Ensuring balance in corporate governance : parts 2F.1 and 2F.1A of the Corporations Law

Effective corporate governance must balance the competing, and at times conflicting, objectives of efficient endeavour and accountability. The CLERP amendments to the Corporations Law introduced on 13 March 2000 go a long way towards providing this balance. While the business judgement rule was introduced to promote efficient endeavour, Pts 2F.1 and 2F.1A maintain corporate accountability. This article compares Pts 2F.t and 2F.1A of the Corporations Law. It is argued that, although there are procedural and substantive differences between the two parts that need to be understood by practitioners, the importance of the two Parts is that they work together to provide for a much-needed improvement and enhancement of shareholder rights and remedies, thus upholding accountability in corporate governance.

Ambiguities and inconsistencies in relation to the obligations of proxies under corporations law: a model for reform

This article reconsiders the important question which came to light as a result of the controversial 2002 Coles Myer annual general meeting: do directors that are appointed as proxy have an obligation to vote as directed (and indeed should they)? A recent decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court, which was subsequently approved on appeal, stands for the proposition that proxy holders are agents of the shareholders that appointed them. However, currently the Corporations Act only requires a Chairman appointed as proxy to vote as directed — not an ordinary director. This article briefly explains the present state of the law in Australia on this issue, and then explores some interesting recent judicial remarks which may suggest that ordinary directors appointed as proxy must vote as directed in order to satisfy their director’s duties (both common law and statutory) to the company. We finally outline a proposed statutory reform initiative which seeks to remove the present uncertainty in the law by introducing a blanket requirement that all proxy holders must vote as directed.

Concise corporations law

This highly regarded exposition of Australia's complex corporations law has been rewritten to take account of changes to September 2000, including most notably the CLERP Act 1999 and the decisions in "Re Wakim and Hughes". Includes succinct, plain language explanations and case summaries.

Corporations law text and essential cases

Corporations Law: Text and Essential Cases is designed as a student text but will be a useful book for practitioners seeking a good, current, concise book on corporations law. Author Julie Cassidy is a proven, successful author and has carefully ensured that the case extracts in this book are long enough to be useful to lawyers needing to cite case authorities in opinions and court submissions.

Concise corporations law

The purpose of this text is to provide a comprehensive, yet succinct, examination of the most significant areas of corporations law. By identifying the key elements underlying the pertinent statutory provisions, writing in a plain English style, and using a simple format, the text seeks to make corporations law more accessible to students and practitioners.

Corporations law : text and essential cases

Corporations Law: Text and Essential Cases is designed specifically to meet the needs of students undertaking one-semester, case-based courses in Corporations Law. The 13 chapters each contain extracts from the leading cases supported by commentary, further readings, and review questions.

"Sexually transmitted debts":the scope of defences to directors' liability for insolvent trading

The recent demise of prominent Australian corporations, such as GIO Australia Holdings Ltd, One.Tel Ltd, HIH Insurance Ltd and Ansett Australia Ltd, have highlighted the relevance of, inter alia, the Australian insolvent trading provisions embodied in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (formerly Corporations Law). What may not be appreciated, however, is that insolvent trading is not only concerned with large public companies. Many of the insolvent trading cases that come before the courts involve small proprietary companies. Moreover, in many cases these are small “family” companies where there may only be one active director. This gives rise to a difficult issue as to the appropriateness of imposing liability for insolvent trading on a spouse who is, factually, merely a dormant director. This article explores the issue of spousal liability for insolvent trading, particularly focusing on the scope of the current defences to insolvent
trading under s 588H.

Removal of company directors in a climate of corporate collapses

The string of high-profile corporate collapses recently has provided a fresh insight into many important topics and issues in Australian corporations law. Notwithstanding this, one topic that continues to receive inadequate attention both in Australia and in foreign jurisdictions is the statutory removal of  directors. In an earlier article published in this journal, one of the present authors contributed towards addressing this lack of commentary on the topic by highlighting a number of peculiarities with the provisions under the then Corporations Law regulating the removal of directors in public and proprietary companies. Since that time, the CLERP amendments to the Corporations Law (now Corporations Act 2001) in 2000 introduced some interesting changes to the provisions dealing with the removal of directors in public and proprietary companies. In this article, the authors provide an explanation and critical analysis of these changes, and consider the recent Western Australian Supreme Court decision of Allied & Mining Process Ltd v Boldbow Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 195, which deals with some of the issues raised by the authors in relation to the CLERP amendments. According to the authors, whilst some of the peculiarities raised in the earlier article no longer exist post-CLERP, the current removal provisions still raise some important questions of interpretation.

The law of insider trading in Australia

This book provides a detailed and practical analysis of Australian insider trading laws. The work: examines all fundamental concepts relating to insider trading such as 'who is an insider', 'what is inside information' and 'when is information generally available', together with commentaries on proposed changes to the laws and an examination of the impact of the most recent decisions, including Hannes, and Rivkin; provides a very detailed examination of the defences and exceptions, with particular attention to the operation of Chinese Walls; analyses fully and systematically the provisions on insider trading in the Corporations Act and the Criminal Code (Cth) within the context of decided cases and relevant secondary materials; covers comprehensively the penalties and remedies for contravention of the insider trading regime (including the intricate civil compensation provisions, and an up-to-date analysis of the civil penalties regime in light of ASIC v Petsas); and discusses the operation and effectiveness of continuous disclosure as a means of preventing insider trading.

Related party transactions under Pt 2E of the corporations act: time for reconsideration

The related party provisions under Pt 2E of the Corporations Act 2001 were introduced in 1992 to protect the resources of companies and shareholder interests by requiring that directors disclose financial benefits given to 'related parties' -- those capable of exercising significant influence over the giving of such benefits. The contention of the authors in this article is that Pt 2E has been unsuccessful in achieving its intended purpose, and should be repealed in its entirety. The authors argue that the various provisions of Pt 2E are so confusing and convoluted that they potentially violate the rule of law virtue that laws must be promulgated in a manner that is clear, so that it is apparent from reading the laws what one must do. Further, [*2] the manner in which Pt 2E is presently drafted, especially the definition of related party, fails to reflect the purpose behind the provisions, making the overall operation of Pt 2E ineffective. It is also argued that Pt 2E is superfluous since the fiduciary duty of directors to disclose a conflict of interest, and to a lesser extent the requirement for disclosure of material personal interests under s 191 of the Corporations Act, adequately deal with the transactions presently attracting the attention of Pt 2E. In light of all this, it is contended that the law would be demonstrably improved by repealing Pt 2E.

The right to privacy and corporations

Traditionally the right of privacy has not been recognised at common law. However, recently the High Court has indicated that it may be willing to develop a new tort of invasion of privacy. Several of the justices have stated that the new action would only relate to natural persons, not corporations. This is because the principles said to underpin the right to privacy, autonomy and dignity, are supposedly inapposite to corporations. This article argues that this reasoning is flawed. Neither the right to autonomy nor dignity is capable of underpinning the right to privacy. Hence, no sustainable basis has so far been advanced for restricting the availability of any future tort of invasion of privacy to individuals. This article also questions whether a separate tort is needed in view of the protection already provided to the privacy interests of individuals and corporations under the equitable doctrine of confidence.

Holding the purse strings : the continuing evolution of human rights law and the potential liability of the finance industry for human rights abuses

While the responsibility of States and, in more recent times, corporations, has been thoroughly discussed in relation to human right~, a new stage of evolution may be emerging in relation to the liability of the financial backers of an enterprise that is accused of human rights abuses. This article considers the basis in international law for such emerging liability and examines some of the legal avenues used in recent domestic litigation against financial institutions. The article concludes by examining some of the relevant instruments of 'soft' international law and notes that although there is little in the way of concrete legislation or judicial precedent that would hold financial institutions responsible for the actions of those they invest in, the potential for the law to evolve in that direction is clear.

Removal of directors of public companies takes centre stage in Australia : an exploration of the corporate law and governance issues

Increasing attention is being given to the legal and governance issues relating to the removal of directors in Australian public companies. This has been due mainly to the difficulties experienced by the board of National Australia Bank in attempting to remove one of its fellow directors, and the subsequent development of public companies entering into so-called 'prenuptial agreements' with new directors, requiring that the director 'resign' if the board pass a vote of no-confidence in the director. In this article, the author revisits the area of director removal in Australian public companies for two reasons. The first reason, which covers the majority of the article, is to engage in a detailed analysis of whether the pre-nuptial agreements which some public companies have indicated that they support using to remove directors, are in fact enforceable under Australia's Corporations Act The second reason is to outline a law reform proposal to enable public companies to remove directors without requiring the vote of shareholders at a general meeting. The proposal involves providing Australia' corporate  regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) with the power to grant relief from the statutory removal provisions to public companies, but in a way which balances the competing objectives of commercial efficiency and shareholder participation and, very importantly, encourages good corporate governance practices by companies in relation to the performance assessment  of directors.

It is in the interests of both shareholders and directors to agree on a set of ground rules for the effective supervision of companies that reconciles the rights of the owners to overall control with the much tougher demands on modern directors