Life, death, and subjectivity : moral sources in bioethics

"This book presents an exploration of concepts central to health care practice. In exploring such concepts as Subjectivity, Life, Personhood, and Death in deep philosophical terms, the book aims to draw out the ethical demands that arise when we encounter these phenomena, and also the moral resources of health care workers for meeting those demands."--BOOK JACKET.

Caring about health

Presenting a philosophical exploration of the ideas central to health care practice this book explores such concepts as caring, health, disease, suffering and pain from a phenomenological perspective. With deep philosophical insight this book draws out, not only the ethical demands that arise when one encounters these phenomena, but also the forms of ethical education that would help health care workers respond to those demands. This is a book which explores the grounds for ethical living rather than enunciating ethical principles. Van Hooft argues that ethical responses arise from sensitive and insightful awareness of what is salient in clinical and other health care settings. This book draws upon thinkers from the classical canon, the Anglo-American tradition and from continental philosophical ideas.

Understanding virtue ethics

After presenting a broad overview of the history of virtue ethics, this work explores virtues in the context of contemporary moral theory to analyse how many intractable moral dilemmas might be overcome by responsible, virtuous agents.

Judgement, decision, and integrity

Although Aristotle did not mention it, integrity can be understood in an Aristotelian framework. Seeing it in these terms will show that it is an executive virtue which concerns the existential well being of an agent. This analysis is not offered as an exegesis of Aristotle's text, but as an attempt to use an Aristotelian framework to understand a virtue deemed important today. This account will have the benefit of solving some problems relating to motivational internalism and, as such, will contribute to that recent current of thought which has been highlighting the importance of virtue thinking in moral theory. I will distinguish moral judgement from decision and show that moral judgement is dependent upon virtue more strongly than it is upon impartial rationality. I will suggest that integrity is the virtue to which moral judgement gives expression and is the virtue which links judgement to decision so as to overcome akrasia.

Overcoming principles: dialogue in business ethics

Basing itself upon a virtue-ethics approach, this paper questions the value of syllogistic or deductive approaches to teaching business ethics and to the modelling of the kinds of judgments that executives are asked to make in situations of moral complexity. It urges that the teaching of ethical theories, of ethical principles, and of logical methods of moral thinking, and the use of hypothetical or historical scenarios, be augmented by the method of `Real Case Dialogue' which more nearly models the eal and intense existential realities of ethical decision making. A brief description of such a dialogue is offered so aslo provide an example.

La caze on envy and resentment

Marguerite La Caze has recently published a stimulating analysis of the emotions of envy and resentment in which she argues that to envy others for a benefit they have received or to resent them for such a reason can be ethically acceptable in cases where that benefit has been unjustly obtained (La Caze, 2001). I question this on the ground that the judgement that the benefit has been unjustly obtained plays a more complex role in the structure of envy and resentment than La Caze allows and should alter the nature of the feeling that is evoked. From the perspective of virtue ethics there is nothing creditable about still feeling envy or resentment in such circumstances.

Pain and communication

It is frequently said that pain is incommunicable and even that it destroys language. This paper offers a phenomenological account of pain and then explores and critiques this view. It suggests not only that pain is communicable to an adequate degree for clinical purposes, but also that it is itself a form of communication through which the person in pain appeals to the empathy and ethical goodness of the clinician. To explain this latter idea and its ethical implications, reference is made to the writings of Emmanuel Levinas.

Ricoeur on responsibility

There are at least two themes in Paul Ricoeur’s recent essay, ‘The Concept of Responsibility: An Essay in Semantic Analysis’ (Ricoeur 2000). The first of these is in the foreground of the essay. It concerns how the concept of responsibility has evolved in recent times from a delimited juridical notion to a much broader moral concept. The second theme remains in the background of the essay and alludes to theses that Ricoeur has developed in his book, Oneself as Another (Ricoeur 1992). This theme concerns how responsibility relates to personal and moral identity and how it emerges dialectically from social formation and from an eliminable subjectivity. In this paper I will explicate Ricoeur’s first theme and also explore how the second theme might solve the problem of the unassumable scope and range of our responsibilities which the first theme might suggest.

Philosophy and the care of the self: a literature survey

This article reviews a number of recent books and practices that address a renewed interest in the role that philosophy might play in the living of a rich and fulfilling life. The review looks at books addressed to the general public as well as books which discuss such classical and Hellenistic philosophers as took their task to be helping people achieve happiness in life. It then turns to contemporary studies of the self and of wisdom and turns finally to some newly emerging philosophical practices such as philosophical counselling and philosophical discussion groups of various kinds in order to explore whether philosophy can still be a source of consolation or guidance in contemporary life.

Integrity and shame

In a recent study, Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze and Michael P. Levine argue for a complex conception of integrity. But they leave two questions unanswered. The first is whether integrity is of greater importance to the agent's own sense of themselves or whether it is a virtue that is of social significance. The bulk of the literature on this virtue stresses its existential import. However, considerable weight should be given to its social significance. It should be linked to the essentially social reaction of shame, as opposed to the existential and personal reaction of guilt. The second question is whether the virtue of integrity has been analysed in such general terms that no specific meaning can be given to the virtue. Being a person of integrity might just collapse into being a virtuous person. This essay offers a distinctive account of integrity by asking what it is to act from the virtue in particular contexts that require public trust.

Cosmopolitanism as virtue

This paper explores cosmopolitanism, not as a position within political philosophy or international relations, but as a virtuous stance taken by individuals who see their responsibilities as extending globally. Taking as its cue some recent writing by Kwame Anthony Appiah, it argues for a number of virtues that are inherent in, and required by, such a stance. It is critical of what it sees as a limited scope in Appiah's conception and enriches it with Nigel Dower's concept of 'global citizenship'. It then seeks to overcome a distinction that Appiah draws between a 'thin' moral conception of justice and a 'thick' ethical conception of our obligations to those with whom we have identity-forming relationships. It argues that a richer conception of the virtue of justice, as suggested by Raimond Gaita, can fully articulate the ideals of cosmopolitanism.