-legal strategies to improve board level commitment to OHS that will influence corporate compliance overall.

Removal of directors of public companies takes centre stage in Australia : an exploration of the corporate law and governance issues

Increasing attention is being given to the legal and governance issues relating to the removal of directors in Australian public companies. This has been due mainly to the difficulties experienced by the board of National Australia Bank in attempting to remove one of its fellow directors, and the subsequent development of public companies entering into so-called 'prenuptial agreements' with new directors, requiring that the director 'resign' if the board pass a vote of no-confidence in the director. In this article, the author revisits the area of director removal in Australian public companies for two reasons. The first reason, which covers the majority of the article, is to engage in a detailed analysis of whether the pre-nuptial agreements which some public companies have indicated that they support using to remove directors, are in fact enforceable under Australia's Corporations Act The second reason is to outline a law reform proposal to enable public companies to remove directors without requiring the vote of shareholders at a general meeting. The proposal involves providing Australia' corporate  regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) with the power to grant relief from the statutory removal provisions to public companies, but in a way which balances the competing objectives of commercial efficiency and shareholder participation and, very importantly, encourages good corporate governance practices by companies in relation to the performance assessment  of directors.

It is in the interests of both shareholders and directors to agree on a set of ground rules for the effective supervision of companies that reconciles the rights of the owners to overall control with the much tougher demands on modern directors

Directors' duties to stakeholders : a reform proposal based on three false assumptions

The Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee has been asked to consider whether the duties of directors under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) should be broadened to require directors to take into account the interests of stakeholder groups other than shareholders when making corporate decisions. In this article, the author argues that the existing statutory duties of directors in Australia should remain unchanged. The existing duties of directors, in particular the overriding duty of directors to act in the best interests of the company, already accommodates consideration of stakeholder interests by directors if the decision is justifiable as being in the company's best interests. Furthermore, corporate culture and norms are moving towards embracing stakeholder engagement, again with the implicit recognition that integrating stakeholder considerations within the decision-making processes of companies is integral to achieving long-term sustainable growth.

Stakeholder and gender characteristics of mining and energy IPO boards of directors

The mining and energy sectors are particularly publicly sensitive sectors and subject to a high degree of public scrutiny. Evan and Freeman (1993) suggest that such public scrutiny needs may be better met by having direct public stakeholder representation on the board of directors. Similarly, Bilimoria (2000) argues a strong commercial case for engaging women on boards. This paper investigates the number and proportion of non equity holding public stakeholder directors and the number and proportion of women directors on the boards of Australian mining and energy company initial public offerings (IPOs) and reports a paucity of public stakeholder directors and also a low proportional female representation on such IPO boards.

Do MBA degrees matter? A study of boards of directors in Australia's top 200 companies

Pfeffer and Fong (2002) suggest that “business school enrolments have soared and business education has become a big business”. The Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree has often been held out to be useful in the career development of managers. The highest level that managers can aspire to, is to be a director of a large public company. This study investigates how many directors within the boards of Australia’s top 200 companies by market capitalization hold an MBA degree. We find that larger companies have proportionally more MBA holding directors than smaller companies. Interestingly we also find that proportionally more women hold MBAs than men; nearly one in five women directors hold an MBA within the top 200 companies dataset.

The stakeholder debate and directors' fiduciary duties

It is usually said that a company is a legal entity separate from its management and shareholders and that the business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of its board. This implies various duties and responsibilities for directors.<br>Directors' duties traditionally include onerous fiduciary duties and obligations of care, skill and diligence in terms of the common law, various statutory provisions in the Companies Act 61 of 1973 requiring certain things of directors or preventing them from doing certain things (see, eg, ss 221-227 and 234-246 of the Act), and possible duties imposed by the articles of association or even separate agreements between directors and their companies.

Directors' remuneration and performance in Australian banking

This paper explores the relationship between directors' pay and performance within Australian banking, using panel data for the 1992-2005 period. The relationship between CEO pay and performance is investigated also. Several earnings models are estimated, using different dependent variables, alternate measures of performance and different estimation techniques. The results indicate an absence of a contemporaneous relationship between directors' pay and bank performance, and no association with prior year performance. However, there is a more distant pay-performance relationship, with total directors' pay having a robust positive association with earnings per share lagged two years, as well as with ROE lagged two years. The other key determinants of directors' pay in Australian banking are bank specific managerial policies, lags in the administration of pay, bank size, directors' age and directors' stock ownership. In contrast to total directors' pay, the evidence confirms a strong positive and direct association between CEO remuneration and prior year bank performance. The pay-performance association is stronger and more direct for CEO remuneration than it is for total directors' remuneration. The responsiveness of CEO pay with respect to bank performance appears to have increased over time.

Attachments between directors and auditors: do they affect engagement tenure?

Auditors and directors may develop personal attachments over time based on trust and familiarity, and these personal ties seem important for the maintenance of long-term auditor-client relationships. This study examines the tenure of the audit engagement in the presence of these links, which is expected to be longer than auditor-client relationships not so linked. Results indicate director-auditor links are positively associated with auditor tenure and the retention of auditors beyond the critical four-year period identified by Levinthal and Fichman (1988).