Investment opportunities and leverage: some Australian evidence on the role of board monitoring and director equity ownership

This paper tests the hypothesis that the negative relationship between investment opportunity set (IOS) and debt is moderated by board monitoring and director equity ownership. According to contracting theory, firms with high growth opportunities (high IOS) are associated with lower levels of debt as a result of the asset substitution and the under-investment problem. However, our hypotheses test the conjecture that the negative debt / IOS relationship will be moderated by the proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the board and director equity ownership. NEDs provide higher monitoring which reduces management discretion while director equity ownership provides incentives for managers to maximize the value of the firm. More specifically, we expect that high growth firms with a higher proportion of non-executive directors and director equity ownership are less likely to be associated with asset substitution and under investment. Thus, the negative investment opportunity set / debt relationship will be weaker for firms with higher levels of non-executive directors and high director equity ownership. Data collected from Australian companies support both these two hypotheses. Results have significant implications for corporate finance theory.

Director in your pocket : holistic help for the hapless home videographer

We present a new aspect of our ongoing research aimed at providing technology for the amateur home videographer. We aim to enable the production of quality video presentations that are well structured and use the expressive properties of the medium to full effect, regardless of the technical or artistic abilities of the user. This task requires that help be given to the user at or before capture time. We use a PDA platform to deliver 3d visualizations of shot directives, instructions to the user about the type of footage to capture, and discuss issues connected with realizing high-level representations in concrete first person animations. Additionally, we discuss the mechanism for mating that metadata with captured footage and implementation issues.

The value of executive director share ownership and discretionary accruals

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between the value of executive director share ownership and discretionary accruals.

Design/methodology/approach – This study uses a dataset of 1,173 firm-year observations drawn from 188 Australian listed companies for the period 2000-2006. The analysis is based on multivariate regression analysis and ordinary least square models were used to investigate the relation between the value of managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. The issue of potential endogeneity is addressed by using a simultaneous equation system.

Findings – A negative relation is found between value of managerial share ownership and discretionary accruals at lower levels of value of ownership, which is consistent with the theorised incentive alignment that as the managers commit more resources to their firms, stakeholders impose less contractual constraints specified in terms of accounting numbers and managers make lower accrual adjustments. After a certain level of value of ownership is attained, a positive relations seen, consistent with increased discretionary accrual adjustments associated with stakeholders anticipating managerial entrenchment. Also, it is found that these results are driven by firms with income increasing, as opposed to income decreasing, discretionary accruals.

Practical implications – Shares and options are forming an increasing proportion of executive remuneration that continues to be the subject of much debate amongst regulators and in the media. Showing that the value of share ownership may be an effective internal governance mechanism to help align incentives adds to the debate and has policy implications.

Originality/value – The paper's primary contribution is finding that the value (as opposed to proportion) of share ownership, typically representing a sizeable proportion of managers' undiversified wealth, is a potentially direct driver of theorised incentive alignment and entrenchment effects associated with share ownership.

Director remuneration and narrative disclosure of remuneration changes: remuneration committee effects

 This thesis investigates the impact of remuneration committees on CEO remuneration, the narrative voluntary disclosure of remuneration information and its attribution. Results show the existence and quality of a remuneration committee play an important roles in relation to CEO remuneration and in relation to remuneration narrative disclosures and attribution.