Financial crisis, Social pathologies and 'generalised perversion' : questioning Zizek's diagnosis of the times

Slavoj Zizek's work has been highly influential in the formulation of an emerging consensus among Lacanian social researchers, that we live in a society of generalised perversion whose initial fruits are the corrosion of democracy and the recent financial crisis. This position rests upon a notion of modern subjectivity that connects ‘commodity fetishism’ with clinical perversion in a pathological configuration, so that social theoretical identification of crisis tendencies, evaluative language about moral problems and diagnostic categories from the Lacanian clinic can be combined in a single figure. In this article, we question the series of conceptual links that constitute this position, tracing them from Zizek’s critique in his short work on the global financial crisis and his broader restatement of this analysis in the recent Living in the End Times, through the moment of his announcement of the notion of ‘generalised perversion’ in The Ticklish Subject, all the way back to fundamental propositions outlined in his earliest work. Our argument progresses through three claims. First, we show in the evolution of this position that it leads Zizek to equivocate in his diagnosis of contemporary society between two mutually exclusive categories (‘psychosis’ and ‘perversion’), indicating an antinomy in his work that is resolved in favour of ‘generalised perversion’ on empirical, not logical, grounds. Secondly, we offer a critical resolution of the antinomy through a critique of what we argue is Zizek’s mistaken over-extension of psychoanalytic reason beyond its legitimate scope of application. Finally, we point to some of the political implications of the way that Zizek speculatively resolves his logical difficulties, by analysing the consequences of his claim that generalised social perversion - the problem to be solved - involves a dethroning of the communal ego ideal. A communitarian streak, implicit in the potential conflation of moral denunciation with psychoanalytic diagnosis that the rhetoric of ‘perversion’ invokes, runs through Zizek’s work on capitalism, we propose in conclusion.

The fallacy of punishing offenders for the deeds of others: an argument for abolishing offence prevalence as a sentencing aggravating consideration

Sentencing outcomes are often marked by a considerable degree ofunpredictability. A key reason for this is the large number of aggravating andmitigating considerations, some of which have unstable questionablefoundation. This article argues that one well-established aggravating factor —offence prevalence — should be abolished. Pragmatically, the courts have notestablished workable criteria or a process for establishing whether an offence isprevalent. From a normative perspective, increasing the penalty for prevalentoffences is unsound because defendants should be punished for their acts, notthose of other offenders. Further, on close analysis, all of the rationales (in theform of general deterrence, denunciation and specific deterrence) invoked tojustify offence prevalence do not do so. Abolishing one sentencing variable willnot make sentencing a significantly more coherent or predictable discipline, butthe methodology applied in this article can be used to assess the viability ofother sentencing considerations.