Aristotle's teleology

This thesis examines Aristotle’s dynamic, organic model of teleological explanation to see if it is a viable alternative to material reductionism. I argue that his teleology provides both a model for and an overview of the scientific enterprise. Aristotle’s theory of knowledge and perception is capable of exerting a unifying effect on the diversity of knowledge. The adoption of substance ontology gives a deeper understanding of any subject than a strictly cause-effect approach. His hylomorphism provides a clearer idea of the role of necessity in regular natural processes, and identifies the role of chance events as accidental anomalies. His actual-potential distinction is the key to understanding both Aristotle’s teleological approach and the complexity and diversity of living things. Aristotle’s teleology does not use only finality: all four conditions of change are incorporated as necessary and sufficient conditions for explanation and full understanding of change. Aristotle’s teleology, based on the human being as part of nature, is applicable at least in biological sciences to provide both a scientific methodology and a scientific method for the study of nature. It is particularly relevant to ecological studies, while his notion of the ‘good’ could be an acceptable criterion for funding of sustainable development.

Aristotle on wisdom

Referring to Atistotle's Ethics and Politics, the thesis argues that knowledge of wisdom entails knowledge of how to acquire it. Accordingly, becoming wiser involves the development of one's virtues, and becoming a good human. It argues that Aristotle's ethical and political theory is applicable to present liberal democratic society: being a good citizen/administrator entails being a good human.

Changing Aristotle's mind and world : critical notes on McDowell's Aristotle

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is central to John McDowell’s classic Mind and World. In Lectures IV and V of that work, McDowell makes three claims concerning Aristotle’s ethics: first, that Aristotle did not base his ethics on an externalist, naturalistic basis (including a theory of human nature); second, that attempts to read him as an ethical naturalist are a modern anachronism, generated by the supposed need to ground all viable philosophical claims on claims analogous to the natural sciences; and third, that a suitably construed Aristotelian conception of “second nature” can form the basis of a viable contemporary philosophy of mind, world, and normativity. This paper challenges each of these three claims. Aristotle’s ethics, we will claim alongside Terence Irwin, Bernard Williams, Philippa Foot, and many premodern commentators, is based in the kind of physics, metaphysics, and metaphysical biology that McDowell says it cannot be. Historically, we will argue that McDowell’s argument that Aristotle’s ethical reasoning is “autonomous” or “self-standing” is distinctly modern, citing evidence from the leading medieval commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics. The felt need to which McDowell responds, of reading Aristotle’s ethical or political thought as wholly non-metaphysical, arises from out of the successes of the natural sciences in the modern world, which he agrees discredit the Aristotelian, teleological account of nature. In the final part of the paper, we propose that McDowell’s account of normativity, rooted in the non-metaphysical “second nature” he reads into Aristotle, we will contend, is as it stands inescapably relativistic. On a different note, we need also to recognize, as McDowell does not, that this is a new Aristotle, one shaped by our requirements and space of reasons, not the mind and world of the Greek Philosopher himself.

Aristotle and the authoritativeness of politikē

This paper explores the normative implications of Aristotle's concept of politikē and demonstrates its relevance to contemporary debates on legitimate political authority. Section one of the paper provides historical and interpretative background on Aristotle's conception of politikē. The second section examines the central normative role that the common good plays in Aristotle's account of politikē and claims that its capacity to play this role points in the direction of a less exclusionary politics than is suggested by Book 1 of the Politics. Finally, in the third section, with reference to work by Andres Rosler and David Estlund, I consider what Aristotle's account can tell us about contemporary debates on the relationship between political authority, legitimacy and expertise.

Amiodarone, anticoagulation, and clinical events in patients with atrial fibrillation: insights from the ARISTOTLE trial

Amiodarone is an effective medication in preventing atrial fibrillation (AF), but it interferes with the metabolism of warfarin.

Two functions of Aristotle's common advantage

This paper identifies two distinct functions of the common advantage in Aristotle’s political thought and argues that distinguishing these functions allows for a reconciliation of the individualist and holist aspects of the Aristotelian account of the polis. I demonstrate that the Aristotelian common advantage functions both as (i) a motivating reason for individuals to enter the polis and (ii) a normative reason — the political good of justice — that provides a criterion for an assessment of the correctness of constitutions (politeiai). The two functions of the common advantage are, I suggest, reconcilable insofar as the Aristotelian polis is best understood as a unity of order rather than a mere aggregation of individual citizens or an organic whole.

Judgement, decision, and integrity

Although Aristotle did not mention it, integrity can be understood in an Aristotelian framework. Seeing it in these terms will show that it is an executive virtue which concerns the existential well being of an agent. This analysis is not offered as an exegesis of Aristotle's text, but as an attempt to use an Aristotelian framework to understand a virtue deemed important today. This account will have the benefit of solving some problems relating to motivational internalism and, as such, will contribute to that recent current of thought which has been highlighting the importance of virtue thinking in moral theory. I will distinguish moral judgement from decision and show that moral judgement is dependent upon virtue more strongly than it is upon impartial rationality. I will suggest that integrity is the virtue to which moral judgement gives expression and is the virtue which links judgement to decision so as to overcome akrasia.

Power relations in virtual communities: an ethnographic study

Peoples' need to socialize with others and greed for power can be best captured with Aristotle's description of human beings as “political animals”/“social animals.” This paper reports on observations of how cyber communities, such as Web-based forums and mailing lists, manifest themselves through social interactions and shared values, membership and friendship, and commitments and loyalty. The paper highlights the importance of power relations in these communities, how they are formed, exercised and evolve. This paper explores power relations as they emerge in two online Vietnamese communities and suggests a new understanding of the formation and evolution of power in virtual societies.

Power relations in cyber communities

Peoples' need to socialize with others and greed for power can be best captured with Aristotle's description of human beings as "political animals"/"social animals." This paper reports on observations of how cyber communities, such as Web-based forums and mailing lists, manifest themselves through social interactions and shared values, membership and friendship, and commitments and loyalty. The paper highlights the importance of power relations in these communities, how they are formed, exercised and evolve. This paper explores power relations as they emerge in two online Vietnamese communities and suggests a new understanding of the formation and evolution of power in virtual societies.

Rhetorical theory of public relations: opening the door to semiotic and pragmatism approaches

The 2001 Handbook of Public Relations edited by Robert Heath contains a prominent article advocating the use of rhetorical theory or ‘rhetorical enactment rational’ as a fruitful way of advancing theoretical understandings of public relations. In 2004 Heath and Dan Millar edited: Responding to Crisis: A Rhetorical Approach to Crisis Communication. These are the latest excursions into a perspective on public relations reflecting the extensive study of rhetoric in North America. Other examples are Public Relations Inquiry as Rhetorical Criticism (Elwood, 1995); Rhetorical and Critical Approaches to Public Relations (Toth and Heath, 1992); and a chapter Public Relations? No, Relations with Publics: A Rhetorical-Organisational Approach to Contemporary Corporate Communication (Cheney and Dionisopoulos, in Botan and Hazleton (Eds.) 1989).

The conventional notion of rhetoric is argumentation and persuasion stemming from the ancient Greek sophists, such as Aristotle, and from the Romans, particularly Cicero and Quintillion. Rhetoric became a fundamental plank of the trivium of ancient and medieval education: grammar, logic and rhetoric. Then in the 20th century Kenneth Burke, Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca extended Aristotle’s suggestion that: “Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic” Aristotle (trans. 1991). To use the rhetorical approach to argue that rational discourse cannot describe the world on its own. Instead living, enculturated human beings have to perceive ‘their’ truths. They take a perceptual ‘position’ on reason.

Public relations, is an industry for influencing perceptual ‘positions’. But the study of perception and attempts to influence perception cannot be claimed by rhetorical scholars alone. Semioticians and linguists who take the perspective of linguistic pragmatics also claim this field. This paper takes the example of ‘public relations’ as a focus for the confluence of rhetorical, semiotic and pragmatism approaches to the ‘problematic’ of understanding and truth.

Beyond mimesis : place, interpretation and response

My study examines the subjective nature of artistic interpretation through the notion of mimesis as process or transformation of material. Influential factors that mediate in the artistic process, such as memory, reflection and an awareness of cultural analogy and metaphor, are examined and related to a specific project in the studio, where the mediation process is further influenced by the materials used to produce the images. My studies of the concept of mimesis have revealed an intermediary realm that exists in the space between empirical reality and its interpretation. Throughout history the process of mimesis has been integral to all forms of the arts. In Plato's time the production of an image that simulated things as they appeared to the eye was considered a desired ideal. Aristotle later introduced developments which extended this concept to include a refiguring or reforming of material derived from the original source, making new connections between existing factors and in this transformation bringing new meanings to a symbolically constituted world. This discussion of the representation of reality, the influence of a dialogue between notions of imitation and the recreation of material continues throughout the exegesis. My study emphasises the interpretive stage of the mimetic process where a consideration of these themes is most relevant and some of the factors that can influence its outcome. It is my opinion that the production of images in response to the particularities of place can be defined in three stages. Firstly, the experience of the place; secondly, the beginning and maturation of the idea or concept; where mimesis takes place, and thirdly, the production of the art work in response. This process is illustrated in Part 2 of the exegesis, where the development of the studio work is documented and linked with the themes discussed in Part 1. The geographic site or place I selected to study is adjacent to Mt. Noorat, a volcanic site in the Western district of Victoria; the surrounding plains are littered with scoria that has been thrown out of the volcano thousands of years ago. Early British, Scottish and Irish settlers to this region used the stone to construct fences reminiscent of their homeland, through this activity they cleared the land and confined and protected their stock. My interests are in factors that include - the material of the stone, notions of enclosure and safety, of boundaries and circumscribed space, and of the cultural reflection that has taken place in this reconstruction of Eurocentric vision. These walls also represent the means by which land was enclosed and property defined, moving from a situation of public access to notions of ownership and the annexation of land for individual gain. Around each point of eruption, the craggy volcanic scoria has been used to create a constructed landscape which both symbolises and mirrors the Anglo - Celtic origins of the people. I have used the legend of Narcissus to illustrate the self-reflective and introspective processes that the settlers invoked in their attempts to come to terms with a strange land. I consider that the story of Narcissus, who fell in love with his own reflection, finds a parellel in the creation of the walls. The re-creation of artifacts from their own cultural environment provided the settlers with a familiar 'face' in an alien world; a reassurance of the familiar in an unfamiliar terrain. Part of this study is an investigation of this notion of landscape as cultural reflection. Geographers have long known that landscape is a cultural construct, an historically evolving ideal manifested in painting, prints and drawings as well as poetry, gardens and parks. One can view these constructions as illustrations or images of meaning which constitute representations of cultural ideals. The neo-classical influence reflected in the paintings of artists who accompanied the early expeditions to Australia demonstrates these themes. The medium of the mirror provides the opportunity to suggest aspects of a cultural reflection and an awareness of identity that has relevance to contemporary Australian culture, therefore, I have allowed it to play a major role throughout this study. Its role in mimesis, firstly, as a reflection in an imitative sense is established, then in its refigurative role, in which the similarities between the original and the reformed rely more on correlative factors than representation. I have used examples from the history of art to illustrate this potential. The formation and development of a narrative involving reflection threads throughout the thesis, both in the visual presentation and in the exegesis. The production of a body of paintings, drawings and sculpture reflect my interpretation and response to the particular site. The correspondences between these works and my theoretical concerns is articulated in the exegesis. The metaphor implied by the use of the walls as agents of enclosure also refers to the capacity of the individual to be confined by notional boundaries and restrictive practices where totalising systems of thought dominate theoretical debate and restrict its freedom. I have used images where gaps in the walls represent the potential implicit to the concept of liminal space, where the spectator moves from one physical space to another and from one stage of development to another. The threshold of this opening in the walls becomes the site where transformation can take place, a metaphor for the mimetic process where the initial experience is translated and transformed into the final product. The paintings, drawings and other works in this series fulfil the role of marks on the surface of the mirror, separating the initial experience from the processes of memory, reflection and speculation. The works draw attention to the materiality that they represent and yet provide the opportunity for new insights and experiences, allowing the subjective nature of artistic activity to combine symbolic elements relating to the site, resulting in the production of meaning.

Constructing the monster : notions of the monstrous in classical antiquity

Focussing on humaniod monsters, this thesis uses insights from Foucault's theory about the "archaeology" of discourses and Derrida's practice of deconstruction to examine how monstrosity was spoken of in antiquity, and how the various "sciences" dealt with anomalous monsters without jeopardising their epistemological credibility. Discussion begins with a survey of the semantic field of teras and monstrum. Since portentousness was central to both terms, the signification of monstrous portents in divinatory practice is next aalysed in the historiography of Herodotus, Livy, and others. Cicero's De divinatione reveals the theory and the problem for that science posed by accidental monstrosities. Chance and novelty are also issues in mythical and scientific cosmogonies < of Hesiod, and Orphism, Empedo-cles, and Lucretius> , where monsters arise and are dealt with while cosmic regularities, reproductive and ethical, are being established. Teleology and the stability of species'forms emerge as important concerns. These issues are further considered in Aristotle's bioogy and in medical writings from Hippocrates to Galen. There, theories are produced about monstrous embryology which attempt to answer the question of how deformities occur if species' forms are perpetuated through repro-duction. Biological and taxonomic--as well as ethical--boundaries are violated also by mythic human-beast hybrids. Narratives about such anomalies clarify the nature of monstrous deviance and enact solutions to the problem. Their strategies have much in common with other modes of discourse. Ethnography is posed similar questions about monstrous races' physical and ethical deviations from the civilised norm; it speaks of those issues in terms of invariance of form through generations, geographical remoteness and the codes which situate those races ethically. Finally, Augustine’s discourse on monstrous individuals and races is examined as Christianity’s belief in God’s governance reformulates the ancient’s discussions of chane or novelty and the invariance of species. In all these discourses founded on determinate meaning, the persistant paradox of monstrosity need offer no challenge to rationality provided its indefinable diversity is unacknowledged and the notion is constructed in such a way as to reaffirm the certainties.

Sophistic 3.0 and the end of media relations

This paper looks at Web 2.0 as a new form of discursive art which may be changing human subjectivity - which may be producing new kinds of people. It casts the Web 2.0 era as the 'Third Sophistic' in comparison to the two other sophistics: (1) the period from the Ancient Greek Enlightenment when grammar, rhetoric and dialectic were invented by the original pre-Socratic sophists up until the times of Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates; and (2) the Second Sophistic in the early centuries of the Common Era when 'epideictic,' that is subtle, artistic rhetoric was perfected. These sophistics marked alterations in the possibilities for human cultural expression and conception. Are we experiencing a 'Sophistic 3.0'? If so what are the likely consequences for contemporary discourse and its media?