Skeptical theism and moral skepticism : a reply to Almeida and Oppy

Skeptical theists purport to undermine evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the fact that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their interconnections is significantly limited. Michael J. Almeida and Graham Oppy have recently argued that skeptical theism is unacceptable because it results in a form of moral skepticism which rejects inferences that play an important role in our ordinary moral reasoning. In this reply to Almeida and Oppy's argument we offer some reasons for thinking that skeptical theism need not lead to any such objectionable form of moral skepticism.

Is theism capable of accounting for any natural evil at all?

Received wisdom has it that a plausible explanation or theodicy for Gods permission of at least some instances of natural evil is not beyond the reach of the theist. In this paper I challenge this assumption, arguing instead that theism fails to account for any instance, kind, quantity, or distribution of natural evil found in the world. My case will be structured around a specific but not idiosyncratic conception of natural evil as well as an examination of three prominent theodicies for natural evil. In contrast, however, to much contemporary discussion, my assessment of these theodicies will be grounded in the prior conviction that a successful theodicy for moral evil is available.

God, gratuitous evil, and van Inwagen's attempt to reconcile the two

Both critics and advocates of evidential arguments from evil often assume that theistic belief is not compatible with gratuitous evil. It is often assumed, in other words, that an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good being would not permit an evil unless he had a morally sufcient reason to permit it. However, this cornerstone of evidential arguments from evil has come under increasing re of late, in particular by Peter van Inwagen. The aim of this paper is to outline and then assess van Inwagen's attempt to reconcile theism with gratuitous evil.

Rowe's new evidential argument from evil : problems and prospects

This paper examines an evidential argument from evil recently defended by William Rowe, one that differs significantly from the kind of evidential argument Rowe has become renowned for defending. After providing a brief outline of Rowe's new argument, I contest its seemingly uncontestable premise that our world is not the best world God could have created. I then engage in a lengthier discussion of the other key premise in Rowe's argument, viz., the Leibnizian premise that any world created by God must be the best world God can create. In particular, I discuss the criticisms raised against this premise by William Wainwright as well as Rowe's attempt to meet these criticisms. The Wainwright-Rowe exchange, I argue, highlights some insuperable dijficulties in Rowe's challenge to theism.

Does hard determinism render the problem of evil even harder?

Hard determinism, in theological dress, holds that there is no human free will since God is the sufficient active cause of everything that happens in creation. It is surprising that, in the ever-growing literature on the problem of evil, very little attention has been paid to theodicies that adopt a hard determinist outlook. It is commonly assumed that without free will the theodical project is a non-starter. I challenge this long-held assumption by, firstly, developing a cumulative-style theodicy from within a hard determinist framework, and secondly, comparing the merits of such a theodicy with two libertarian rivals, specifically, Molinism and open theism. The hard determinist model of divine providence is, I argue, in no worse shape than the principal models developed by libertarians.

Emptiness and becoming : integrating Madhyamika Buddhism and process philosophy

Beginning with a comparison of process philosophy and Madhyamika Buddhism -focussing in particular on Charles Hartshorne and Nagarjuna - which seeks to find points of similarity and difference, this thesis goes on to ask whether the differences are disagreements or complementary insights that may be integrated by means of a hermeneutical framework which can facilitate the enrichment of both systems. It is argued that process philosophy's method of creative synthesis and Madhyamika's method of negative dialectics are complementary rather than rival methods, because: (1) the Madhyamika bi-negation of symmetrical internal and external relations is complemented by process philosophy's argument that asymmetrical relations have primacy, which can be integrated into a theory of 'asymmetrical interdependence'; (2) the Madhyamika bi-negation of being and non-being is complemented by process philosophy's argument that becoming has primacy; (3) Madhyamika's emptiness (or openness) and process philosophy's creativity are complementary ideas that can be integrated into a ‘creative emptiness’; (4) Madhyamika's deconstruction of theism and acceptance of a conventional (and thus empty) ‘Cosmic Buddha-Bodhisattva’ and process philosophy's panentheism are complementary and can be integrated in the idea of an ‘empty God’; (5) The creative emptiness and the empty God are two different but complementary ultimates - the ultimate activity and the ultimate actuality; (6) Madhyamika’s two truths -conventional (empty world) and ultimate (emptiness) - can be enriched by expanding the conventional to include ultimate actuality (empty God), and not subordinating the conventional to the ultimate; (7) process philosophy can be similarly enriched by meditating on creative emptiness, which reveals the empty God-world, which is not dominant vis-a-vis creative emptiness. An attempt is made to develop a hermeneutical framework for the comparison and integration of Madhyamika and process thought, which can also be used to construct a general theory of worldviews and a theory of interreligious dialogue. Finally, the practical applications of the integration of process thought and Madhyamika Buddhism are explored, focussing on ethical and socio-political issues and how the integration of the two systems can be used to advantage in these contexts.