Shattering the Shia: a Maliki political strategy in post-Saddam Iraq

This chapter argues that one key legacy of the US effort to bring democracy to Iraq has been that many elements within Iraq’s Shia Arab political elite have viewed democracy through the lens of a cynical majoritarianism and manipulated it to catapult themselves to power. This has had a further legacy, enabling the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to utilise his incumbency to maintain the veneer of democracy while becoming increasingly dictatorial and authoritarian. In doing so, Maliki’s government shares much in common with other ‘hybrid regimes’ in which governments hijack nominally democratic mechanisms such as elections, media freedoms, political opposition and civil society as part of their strategy to retain, rather than diffuse, power (Dodge 2012b, 2013). Although Maliki hasdeployed a host of different strategies along these lines – including blatant sectarianism, undermining key state institutions, the creation of a shadow state loyal to himself, and the concentration of military and political power in his own hands – this chapter focuses on Maliki’s less well-known efforts to shatter the unity of his Shia Arab political opponents. It focuses on his first two terms in power and examines the ways in which he has been able to systematically fracture the Shia political elite to such an extent that once tenuously united factions now stand bitterly divided. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the reasoning behind such an approach and the prospects of Iraq’s democracy moving beyond the blatant power grab of the incumbent Malikigovernment.

The streets of Iraq : protests, the public sphere and democracy

Since the invasion of Iraq by Coalition forces in 2003, much attention has been paid to the violence ravaging Iraq’s streets, so much so that they have become synonymous with bloodshed and chaos. This paper begins by countering this prominent view with a brief outline of some of the more positive scenes that have played out on Iraq’s streets, including the successful elections of 2005 and 2009. The bulk of the paper builds on this discussion to detail the various protest movements that have emerged across Iraq since 2003, including those organised by Shia clerics, minority movements, women’s organisations and Iraqi worker unions. This paper concludes by arguing that the willingness of normal Iraqi citizens to exercise their democratic right to protest indicates the degree to which democratic ideals are taking hold in Iraq and represents a fundamental step towards a more peaceful and inclusive future.

Cultural destruction and identity politics : targeting the history of Iraq

Since its inception in 1921, a number of successive regimes have sought to politicize Iraq‟s cultural history in order to develop national identity and foster social cohesion across this rich and complex nation. Foremost among these were the Baath party, particularly under the rule of Saddam Hussein, who used much of the nation‟s Oil wealth to undergo an extensive nation-building campaign. However, identity in Iraq is far from monolithic and various factions have long resisted the state sanctioned version of “Iraqi” identity and asserted alternative histories and narratives to underpin their own identity politics. With the invasion of Iraq by Coalition forces in 2003, however, came an unprecedented era of cultural destruction. Following the devastation of the battle phase of the war, there were further attacks on Iraq‟s cultural heritage including everything from the carefully choreographed removal of the giant bronze statue of Saddam in Firdos square, through to military bases set up at sensitive archaeological sites such as the ancient city of Babylon. In addition, Iraqi civilians targeted the cultural history of their nation with wanton looting and arson, as well as systematic attacks on sites of archaeological or ethno-religious significance. More recently, the Shia and Kurdish dominated Iraqi Government have organised the “Committee for Removing Symbols of the Saddam Era” and drew up plans to purge the state of its Sunni dominated past.

This paper argues that the unprecedented scale and magnitude of the destruction of Iraq‟s cultural history has played a part in eroding the various intersecting and overlapping versions of identity politics in Iraq. In turn, this has provided fertile ground for terrorists and sectarians to plant the seeds of their own narrow and deadly ideologies. This has brought about the rise of ethno-religious based violence and seen a series of bloody and protracted conflicts emerge between previously peaceful and compatible factions. In this way, Iraq serves as a powerful case study in furthering academic discussion on the complex inter-relationships between cultural and historical destruction and identity politics, sectarianism, violence and democracy.

Targeting the cultural history of Iraq : implications for national identity and democracy

Since its inception in 1921, a number of successive regimes have sought to politicize Iraq’s cultural history in order to build nationalistic sentiment and social cohesion across this rich and complex nation. Foremost among these were the Baath party, particularly under the rule of Saddam Hussein, who used much of the nation’s Oil wealth to undergo an extensive nation-building campaign. However, with the invasion of Iraq by the US in 2003 came the deliberate destruction and blatant negligence of the occupying forces. In addition, Iraqi civilians targeted the cultural landscape of their nation with wanton looting and arson, as well as systematic attacks on sites of archaeological or ethno-religious significance. More recently, the Shia and Kurdish dominated Iraqi Government have organised the “Committee for Removing Symbols of the Saddam Era” and plan to purge the state of its Sunni dominated past. This paper argues that the destruction of Iraq’s cultural history has played a part in eroding the national identity that many of these symbols and institutions were designed to promulgate. In turn, this has brought about the rise of ethno/religious sectarianism in Iraq which has had particular implications for the nation’s fledgling democratic order.

Manipulating Islam and democracy in Iraq’s ‘Pluralised Authoritarianism’

With the realisation that the initial motives for the 2003 invasion of Iraq – Saddam’s alleged stockpile of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and his links to Al-Qaeda – were grievous intelligence errors the Bush administration, with varying degrees of success, were able to spin the war’s rasion d’etre and redefine the parameters of victory. A central tenet of this approach was to begin speaking about democracy as if it had always been one of the aims of the war itself. For the first few years, the effort to democratise Iraq appeared to gain some credible momentum: a complex array of political, religious and ethno-sectarian factions formed political parties and civil society movements; uncensored news was enthusiastically consumed across the nation; Iraqi citizens took to the streets to protest key government decisions; and millions of Iraqis voted in relatively free and fair national elections (Davis, 2004, 2007, Isakhan, 2008, 2011b). Central to each of these developments were various Iraqi religious establishments – but especially those of the Shia Arab population of Iraq – who saw no distinction between their Islamic faith and the notion of democracy. Not surprisingly, a body of literature has emerged which has been very optimistic about Iraq’s engagement with both ‘Islam’ and ‘democracy’ in the post-Baathist period, while acknowledging the challenges it faces in creating a stable, egalitarian and democratic society (Al-Musawi, 2006, Cole, 2006, Davis, 2005, Dawisha, 2009, Isakhan, 2011a, Stansfield, 2007).

However, there have been virtually no studies which have sought to question this optimism in the light of more recent events. Addressing this lacuna, this paper documents the last few years (2006- 2011) which have seen many elements within the Iraqi political elite – most notably the Maliki government and his State of Law Coalition (SLC) – demonstrate what has been referred to in literature on other Arab states alternatively as ‘liberalised autocracy’ (Brumberg, 2002), ‘semi-authoritarianism’ (Ottaway, 2003) or ‘pluralised authoritarianism’ (Posusney and Angrist, 2005). That is to say, that these states consolidate their incumbency while putting in place measures that can be considered more or less liberal. To do this, the regime actually utilises (and controls) nominally democratic mechanisms such as elections, media freedoms, political opposition and civil society as part of their strategy to retain power. Of particular interest here are the ways in which the Maliki government – and Shia Arab Iraqi political factions more broadly – have manipulated both ‘Islam’ and ‘democracy’ towards such ‘pluralised authoritarianism’.

Civil society after Saddam: oil unions and democracy in Iraq

Following the intervention in Iraq by coalition forces one decade ago, the Bush Administration underwent an enormous and unprecedented project to bring the ‘Western’ liberal model of democracy to Iraq. For the first few years the project to bring democracy to Iraq had its share of successes as the Iraqi people proved themselves capable of understanding and utilizing democratic mechanisms and institutions. This culminated in a series of nation-wide elections from 2005 onwards that brought a democratically elected government to power (Isakhan, 2012). However, one of the unfortunate consequences of the war and the US effort to bring democracy to Iraq was that many key ethno-religious political factions viewed it as an opportunity to pedal their own relatively narrow and very divisive political rhetoric (Davis, 2007). This meant that the Iraqi government was constituted not so much by a body who wanted to draw Iraq together behind a common ideology and to work towards a collective and egalitarian future, as it was by representatives who would fight on behalf of their ethno-religious constituencies. Not surprisingly, a great deal of academic literature has emerged which has analysed and criticised the formal political parties and institutions of the post-Saddam era (Dawisha, 2009). Indeed, the bulk of contemporary scholarship on Iraqi politics focuses on issues such as: the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the Iraqi government; the obstinacy and ineptitude of many elements of Iraq’s political elite; the systemic corruption that is hollowing out the coffers of the state; the moribund bureaucracy that are struggling to deliver basic services and; of course, the deep-seated divisions within and between those that represent Iraq’s three main ethno-religious blocks: the Shia Arabs, the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds.

Succeeding and seceding in Iraq: the case for a Shiite State

The US project to democratize Iraq has given way to a dramatic upsurge in ethno-religious factionalism in which a series of groups have sought to use ‘democracy’ to create or exacerbate division. Among these divisive political elements a relatively fringe idea held mostly by power-hungry elites has become a central driving force of much political debate within Iraq: separatism. Although there are many examples of political factions within Iraq which have called for territorial separatism since 2003 (such as some Kurdish, Sunni, Assyrian and Turcoman political parties), this chapter focuses on the less known case for a Shiite state. Specifically, it concentrates on the Shia Arab Islamist political party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which differs from other Shia political factions in their calls for a decentralized federal Iraq with an autonomous Shia Islamic state in the south.

Conclusion : The Iraq legacies and the roots of the ‘Islamic State’

With the deadly ISIS advance, the sudden rousing of Shia militias and the threat of Kurdish secession, Iraq faces a host of deep-seated and intractable problems. Together, these events raise a number of serious questions, not just for Iraq and its future but also for the broader Middle East, the United States and its Coalition partners and the international community. While these challenges and questions will drive much academic debate, political analysis and media discussion in the months and years ahead, they are not the central purpose of this chapter. While there is always a risk in commenting on unfolding events, including the potential to overstate their significance and likely long-term impact, it is difficult to ignore the significance of the deadly ISIS advance and all that has happened since. This chapter argues that key to understanding these events is coming to terms with the three varied and complex legacies of the 2003 Iraq War. The first central legacy of the Iraq War is the ongoing consequences of several critical mistakes made by the US-led Coalition before, during and immediately after the 2003 intervention. The second legacy addressed here is the fact that the 2003 war shattered – perhaps irreversibly - Iraqis fragile cultural mosaic and its rich and complex history of overlapping and intersecting communities, ideologies and narratives. The third and final legacy of the 2003 Iraq War detailed in this chapter is its significant regional and global consequences – from spiralling sectarianism across the Middle East to a profound challenge to America’s status as the last remaining superpower and its use of military power for ‘humanitarian’ ends. The argument here is that these three important legacies set in train a sequence of events that have served as the collective catalyst for the expansion of the ‘Islamic State’ from mid-2014.

Why does Iran need Hizbullah?

The political and military commitment of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Hizbullah in Lebanon has gone through the baptism of fire once again. The Syrian crisis has become a critical theatre of war for the three way alliance between Iran, Hizbullah and Syria, celebrated as the ‘axis of resistance’ in Tehran. The Iranian leadership has used the Syrian crisis to further consolidate its ties with Hizbullah and warn potential enemies of the risks in underestimating Iran’s capacity to take the war to them. Iranian leaders call this a strategy of deterrence, warning Israel and the United States of massive retaliation in case they take any action against Iran. Hizbullah is key to that policy. This paper will explore relations between Iran and Hizbullah in the broader context of Iran’s external relations and geo-strategic calculations. It notes the significance of Iran’s revolutionary ideology and its version of Shia Islam in lubricating this relationship. Hizbullah adheres to the ideological principles advanced in Tehran and shares Iran’s Manichean worldview which divides the world between the oppressors and the oppressed. In this perspective, the United States and Israel are seen as the principal oppressors of the Muslim world. This religious and ideological platform has facilitated a close strategic partnership between Iran and Hizbullah. The Syrian crisis has demonstrated that both parties place significant value in this partnership and are prepared to go to extreme lengths to protect it. This consideration has played a major role in Hizbullah’s military steps to defend the Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.