Scientific proof that humans enjoy punishing wrongdoers: The implications for punishment and sentencing

Recent developments in brain science confirm that as a race we are in fact a punitive lot. Human beings actually derive pleasure from inflicting punishment on wrongdoers. We are wired in such a way that the part of our brain that reports pleasure is activated when we punish norm violators. This is even when punishment has no tangible or demonstrable benefits. However, we are not slaves lo our emotions. Another region of our brain 'kicks-in' if punishment becomes self-defeating, in that it conflicts with our other interests. The implications of this research for punishment theory and the practice of sentencing are discussed in this paper. The findings give qualified support to the theory known as intrinsic retributivism, but do not suggest it is the soundest theory of punishment. This is because we stop punishing when it comes at a cost to us. The good feeling that punishment invokes in punishers is another consequential consideration in favour of the utilitarian theory of punishment. However, it is not clear that the utilitarian calculus is necessarily affected by the findings. The main implication of the research findings relates to the relevance of public opinion to sentencing practice. The findings support the view that public sentiment, which seems to support increasingly tougher sanctions, can be curtailed of the public are informed that punishment comes of a cost to community.

Hard times and the "fact" and "fancy" of modern labour management

Dickens believed that, played out in practical terms, the pursuit of a totally rationalised society devoid of ‘Fancy’ only served to benefit those in power to the impoverishment of those in their charge. He was appalled by a selfish and self-interested philosophy that combined with laissez-faire capitalism to reduce human effort to mere numbers for the sole purpose of determining its monetary worth. His story thus provides a rebuke to the dehumanising effects of utilitarianism and the way it is used to calculate workers in the manner of machines; reducing them to little more than a resource that is no more or less important any other resource used in industrial enterprise. Their modern-day counterparts live in similar Hard Times in being in the grip of laissez-fair economics of global proportions, which visits upon them similar conceptions of their worth, as evidenced by the current precariousness of their employment and their present exposure to the vicissitudes of arbitrary power exercised by managements still wedded to utilitarian principles. As a result, the ‘light of Fancy’ that at one time would periodically burst through in earnest storms of protest, is now refracted into cynical asides directed at rational systems that continue to standardise and homogenise all that ‘counts’ in working life.

Liberalism and economic growth: a theoretical exploration

This article explores how the liberal tradition of political thought has dealt with the prospect of limits to economic growth and how it should approach this issue in the future. Using Andrew Moravcsik’s explanatory liberal theory, it finds that the commitment of governments to growth stems primarily from the aggregation of societal preferences for the social goods that growth produces. The arguments of liberal thinkers who have grappled with the issue of growth are then examined to gain a deeper theoretical understanding of the relationship between liberal democracy and growth. These include John Stuart Mill, for whom a non-growing economy was essential for overcoming the tension between liberty and equality; Ronald Dworkin who argues that growth is a derivative means to further more fundamental ends; and Marcel Wissenburg who suggests that it is legitimate for liberal democracies to limit the preference for growth if it risks undermining liberal norms and institutions. Using
these theoretical insights, it is argued that environmental degradation, which is partly driven by growth, now threatens the fundamental liberal commitments of many liberals, including some forms of
state neutralism, utilitarianism, inalienable individual rights and above all human autonomy. Therefore, liberal democratic states not only can, but must move towards a post-growth economy to secure these objectives into the future.

Prospects for a post-growth liberal society

This paper explores how the liberal tradition of political thought has dealt with the prospect of limits to economic growth and how it should approach this issue in the future. Using Andrew Moravcsik’s explanatory liberal theory, it finds that the commitment of governments to growth stems primarily from the aggregation of societal preferences. The arguments of liberal thinkers who have grappled with the issue of growth are then examined to gain a deeper theoretical understanding of the relationship between liberal democracy and growth. These include John Stuart Mill, for whom a non-growing economy was essential for overcoming the tension between liberty and equality; Ronald Dworkin who argues that growth is a derivative means to further more fundamental ends; and Marcel Wissenburg who suggests that it is legitimate for liberal democracies to limit the preference for growth if it risks undermining liberal norms and institutions. Using these theoretical insights, it is argued that environmental degradation, which is partly driven by growth, now threatens fundamental liberal commitments to state neutralism, utilitarianism, inalienable individual rights and above all human autonomy. Therefore, liberal democratic states not only can, but must move towards a post-growth economy to secure these objectives into the future.