An introduction to CLERP 9

An Introduction to CLERP 9, as its title suggests, is aimed at providing legal practitioners and students with an overview of Australia’s corporate governance reforms, but more than that, it also analyses the events that led to the reforms and provides practical examples of how the amendments will change corporate practices.

The book begins by defining what is generally meant by good corporate governance. It then outlines the relevant recent events that led to introduction and commencement of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP 9) on 1 July this year. The corporate failures of Enron and HIH – and subsequent Royal Commission – in 2001, and the failure of private auditing firms to warn of their client’s problems are well summarised.

As well as the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, the US equivalent to CLERP 9, the establishment of the ASX Corporate Governance Council and the release of its Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations are examined in detail.

The book covers all the chief changes, including the new rules for audit independence, financial disclosure, whistleblowing, remuneration for directors and executives and continuous disclosure.

Throughout, the book provides a comprehensive and easy to understand commentary on how the CLERP 9 Act alters the Corporations Act 2001 and the ASIC Act 2001, as well as highlighting important changes that affect present practice. For example, the author notes that under the auditor independence rules, when an audit firm contravenes an independence requirement, liability is placed on all members and directors of the audit firm, not just the lead auditor responsible for a particular audit. This, he says, is aimed at introducing a “culture of compliance”.

As well as providing a quick reference guide to how the CLERP 9 Act amends the Corporations and ASIC Acts at the beginning of the book, the table at the end of the book comparing the corporate governance reforms in the US, UK and Australia will be very useful for practitioners trying to make sense of how multinational clients might be liable across different jurisdictions.

Auditor independence: regulation, oversight and inspection

Much of what auditors do is unobservable. Indeed, what goes on in an audit has been described as ‘secret audit business’. Audits in this context are of financial reports and those financial reports are the representations of the management of those companies, not the auditors. The audits of financial reports are of value in that they provide a competent and independent (of auditee management) attestation of the validity of those management representations. This attestation lowers the ‘information risk’ for the users of these financial reports. There has been a marked increase in activity to regulate matters relating to independence. The proposals outlined in CLERP 9 are one example of this. The requirements in the United States under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are a further example.

Audit firms operate in a highly regulated yet highly competitive market. Evidence exists to suggest that audit firms are active competitors in respect of audit pricing and competency, including specialist industry expertise. Until recently, there has been little or no observable evidence that audit firms compete in respect of independence. The issues as they relate to audit independence are complex. One issue is that threats to independence are frequently subtle and difficult to observe and measure. Hence, controlling the decisions that relate to them cannot rely solely on regulation which itself inevitably relies on crude definitions and imprecise measures. Additionally, further regulation may not achieve the desired end without other processes being but in place in tandem.

This paper argues that:

1. auditors of certain classes of companies (in particular, those that are publicly traded) should be provided with incentives or requirements to have observable processes on independence
2. the means of observability should be in the form of an inspection and review process focussing on issues critical to the audit, such as independence
3. expert persons not having a current or past financial interest in the firm or in the commercial outcomes of the review should be used in the inspection and review process
4. the review process should have wide-ranging powers of inspection to examine the policies, processes, structures and ‘culture’ of audit firms
5. the report of the inspection and review should be made public, unedited and in full, and in a timely fashion. The primary objectives of this proposal are to (1) make more transparent to the market for information the characteristics of the audit firms and their process to ensure audit independence, and (2) provide a rigorous oversight of independence decision-making by persons who have no commercial interest in the outcome of the decision.

Ethics education in the Australian accounting curriculum: a longitudinal study examining barriers and enablers

Abstract: The increasing significance of ethics in the accounting profession is evidenced by the seminal events that witnessed the collapse of major corporations (eg. Enron and WorldCom); regulatory interventions (eg. Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA and the CLERP 9 Act in Australia); and calls for increased ethics interventions in the accounting curriculum. This project has two objectives: to investigate the nature of ethics education in the Australian accounting curriculum and how it has changed from 2000 to 2012; and to analyse the barriers to enhancing ethics education by soliciting the opinions of Heads of Department/Schools of Australian universities. Compared with early empirical evidence, universities responded to the call for ethics education with increased levels of ethics intervention, but had failed to enhance the extent of ethics education coverage in the intervening period in which the data were collected. He lack of qualified staff and research opportunities represent major obstacles to the enhancement of ethics education.

City-level auditor industry specialization, economies of scale, and audit pricing

We examine the effects of city-level auditor industry specialization and scale economies on audit pricing in the United States. Using a sample of Big N clients for the 2000-2007 period, and a scale measure based on percentile rankings of the number of audit clients at the city-industry level, we document significant specialization premiums and scale discounts in both the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) periods. However, the effects of industry specialization and scale economies on audit pricing are highly interactive. The negative effect of city-industry scale on audit fees obtains only for clients of specialist auditors. By contrast, clients of non-specialist auditors obtain scale discounts only when they enjoy strong bargaining power, suggesting that auditors are "forced" to pass on scale economies to clients with greater bargaining power.

Executive equity risk-taking incentives and audit pricing

Using a large sample of U.S. firms spanning the period 2000-2010, we document a strong positive association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio to stock return volatility (vega) and audit fees. We also show that the positive association between vega and audit fees is weaker in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period. In supplementary tests, we show that the relation between vega and audit fees is stronger for firms with older CEOs and in firms where the CEO is also chairman of the board. Collectively, our results suggest that audit firms incorporate executive risktaking incentives in the fees they charge for their services.

Auditor client specific knowledge and internal control weakness: some evidence on the role of auditor tenure and geographic distance

In this paper we draw on the audit quality and cluster theory literature to examine whether auditor tenure and auditor's geographic proximity to the client (proxies for auditor client specific knowledge) are associated with the incidence of Section 404 internal control weakness (ICW) under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). Using a large sample of 24,217 firm-year observations for the period 2004-2012, we show that firms with long auditor tenure and in closer geographic proximity to auditors have lower incidence of ICW. Furthermore, we find that the positive association between auditor-client geographic distance and ICW is weaker for firms with longer auditor tenure. Our results suggest that auditor rotation policies could deprive the auditor of client specific knowledge, especially for auditors located further away from their clients. Our results are robust to propensity score matching method and endogenous effects.

Remedies for unfair dismissal under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 - a fair go all round?

Background to unfair termination laws - remedies at common law - remedies for unfair termination under Federal Awards - overview of remedies under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 - compensation - reinstatement.

Impact of the new business tax system (alienation of personal services income) Act 2000

The implications of categorising income as "personal services income" and the actual meaning of this term have been marked with uncertainty. The Commissioner of Taxation has long asserted that "personal services income" inherently may not be derived by an entity other than the person whose exertions produce the income. In Liedig v FCT (1994) 28 ATR 141, however, Hill J held that in the absence of a specific legislative provision, there was no basis for the Commissioner's doctrine. The specific legislative measures Hill J required were put in place through the New Business Tax System (Alienation of Personal Services Income) Act 2000. In certain circumstances this Act prevents interposed entities from deriving personal services income. Such payments are attributed instead to the individual who performs the services.

It will also be seen, however, that these provisions do not apply to entities that are conducting a "personal services business". It is submitted that the combined effect of, inter alia, the Act's definition of "personal services income" and "personal services business" is to give the Act a narrower scope than the Commissioner's personal services doctrine. Moreover, it will be submitted that the statutory definition of personal services income also suffers from the same flaws that Hill J identified as relevant to the Commissioner's personal services doctrine.

Related party transactions under Pt 2E of the corporations act: time for reconsideration

The related party provisions under Pt 2E of the Corporations Act 2001 were introduced in 1992 to protect the resources of companies and shareholder interests by requiring that directors disclose financial benefits given to 'related parties' -- those capable of exercising significant influence over the giving of such benefits. The contention of the authors in this article is that Pt 2E has been unsuccessful in achieving its intended purpose, and should be repealed in its entirety. The authors argue that the various provisions of Pt 2E are so confusing and convoluted that they potentially violate the rule of law virtue that laws must be promulgated in a manner that is clear, so that it is apparent from reading the laws what one must do. Further, [*2] the manner in which Pt 2E is presently drafted, especially the definition of related party, fails to reflect the purpose behind the provisions, making the overall operation of Pt 2E ineffective. It is also argued that Pt 2E is superfluous since the fiduciary duty of directors to disclose a conflict of interest, and to a lesser extent the requirement for disclosure of material personal interests under s 191 of the Corporations Act, adequately deal with the transactions presently attracting the attention of Pt 2E. In light of all this, it is contended that the law would be demonstrably improved by repealing Pt 2E.

The desirability of criminal penalties for breaches of part IV of the trade practices act

Following the introduction of criminal sanction, including jail terms, for hard core cartelisation in the United Kingdom, the Dawson Review has recently recommended that criminal penalties be introduced in Australia for individuals and corporations found to have engaged in hard core cartels. A number of reasons have been advanced to justify the introduction of criminal sanctions for this type of conduct, the most common of which are that it would bring Australia in line with other competition regimes and that criminal sanctions are more likely to provide an effective deterrent. This article evaluates those reasons, and others, to determine whether there is any adequate justification for the proposed criminal regime.

Players, clubs, events and the Trade Practices Act : a primer for sporting clubs

The Trade Practices Act (TPA) has had an enormous impact on how corporations in Australia may conduct their business. In relation to sporting clubs, it limits the freedom of clubs to deal with players, each other and the public. While previously many clubs may have escaped the ambit of the TPA because they were not “corporations”, state equivalent Fair Trading legislation and the introduction of the national competition policy in 1995 have effectively expanded the scope of consumer and competition regulation to include individuals and associations. Consequently, an understanding of the nature and scope of trade practices regulation is now important for any sporting organisation—regardless of size or structure. This paper identifies the legislative provisions most likely to impact upon sporting clubs and examines some possible circumstances in which clubs might find themselves exposed to liability.

University marketing and the law: applying the trade practices Act to universities` marketing and promotional activities

Application of the Trade Practices Act and its State equivalents to the  marketing by universities of the courses they teach - ramifications of the Act  are not understood within the wider university community, importantly by   those responsible for marketing courses - the Act prescribes many forms of  conduct not instantly recognised as morally reprehensible and are not  automatically avoided on the ground that they are inconsistent with  acceptable behaviour - the Act creates significant proscriptions, applicable to universities and their staff, which can have serious consequences.

Corporate social responsibility: why business should act responsibly and be accountable

This paper identifies drivers which are pressurising organisations to adopt corporate social responsibility and produce corporate social reports. The authors discuss what constitutes a good report, some of the problems with current reporting practices, benefits to organisations which produce corporate social reports and the costs to those which do not.