Information disclosure and corporate governance in listed companies in China: from Yinguangxia to Enron

China's path to the development of a modern securities market has not been a smooth one. This article argues that efforts to impose Western securities market models on China have been fraught with difficulty. This is especially clear from the adoption of information disclosure principles and practices. While the integrity of disclosure practices is a fundamental element in maintaining investors' confidence in securities markets, disclosure practices need to be attuned to China '5 systemic features, especially in regard to its legal structure and rules. Market failures, such as the collapse of Enron in the United States, have led to a realisation that US disclosure models have their own difficulties and that these should not be uncritically used. This article reviews recent Chinese law andpractice (using the Yinguangxia false disclosure scandal as an example) in this area and calls for the adoption of a more critical approach towards the use of Western models with particular regard to China's own distinctive pathways of reform.

Derivative actions as a mechanism for the protection of minority shareholders in China: a result of convergence or divergence

The protection of minority shareholders has become one of the key features of company law reform in many countries in recent years. Various mechanisms have been created to achieve this objective. Australia has introduced the statutory derivative action procedure mainly based on models drawn from Canada and New Zealand; this provision was inserted into the Corporations Act in March 2000. China has also adopted a similar mechanism – known as the shareholder representative action; this scheme was based upon China’s understanding of statutory derivative actions in Western countries. China’s derivative action mechanism is reflected in amendments to the 2005 PRC Company Law and 2005 Securities Law that both were passed on 27 October 2005 and came into effective on 1 January 2006. The development of statutory derivative actions in different countries demonstrates the interaction between forces of convergence and divergence in company law reforms. This article reviews different mechanisms adopted in the Chinese law for the protection of minority shareholders. It especially focuses on an analysis of the nature of the shareholder representative action and the procedures for its utilisation in China – the equivalent to Western countries’ derivative actions. In comparison with statutory derivative actions in Australia, this article argues that the concept of the shareholder representative action in China rests upon a misunderstanding of Western derivative actions; this has involved a compromise between the dire need to protect shareholders and the ambiguities of a weak court system. As a consequence, China’s reforms in this area are largely a tentative gesture and are therefore unlikely to be very effective.

Legal regulation and corporate governance in China`s top 100 listed companies

This article reports findings from an empirical study of corporate governance in China's top 100 listed companies. It examines the effectiveness of legal regulation, enforcement and remedies, finding that China's company and securities laws have not provided as string a legal framework for the protection of stakeholders im China's stock exchange listed companies as might be expected by investors.

Call auction transparency and market liquidity: Evidence from China

This paper uses the natural experiment offered by the Shanghai Stock Exchange to investigate the impact of opening call auction transparency on market liquidity. We find that the dissemination of indicative trade information during the pre-open call auction session leads to an overall improvement in stock liquidity in the continuous trading session. Bid-ask spreads narrow in the first trading hour because adverse selection risk fell significantly and there is less price volatility in the continuous market. This effect is greater for actively traded securities than illiquid securities. Our findings are robust for different lengths of sample period, different lengths of trading hours after market open, and stocks that had (and had not) reformed the share split structure during our research period.