The role of hegemony in secessionist movements : the case study of the Moldovan Republic of Transnistria

The aim of the article is to analyse the secessionist phenomenon by applying the concept of hegemony. Based on critical realist interpretations of the concept, it is argued that hegemonic practice incorporates both inter-subjective and structural aspects. The inter-subjective aspect of hegemony places emphasis on the relations between social groups and the way hegemonic practice leads social agents towards political projects that secure consensus in favour of the interest of particular elites. The structural character of hegemonic practice is evident in the reproduction of social conditions and values that underlie the relations between social agents both globally and domestically. Accordingly, the inter-subjective character of secession as hegemonic practice is evident in the organization of social agents towards a political option (territorial separatism) to the extent that it serves the goals of certain elites. The sturctural aspect of secessionist practice is hegeminic because it reproduces international structures that tend to associate political organization with ethnicity at the state level. The analysis then turns to the case study of Transnistria in Moldova as an empirical illustration of the two tendencies of hegemonic practice in secessionist politics leading ot useful conclusions both for the case study in particular and the study of secession in general. 

Conclusion : The Iraq legacies and the roots of the ‘Islamic State’

With the deadly ISIS advance, the sudden rousing of Shia militias and the threat of Kurdish secession, Iraq faces a host of deep-seated and intractable problems. Together, these events raise a number of serious questions, not just for Iraq and its future but also for the broader Middle East, the United States and its Coalition partners and the international community. While these challenges and questions will drive much academic debate, political analysis and media discussion in the months and years ahead, they are not the central purpose of this chapter. While there is always a risk in commenting on unfolding events, including the potential to overstate their significance and likely long-term impact, it is difficult to ignore the significance of the deadly ISIS advance and all that has happened since. This chapter argues that key to understanding these events is coming to terms with the three varied and complex legacies of the 2003 Iraq War. The first central legacy of the Iraq War is the ongoing consequences of several critical mistakes made by the US-led Coalition before, during and immediately after the 2003 intervention. The second legacy addressed here is the fact that the 2003 war shattered – perhaps irreversibly - Iraqis fragile cultural mosaic and its rich and complex history of overlapping and intersecting communities, ideologies and narratives. The third and final legacy of the 2003 Iraq War detailed in this chapter is its significant regional and global consequences – from spiralling sectarianism across the Middle East to a profound challenge to America’s status as the last remaining superpower and its use of military power for ‘humanitarian’ ends. The argument here is that these three important legacies set in train a sequence of events that have served as the collective catalyst for the expansion of the ‘Islamic State’ from mid-2014.

Self-determination and collective responsibility in the secessionist struggle

The often violent emergence of new independent states following the end of the Cold War generated discussion about the normative grounds of territorial separatism. A number of opposing approaches surfaced debating whether and under which circumstances there is a right for a community to secede from its host country. Overwhelmingly, these studies placed emphasis on the right to secession and neglected the moral stance of secessionist movements as agents in international relations. In this book Costas Laoutides explores the collective moral agency involved in secessionist struggles offering a theoretical model for the collective responsibility of secessionist groups. Case-studies on the Kurds and the people of Moldova-Transdniestria illustrate the author’s theoretical arguments as he seeks to establish how, although the principle of self-determination was envisaged as a means of gradually bestowing political power upon the people, it never managed to realize its full potential because it was interpreted strictly within a framework of exclusionary politics of identity.

Challenges of development in difficult sociopolitical contexts

In the middle of writing this chapter, I visited a friend who has beenin the development industry for a couple of decades. I had not seenhim for a while as he had been in Afghanistan and, for a considerableperiod after that, in hospital. Afghanistan has arguably been the mostdangerous place in the world to do development work, perhaps since the1960s, and, of course, undertaking development while a war is ongoingis almost a contradiction in terms. Especially in Afghanistan, butperhaps in many other ‘difficult sociopolitical contexts’, developmentgains have been few, extraordinarily expensive for their outcomes, andprobably not sustainable.Not all development workers end up in my friend’s situation; a suicidebomber left him substantially and permanently damaged. But, juston this personal level, I have had colleagues and friends arrested, shotat, jailed and kidnapped, as well as being exposed to dangerous illnessesand, too often unstated, often long-term psychological trauma. Localswhom colleagues have worked with have experienced all this, as well asbeing beaten, tortured and, too often, killed. My own first rule in ‘difficultsociopolitical contexts’ is never to expose another person to danger,either at the time or, potentially, later. Yet it happens, to foreigners, tolocals working with foreigners and to state employees. Developmentworkers easily fall foul of the extremes of competing perspectives andgoals, where there is no such thing as neutrality and everyone who isnot a clear friend is a clear enemy.